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ABSTRACT
The opportunity now exists to use Russian space hardware to help
make the goals of the U.S. Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) achievable. The
Russian space program has already developed many of the space assets
needed for the SEI, and is willing to make them available at a price that is far
less than what it would cost the U.S. to develop an equivalent capability.
There are a number of problems, however, with the use of Russian space
hardware in the SEI, including the possible harm that such use might cause to
U.S. industry, the risk of relying on the unstable Russian space program, and
national security concerns.
This paper attempts to determine whether the benefits of using
Russian space hardware in the SEI would outweigh the costs. First, the SEI
and the Russian space program are examined. The knowledge thus gained is
then used to help determine the issues involved in the use of Russian space
hardware in the SEI and the feasibility of various methods of carrying out
such use. Next, the basic hardware requirements of the SEI are determined,
and various items of Russian space hardware are examined against technical,
economic, and policy-related criteria to see if they are superior to any
alternative in meeting the requirements.
Finally, two schemes for the use of Russian hardware in the SEI are
proposed: a low risk scenario with limited U.S./Russian interaction, and a
higher risk approach that could result in greater benefits.
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I. Introduction
For thirty years, the United States and the Soviet Union battled for
dominance in space. With global prestige at stake, the two superpowers
initially poured money and resources into their space programs in an effort to
beat each other to a series of goals: first satellite, first man in space, first man
on the Moon. After the United States won the race to the Moon, the
competition continued, but the directions of the Soviet and American space
efforts diverged, due to differing goals, philosophies, and technical strengths.
By the late 1980s, the two nations had developed extensive space programs
with markedly different technical capabilities.
The revolutionary changes that swept the USSR and its offspring
republics over the last few years have created an opportunity for the United
States to use Russia's unique space capabilities to aid in achieving its own
space goals.1 Such a course of action would have been extremely difficult to
realize as recently as the 1980s, but many of the barriers that then stood in the
way have since been removed. National security concerns about working
with Russia eased with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the
USSR. Secrecy about most Russian space hardware has evolved into a fairly
high degree of disclosure. Perhaps most importantly, diffident early attempts
to market a few space services have grown into near-desperate efforts by both
government leaders and space program managers to sell almost any item of
Soviet space hardware.
1Russia has authority over the overwhelming majority of the former Soviet Union's space assets.
One U.S. space effort in particular, the Space Exploration Initiative
(SEI), has a great deal to gain by using Russian space hardware. The SEI is
intended to be a long-duration sustained program of human exploration of
the solar system, with the initial objectives of returning astronauts to the
Moon and exploring Mars, but it is currently in serious jeopardy of being
eliminated due to a combination of its high cost and a lack of congressional
support for its goals. The use of Russian space hardware in the SEI could do
much to alleviate both of these problems. First, the Soviet space program has
already developed many of the space assets that the SEI requires to meet its
goals, and is willing to make them available at a price that is far less than
what it would cost the U.S. to develop an equivalent capability. Second,
Russian participation in the SEI could give the initiative the impetus it needs
to gain support from Congress and the public.
There are a number of problems, however, with the use of Russian
space hardware in the SEI. One is that the situation within the former Soviet
Union is still far from stable; it is not clear whether particular items of
Russian hardware will continue to be manufactured, or deals made with
Russian organizations will continue to be honored, over the long time frame
of the SEI. Another problem is that the use of Russian space hardware in the
SEI might harm the U.S. aerospace industry, not only by taking work away
from U.S. firms, but also by strengthening potential Russian competition. A
third set of problems have to do with national security issues; U.S. purchase
of Russian space hardware might help maintain the Soviet military-
industrial complex, and close cooperative endeavors might allow the
Russians to acquire advanced U.S. technology.
It is clear, then, that there are both advantages and disadvantages to the
use of Russian space hardware in the SEI. This paper attempts to determine,
on a case-by-case basis, whether the benefits of using Russian space hardware
in the SEI would outweigh the costs. The basic approach taken was to first
determine the economic, policy, and technical issues involved in such an
endeavor and then to measure the Russian hardware against the SEI's
requirements, using the economic, policy, and technical issues as criteria.
Determining the technical feasibility of using an item of Russian space
hardware in the SEI is relatively straightforward. Probable hardware
requirements for SEI missions can be derived from the various strategies that
have been proposed for carrying out the SEI; the performance characteristics
(including the reliability) of the particular hardware can then be examined to
determine whether it meets the SEI's requirements. Many items of hardware
will require some modifications in order to meet the SEI's requirements; the
feasibility and cost of performing any necessary modifications must be taken
into account in the overall determination of the hardware's suitability for use
in the SEI.
The economic and policy criteria used to determine if a given item of
Russian space hardware should be used in the SEI do not, at first glance, seem
to be significantly more complex than the technical criteria. The basic
economic criterion is the overall cost of using the Russian space hardware,
including any purchase price, the costs of integrating the hardware into the
rest of the SEI, and the effects of the purchase on the U.S. aerospace industry.
The fundamental policy criterion is the political feasibility of the use of
Russian hardware, both within the U.S. and Russia, and in the international
policy environment. Both the economic and policy implications of the use of
Russian space hardware depend strongly on the methods by which the
hardware would be acquired for use in the SEI. For example, the cost and
political implications of using a Russian launch vehicle will be different if the
vehicle is directly purchased by the U.S. than if the vehicle is launched by the
Russians within the framework of a large-scale international cooperative
program.
A number of factors, however, add complexity to both the economic
and policy criteria. First, it is often difficult to assess even the present-day
costs or political implications of a large-scale endeavor such as the
incorporation of Russian hardware into the SEI. The costs of developing new
hardware, for example, are notoriously difficult to determine; NASA has had
difficulty in estimating the costs of its major programs to within even a factor
of two. Second, neither the economic costs nor the political implications of
the use of Russian space hardware are likely to remain constant over time.
The Russian reaction to the U.S. purchase of a space station, for example, may
be different in 1998 than it is in 1992--Russia may not exist as a separate
republic in 1998!
Despite these difficulties, it is still possible to get a fairly good answer to
the question of whether Russian space hardware should be used in the SEI.
First, estimates of cost and political feasibility may not be entirely accurate, but
a high level of accuracy is not necessary to determine which hardware items
are clearly worth using and which ones obviously are not. Second, while it
may not be possible to accurately predict the future of the SEI or the Russian
space program, careful study of these institutions' pasts, and of the forces
working to change them (rather than on the details of their present
configuration), can at least lead to an idea of the range of future directions
they might take, and to an understanding of ways in which their future might
be shaped.
This paper first examines the SEI (Chapter II) and the current Russian
space program (Chapter III) from an institutional perspective, focusing on the
forces that are driving the evolution of the two programs. In Chapter IV, the
context of international interactions in the SEI is examined and, drawing
from the previous two chapters, a set of guidelines for handling the use of
Russian hardware in the SEI is established. In Chapters V and VI, published
SEI strategies and the basic principles of space travel are used to derive the
hardware requirements for the SEI. In Chapter VII, various items of Russian
space hardware are evaluated, using technical, economic, and policy criteria,
to determine whether they should be used to meet these requirements.
Finally, in Chapter VIII, recommendations for the use of Russian space
hardware in the SEI are proposed.
II. The Space Exploration Initiative
The Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) is a NASA-led multi-agency
effort to carry out a sustained program of extending human presence and
activity beyond Earth orbit and into the Solar System. To fully understand
the implications of the possible use of Russian space hardware within the SEI,
it is necessary to first understand the initiative's history and its political and
institutional standing.
History of the Space Exploration Initiative
The Creation of the SEI: 1984-1989
In the 1989 speech that was the go-ahead signal for the Space
Exploration Initiative 2, George Bush said "...there's very little question that,
in the 21st century, humans will again leave their home planet for voyages of
discovery and exploration. What was once improbable is now inevitable."
What was less inevitable and much more improbable was that the the already
overcommitted U.S. space program was, with the support of the
Administration, preparing to launch into an ambitious open-ended program
of human exploration of the Solar System. This improbable occurrence can
be traced to the conjunction of such disparate elements as a twenty year old
vision for the future of the space program, a perceived need for long-term
national goals in space, the re-evaluation of the space program after the
Challenger accident, attempts to rally support for the space station program,
and a reorganization of the nation's space policy making process.
2George Bush, "Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing", July 20, 1989.
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Figure II-1 diagrams the major motives and actions that eventually
resulted in the creation of the SEI. The figure is chronological, covering
(from top to bottom) the period from 1984 to 1989.
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Figure II-1: Creation of the SEI 1984 - 1989
11
Although the SEI as it currently exists only began to pick up momentum in
the early 1980s, previous efforts to mount such an endeavor had taken place
as far back as the Nixon Administration. In 1969, Nixon's Space Task Group
recommended that the United States adopt a long-range goal of manned
planetary exploration, with the first target a manned Mars mission before the
end of the century.3 President Nixon endorsed this goal in 1970, but public
and political reaction was decidedly negative and support from the White
House soon disintegrated. 4 Lukewarm support for the space program
through the 1970s led NASA to concentrate its resources on the space shuttle,
and put Moon and Mars exploration plans on hold. President Carter's Space
Policy specifically stated that "It is neither feasible nor necessary at this time to
commit the United States to a high-challenge space engineering initiative
comparable to Apollo."s5
Hopes for further human space exploration efforts remained dim in
the early 1980s. No support for such activity was evident from the Reagan
Administration, and advocacy within NASA was also muted, as exploration
did not fall under the clear jurisdiction of any Associate Administrator.
President Reagan's 1984 endorsement of the space station appeared to further
lower the chances for any near-term human exploration effort, as it seemed
clear that the proposed space station would absorb much of NASA's resources
3Michael A. G. Michaud, "Let's go to Mars - With Out Friends and Allies", The Case for Mars
III: Strategies for Exploration - General Interest and Overview, San Diego: Univelt Inc., 1989,
p.109.
4Leonard David, "Political Acceptability of Mars Exploration: Post-1981 Observations, The
Case for Mars II, San Diego: Univelt Inc., 1985.
5
"U.S. Civil Space Policy", White House Fact Sheet, Office of the White House Secretary,
October 11, 1978.
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and energy for at least a decade, and it was hard to imagine Congress and the
Administration initiating an additional large space project during that time.6
Groups both within and outside NASA, however, were studying and
promoting a return to the Moon and expeditions to Mars. Notable among
these groups were the "Mars Underground" and the Lunar Base Working
Group, which held conferences discussing the technical, political, and
economic aspects of further exploration of the Moon and Mars. 7,8,9, 10 A
concurrent endeavor, which received a great deal of publicity, was an effort by
opponents of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative to promote a joint U.S.-
Soviet mission to Mars. Advocates of this mission, who saw it as an
alternative to military competition between the U.S. and the USSR in space,
included Senator Spark Matsunaga and the leadership of the Planetary
Society, a prominent space science-oriented group.11
At the same time the visibility of human space exploration was rising,
the consensus was growing that the nation's space program would be
improved if long-term goals were adopted and used to determine what kind
of hardware should be built.12 This call to define the nation's long-term goals
in space was issued in the middle of a heated battle over the development of
the space station while, in the background, various groups were promoting
6John Logsdon, "Dreams and Realities: The Future in Space", Lunar Bases and Space Activities
of the 21st Century, Houston: Lunar and Planetary Institute, 1985, p.707 .
7W.W. Mendell, ed., Lunar Bases and Space Activities of the 21st Century, Houston: Lunar and
Planetary Institute, 1985.
8Penelope J. Boston, ed., The Case for Mars, San Diego: Univelt Inc., 1984.
9Christopher P. McKay, ed., The Case for Mars II, San Diego: Univelt Inc., 1985.
10Carol Stoker, ed., The Case for Mars III: Strategies for Exploration - General Interest and
Overview, San Diego: Univelt Inc., 1989.
11Michael A. G. Michaud, "Let's go to Mars - With Out Friends and Allies", The Case for Mars
III: Strategies for Exploration - General Interest and Overview, San Diego: Univelt Inc., 1989,
p. 111.
120ffice of Technology Assessment, Civilian Space Stations Assessment. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1984, p.126 .
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human space exploration. The end result was that space station advocates
began to claim that the space station was just the first step towards reaching a
long-term goal of human space exploration. This connection was
emphasized by the Reagan White House Science Advisor, George Keyworth,
who said in June 1984 "...the President announced the space station initiative
- not as an end in and of itself, but as a first step toward many new exciting
long-term goals in space. A manned space station will be, first and foremost,
a doorway to exploring and developing the solar system."13
At this point, official talk of future exploration endeavors was quite
clearly nothing but rhetoric, but the concept had now been aired in public and
endorsed by both NASA and the Reagan Administration. In the mid- to late-
1980s, a sequence of events further raised the profile of human space
exploration and began to pressure NASA into making the exploration effort
more than just a nebulous justification for the construction of the space
station. The first of these events was the study and report of the National
Commission on Space (NCOS).
Congress, still trying to define long-term goals for the space program,
created the NCOS and charged it with formulating a "bold agenda to carry
America's civil space enterprise into the 21st century." The NCOS was
composed of fifteen members both from outside and within the space field
and was chaired by Thomas O. Paine, a former NASA Administrator. Its
report, Pioneering the Space Frontier, 14 which was published in 1986,
proposed a national mission for 21st-century America of "lead[ing] the
exploration and development of the space frontier, advancing science,
13Leonard David, "Political Acceptability of Mars Exploration: Post-1981 Observations", The
Case for Mars II, San Diego: Univelt Inc., 1985, p.43.
14National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier, Bantam Books, 1986.
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technology and enterprise, and building institutions and systems that make
accessible vast new resources and support human settlements beyond Earth
orbit, from the highlands of the Moon to the plains of Mars." As Paine was
the same man who had recommended exploration of the Moon and Mars to
the Nixon Administration, it was perhaps no surprise that the NCOS
recommended the robotic and human exploration of the Moon and Mars.
The Challenger accident in early 1986 overshadowed the publication of
the NCOS report, but it also encouraged further review of the space program
and led to the real possibility of major changes in the space agency. The string
of setbacks that plagued NASA over the next few years, including the lengthy
shuttle stand-down, rising cost estimates for the space station, and the
problems of the Hubble Space Telescope, kept reviews of the agency coming
and also maintained the pressure on NASA to heed the recommendations
made in the reviews.
One important review began in 1987, when the NASA Administrator
formed a task group "in response to growing concern over the posture and
long-term direction of the U.S. civilian space program" to "define potential
U.S. space initiatives, and to evaluate them in light of the current space
program and the nation's desire to regain and retain space leadership."15 The
NASA task group attempted to find a set of goals that would be consistent
with both the national interest and NASA's capabilities. The group's report
(known as the "Ride report" after its main author, astronaut Sally Ride)
recommended four possible initiatives for further study and evaluation.
These were 1) Mission to Planet Earth, 2) Exploration of the Solar System, 3)
Outpost on the Moon, and 4) Humans to Mars. One sign of NASA's post-
15Sally K. Ride, Leadership and America's Future in Space, Report to the NASA
Administrator, August 1987, p.7.
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Challenger willingness to respond to recommendations came when, as
recommended in an early draft of the Ride report, the NASA Administrator
established the Office of Exploration to fund, direct, and coordinate studies
related to human exploration "in response to an urgent national need for a
long-term goal to energize the U.S. civilian space program and stimulate the
development of new technology."' 6
Events high in the executive branch then began to propel human space
exploration towards a prominent place in the space program. The first of
these was a Senior Interagency Group on Space 17 review of national space
policy. This review, which was prompted by the Challenger accident, growing
foreign space capabilities, and the perception of a "space leadership crisis,"18
drew from the NCOS and Ride reports, and resulted in a new national space
policy, which was approved by President Reagan on January 5, 1988. Official
support for human space exploration, at least as an eventual goal, was
manifested in the policy's list of six overall goals of U.S. space activities, of
which the only new one was: "as a long-range goal, expand human presence
and activity beyond earth orbit into the solar system." As a part of the long-
range goal to expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit, NASA
was directed to pursue the "Pathfinder" program, a systematic development
of technologies to enable and support a range of future human space
exploration missions. 19
160ffice of Exploration, NASA, Beyond Earth's Boundaries, 1988 Annual Report to the
Administrator, 1988, p.7.
17SIG-Space included representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce,
NASA, the OMB, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA, and was chaired by a member of the
National Security Council
18Roger DeKok, "National Space Policy" Presentation to the NAS/NAE Committee on Space
Policy, June 16, 1988.
19Patricia E. Humphlett, Civilian Space Policy Under the Reagan Administration: Potential
Impact of the January 1988 Directive, Congressional Research Service, March 21, 1988.
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The election of George Bush gave further momentum to the push for
an exploration initiative. While still vice-president, Bush had voiced support
for human space exploration, saying "We should make a long-term
commitment to manned and unmanned exploration of the solar system.
There is much to be done --further exploration of the Moon, a mission to
Mars, probes of the outer planets. These are worthwhile objectives, and they
should not be neglected."20 Very early in his Administration, Bush created a
National Space Council (NSC) to coordinate national space policy, a move
that was instrumental in furthering the cause of a human space exploration
initiative. 21
The National Space Council replaced the space policy mechanism used
during the Reagan Administration, in which SIG-Space recommended space
policy and transmitted its recommendations to the president through the
National Security Council. The National Space Council is a much higher
profile body than SIG-Space used to be; it is chaired by the Vice President and
its members include the NASA Administrator, the Secretaries of State,
Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and Transportation, the Directors of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of Management and Budget, the
President's Chief of Staff, and the Assistants for National Security Affairs and
for Science and Technology. The formation of the National Space Council
increased the prominence of space in the Administration and of civilian
space efforts within the overall national space program. Importantly, it also
presented the Vice President with an opportunity to show leadership.
20George Bush, "Space", Speech at Huntsville AL, October 20, 1987.
21George Bush, "Message to the Congress Transmitting a Report on the Establishment of the
National Space Council", February 1, 1989.
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In the spring of 1989, the Vice President took that opportunity and met
with NASA officials to discuss future plans for the space program.22
Considering the prominence that human space exploration had achieved by
this time, it is not surprising that it was chosen to be the Administration's
new space initiative. The decision was announced by President Bush on the
20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon landing. In his speech, he called for
"a national commitment to a sustained program of manned exploration of
the solar system and the permanent settlement of space". His proposal in the
speech was for "a long-range continuing commitment," beginning in the
1990s with the space station, followed by a return to the Moon, "this time to
stay", and finally a manned mission to Mars, "with each mission laying
groundwork for the next." The President then called upon the Space Council
to come up with "concrete recommendations to chart a new and continuing
course to the Moon and Mars and beyond."23
Defining the SEI: 1989-1992
The period between the president's call for a program of human space
exploration and the present has been marked by two major conflicts over the
future of the SEI. These battles began shortly after the President's
announcement and have only recently begun to cool down. One of the
battles was fought between the Bush Administration and NASA over the
relative importance of the SEI and the space station program. The other, over
the size of the SEI and the speed with which it should start, was fought
22Franklin Martin, "Human Exploration Initiatives: Mission Concepts", in Leaving the Cradle:
Human Exploration of Space in the 21st Century, 28th Goddard Memorial Symposium, San
Diego: Univelt Inc., 1991.
23George Bush, "Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing", July 20,
1989.
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between the Administration and Congress. Complicating the situation, these
two battles occasionally spilled over into each other and the institutions
involved did not always act monolithically. Figure II-2 diagrams the major
motives and actions that influenced the development of the SEI over the
period from 1989 to 1992.
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Figure II-2: Defining the SEI 1989 - 1992
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The battle between the Bush Administration and NASA over the
relative importance of the SEI and the space station only really began after the
SEI was endorsed by Bush. Before this event, NASA had been mildly
supportive of efforts to promote human space exploration, as such endeavors
had helped provide a justification for the space station project. When told to,
the Agency had initiated the Exploration Office and "Project Pathfinder", but
it had not invested a lot of energy in either of them. As human exploration
did not have any strong advocates in the Reagan Administration, NASA did
not get into trouble for this policy of lukewarm support for human
exploration of the solar system.
The situation changed after Bush's 1989 endorsement of human space
exploration as a major national goal. Suddenly, the SEI had been elevated to
a serious potential competition to the space station. This status galvanized
opposition to the SEI within NASA, as the space station was the agency's
largest development project.24 The SEI represented a particularly dangerous
threat to the space station because it seemed likely that if the Administration
was forced to choose to keep one major space initiative, it would choose "its
own" program rather than the space station, which was a legacy of the Reagan
Administration.
While the SEI did have supporters within NASA, the Office of
Exploration (which did not have its own Associate Administrator) was no
match for the powerful Office of Space Station. The result was that NASA
was inclined to try to shape the SEI so that it would support the space station,
or at least not compete with it. Because of the SEI's high profile, however,
24It seems possible that years of defending the space station from Congress had ingrained
NASA management with the habit of defending the station against any possible threat; this
might be a contributing cause to the Agency's reaction.
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NASA's actions along these lines could not go unnoticed. This resulted in
considerable conflict with the Bush Administration, which was interested in
seeing the SEI succeed, even if its success might cause trouble for the space
station program.
The other big battle over the SEI during this time period was the
conflict between the Bush Administration and Congress over the initiative's
size and the speed with which it should start. Though Congress had
supported the search for long-term space goals, few members were willing to
pay for a major new space development program while the space station was
still being built. The Congressional Budget Office had estimated that the
plans put forth by the National Commission on Space and the Ride Report
would require an annual NASA budget in excess of $20 billion/yr by the mid-
1990's and over $30 billion/yr by 2000,25 and most in Congress were unwilling
to increase NASA's budget to those levels.
A number of other factors added to Congress' resistance to funding the
SEI. First, many in Congress had developed a distrust of the space agency's
cost estimates during the lengthy battles over the space shuttle and space
station programs. In a similar vein, many were wary of NASA's propensity
for using a "funding wedge" (in which funding requirements for apparently
small programs are increased each year) to get major projects started. Third,
supporters of the space station program in Congress shared NASA's
apprehension about the possibility that the SEI might supplant the space
station. Finally, some in Congress supported a third major project, the
environment-monitoring Earth Observing System, over both the space
25Congressional Budget Office, The NASA Program in the 1990s and Beyond, May 1988, p.51.
21
station and the SEI. The combination of all these factors provided formidable
obstacles to the Bush Administration's attempts to get the SEI started.
The event that marked the real beginning of both of these battles was
the publishing of NASA's "90-Day Study" on the SEI. 26 (NASA had carried
out this study to support the Space Council in its task of coming up with
"concrete recommendations for the SEI.") The report was notable for its
emphasis on the space station (mentioned 18 times in the executive
summary, for example) and its estimate (deleted before publication) that the
cost of the 30-year initiative would exceed $400 billion.27 Cynical observers
said the 90-Day report was recycled from post-Apollo plans made twenty years
ago, with the phrase "Space Station Freedom" inserted wherever possible. 2 8
Adding fuel to the fire, a group of scientists at the Department of Energy's
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory asserted that the NASA "three decades and
$400 billion" lunar and Mars program was untenable, 29 and proposed their
own ambitious plan ("The Great Exploration") to put humans on Mars
within 10 years for less than $10 billion.
Shock at the vast price tag on NASA's plan and at the low cost of the
Livermore proposal led the National Space Council to call for a nationwide
search for new ideas and innovative technologies to "ensure all reasonable
space exploration alternatives have been evaluated."30 NASA proposed
awarding six to ten $1 million study contracts to industry to perform this
26NASA, Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, November
1989.
27James R. Asker, "NASA Offers Five Alternatives For Landing Humans on Mars by 2018",
Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 27, 1989.
28James Vedda, "Relearn Moon Before Trying Mars", Space News, September 17-23, 1990.
29Andrew Lawler, "Livermore Group Proposes Cheap Mission to Mars", Space News, November
13, 1989.
30NASA, "NASA's Space Exploration Package", Thomas O. Paine, ed., Leaving the Cradle:
Human Exploration of Space in the 21st Century, 28th Goddard Memorial Symposium, San
Diego: Univelt Inc., 1991, p.87.
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nationwide search,31 but Congress instead mandated the creation of a three-
part outreach program to gather ideas on the SEI from a wide variety of
sources. The first part of this program was a campaign to gather ideas from
industry, universities, federal laboratories, and the general public. The
second was an effort to gather ideas from the technology-related agencies, and
the third was a technology assessment led by the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics. These ideas were then to be reviewed by a
group of outside advisors known as the "Synthesis Group," who would
recommend program architectures and pertinent technical opportunities to
NASA.
While the outreach program was underway, President Bush continued
to push the SEI forward. First, he announced a new policy that further
defined the SEI in March, 1990.32 The new policy placed emphasis on broad
early technology development and the definition of possible schemes for
human space exploration. It also named NASA as the principal
implementing agency for the SEI, and gave the Departments of Energy and
Defense major roles in technology development and concept definition. The
National Space Council was tasked with developing an implementation
strategy for the initiative. Later that spring, the President gave the initiative
another push, saying that "before Apollo celebrates the 50th anniversary of its
landing on the Moon [2019] the American flag should be planted on Mars."3 3
Congressional support for the exploration initiative, however
remained low --Senator Gore proclaimed that the Administration needed a
31Douglas Isbell, "Congress says OK to Moon, Mars Work", Space News, May 28 -June 3, 1990.
32The White House, "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the President's Space
Exploration Initiative", March 8, 1990.
33George Bush, "Remarks at the Texas A&I University Commencement Ceremony in Kingsville,
Texas", May 18, 1990.
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"mission to reality"34 if it thought the SEI was going to be funded. Congress
showed its lack of support for the exploration initiative as defined by
President Bush by deleting almost all of the President's exploration funding
request for 1991, over the Administration's strong protests. NASA, more
concerned with getting funding for the space station, reportedly did not lobby
very hard to keep the funding.35, 36
This defeat for the SEI, and the publishing of the report of the Advisory
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program 37 in December of 1990 led
to a reassessment of the funding strategy for the initiative, and a
strengthening of the SEI's position within NASA. This Advisory Committee
had been chartered by NASA and the Vice President as a response to concerns
about the state of NASA's programs and institutions, and was charged with
advising the NASA Administrator on overall approaches that NASA
management could use to implement the civil space program.
One of the report's important recommendations was that the SEI
should adopt a "go-as-you-pay" funding approach, meaning that the initiative
"should be programmed to proceed at a schedule consistent with
available funding and the establishment of a solid technology
underpinning. When there are problems in the program, as
there will always be, the schedule should be slipped rather than
taking money from other programs such as the research
program. '"38
34Douglas Isbell and Andrew Lawler, "Senators Assail Bush Plan", Space News, May 7-13,
1990.
35Andrew Lawler, "Bush Moon-Mars Plan Handed First Defeat", Space News, June 18-24, 1990.
36Andrew Lawler, "Moon, Mars Fight Escalates", Space News, June 25-July 1, 1990.
37Advisory Committee on-the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990.
38Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991, p.
17.
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The Administration, stung by its failure to get funding from Congress for an
aggressive Moon-Mars program, adopted the go-as-you-pay approach for the
SEI in 1991, and played down the exploration role for its advanced technology
programs.39 This was a significant turnaround from the "Mars by 2019" goal,
but it succeeded in getting Congress to increase funding for exploration-
related work for 1992.
The report of the Advisory Committee also had a major effect on the
ongoing struggle over SEI between the Bush Administration and NASA.
First, the report said that the space station was not needed as a transportation
node for exploration. The Committee instead saw the main role for the space
station as being a platform for "life sciences experimentation and the
development and verification of long duration space operating systems."40
The long-awaited output of the Outreach Program, the report of the Synthesis
Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, seconded this observation,
but went even further, questioning the ability of NASA's space station to
even provide life science data.41
Another of the Advisory Committee's recommendations was that
NASA establish the position of Associate Administrator for Exploration; this
Associate Administrator would have the responsibility of planning,
overseeing, and integrating technology bases and program elements related to
both manned and unmanned exploration missions.42 This recommendation
39Andrew Lawler, "Bush Shifts Strategy on Moon, Mars Proposals", Space News, April 15-21,
1991.
40Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, U.S. Government Printing Office, December
1990, p. 29.
41The Synthesis Group was composed of 27 space experts, many with experience in the Apollo
program, and was chaired by former astronaut General Thomas Stafford, p.102.
42Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990,
p.28.
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was also seconded in the Synthesis Group report, which, in addition,
recommended that NASA establish a long-range strategic plan with the SEI as
its centerpiece. 43
To the NASA leadership, the cumulative effect of these
recommendations was to greatly increase the SEI's potential threat to the
space station. First, the SEI was no longer a plausible justification for building
the space station; it could even conceivably result in the station being
redesigned or cancelled. Second, the appointment of an Associate
Administrator would strengthen the SEI relative to the space station. Finally,
if NASA were to establish a long-range strategic plan with the SEI as its
centerpiece, the balance would be tipped even further towards the SEI.
NASA, after a lengthy delay, eventually appointed an Associate
Administrator for Exploration in August 1991. 44 Despite a general lack of
support from the top of the Agency, the new Associate Administrator moved
quickly, proposing simple early robotic missions to the Moon, and
experiments with innovative procurement methods. 45 The exploration
funding request for 1992, however, was still reduced, as the NASA leadership
accepted an overall funding cut for the agency in exchange for saving the
space station.
In early 1992, the Bush Administration made a series of moves that
effectively ended the battle with NASA over the SEI. The first came in
February, when Bush demanded the resignation of NASA Administrator
Richard Truly. Truly's continued support of the space station at the expense
43Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991.
44Andrew Lawler, "NASA Names Chief for Exploration", Space News, August 26-September 8,
1991.
45Andrew Lawler and Debra Polsky, "Griffin: Start Small on Exploration Project", Space News.
November 18-24, 1991.
26
of the SEI and the rest of the space program is thought to have been one of the
major causes behind his ouster. As an administration official put it, Truly
"was not a team player with the programs the White House was pushing."46
The second move was the release of a new national space policy directive
dealing with SEI strategy.47 This policy formalized the SEI's status as a multi-
agency organization led by the Associate Administrator for Exploration, and
codified most of the Synthesis Group's organizational recommendations.
Bush's final move that spring was the appointment in April of Daniel
Goldin, an "outsider" with no strong connections to existing NASA
programs, as the new NASA Administrator.4 8
The Future of the SEI
The SEI has come a long way since the mid-1980's. It is now established
in NASA, with an Associate Administrator to give it bureaucratic standing
and prestige. Major reviews of the space program have been positive about
the value of a major exploration initiative, and the President and Vice
President have voiced strong support for the SEI. Despite this, the SEI
remains in a precarious situation and will have to struggle for funding, and
perhaps for its very existence, for the foreseeable future. The future of the SEI
will depend primarily on its support from the President and Congress,
though the public, NASA, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department
of Energy (DoE), and the aerospace industry may also play a role. The ways in
46Andrew Lawler, "Truly Ouster Was Two Months in the Making", Space News, February 17-
23, 1992.
47George Bush, Space Exploration Initiative Strategy, National Space Policy Directive 6,
March 9, 1992.
48Andrew Lawler, "TRW's Goldin is Surprise Pick to Head NASA", Space News, March 16-22,
1992.
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which each of these groups can influence the future of the SEI are outlined
below.
The Presidency
The fate of the SEI is highly dependent on support from the President.
Without the continued support of the Bush Administration, the SEI would
probably cease to exist. There is no sign that the Bush Administration is
slackening in its support of the SEI, though; if re-elected, Bush and Quayle
seem very likely to continue trying to expand the SEI. If Bush is defeated in
the 1992 election, though, the SEI would almost certainly be eliminated as
Senator Gore, a long-time foe of the SEI, would become the head of the NSC.
Even if Bush is re-elected and supports the SEI for the next four years,
the initiative will still probably be far from secure. The SEI is inherently a
long-term plan; in the SEI architectures proposed by the Synthesis Group, no
missions are launched until 1998. It seems unlikely that four more years of
support will make the SEI strong enough to survive opposition from a
President; Executive Office support will probably be required through 2000 for
the initiative to survive. (Of course, considering the long time frame of the
SEI, the program might be able to rise again after a four-year cancellation.)
Congress
Though the President may determine if the SEI will survive or be
cancelled, Congress will largely determine if it will ever grow to be more than
a small research program. The significant budget increases required to begin
major work on the SEI seem very unlikely to be approved in the current
constrained budget climate. Barring some major event it seems unlikely that
significant funding for the SEI will become available before the turn of the
28
century, when space station costs should begin to decline. One major event
that could result in early significant funding for the SEI would be cancellation
of the space station program. Others might be the the rise of a strong lobby for
the SEI, or even the development of a convincing rationale for pursuing the
initiative.
Though it is unwilling to make a major commitment to the SEI,
Congress may be more willing to fund small SEI-related programs than it has
been in the past. There are a number of reasons why this may be so. First,
Congress may be more willing to trust NASA's cost estimates and future
plans now that "outsiders" are running both the Agency and the SEI. Second,
the SEI has followed most of the recommendations made about it by the
various advisory groups --it seems unlikely that it will become a money sink
like the shuttle and space station programs. Third, NASA is more likely now
to lobby hard to support SEI funding.
The Public
One reason that Congress has not been very supportive of the SEI may
be that there is little public support for missions to the Moon and Mars. A
February 1992 survey49 found 49% of Americans supporting a permanent
lunar settlement and 60% supporting a human mission to Mars.
Enthusiasm was higher for new launch systems (67%), the space station
(68%), the national aerospace plane (70%), joint space missions with other
countries (77%), and satellites to monitor the environment (91%). In general,
public enthusiasm for space projects drops rapidly when they are asked to
choose between space projects and other programs (i.e. building a space
49Andrew Lawler, "Poll Shows Americans Like Earth Observation", Space News, March 23-29,
1992.
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station vs. building affordable housing), so real support may be lower than
these figures would indicate.5 0
This low public support for the SEI could result in the termination of
the program; in any case it seems likely to weigh against its expansion. Public
support for the SEI is unlikely to change drastically unless a better rationale
for pursuing the initiative is developed. Some rationales that might
influence public opinion could be the development of space resources
(perhaps touted as a benefit to Earth's environment), or the use of the SEI as a
symbol of international cooperation.
NASA
Support within NASA can, as we have seen, have an effect on a
program such as the SEI. The battle between the station supporters and SEI
supporters, however, has already swung towards the SEI; this support seems
likely to increase as time goes on. NASA still has a lot riding on the space
station project, but it in the next few years the project will probably either be
built or killed. Either result will leave the SEI (assuming the President and
Congress haven't previously cut it) as the big project that will keep the
agency's engineers busy for the foreseeable future. An additional strong
source of support for the SEI within NASA is that many people in the agency
personally believe that human expansion into the solar system is a
worthwhile goal.
There is still some opposition to the SEI within the space community,
though. Space scientists are wary of the new initiative because it "relates to
50Eddie Mahe, "The American Public and Space Exploration", Leaving the Cradle: Human
Exploration of Space in the 21st Century, 28th Goddard Memorial Symposium, San Diego:
Univelt Inc., 1991.
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space science and could be seen as competing with science missions for a slice
of the constrained budget pie."51 (Planetary scientists, especially those
interested in the Moon and Mars, however, generally support the SEI,
including its human exploration aspect.)52 Proponents of smaller projects
within the space program may be worried as they have seen how major
initiatives in the past have run over budget and made up the overruns by
cutting into the budget of smaller projects. Overall, though, NASA is likely
put its clout behind the SEI more and more as time goes on.
The Department of Defense
The Department of Defense could potentially play a large role in the
future of the SEI, but its interest in the initiative has not been strong so far.
While the DoD has placed a deputy within the Office of Exploration and the
Defense Space Council cautiously endorsed the SEI in 1990,53 the DoD did not
request any funding for exploration in 1993. The main reason for this is that
the DoD is currently trying to direct its diminishing funding towards projects
that it believes are essential for national security. As there are currently no
pressing defense needs for the major hardware items needed by the SEI, there
is little departmental support for pursuing them.
If a military need were to develop for some of the hardware needed by
the SEI, the DoD could potentially fund its development and then share the
results with the SEI. It is more likely, though, that rather than developing
technology, the DoD may eventually take responsibility for certain tasks
51Susan E. Walker, "Scientists Wary of Exploration Plan", Space News, November 18-24, 1991.
52Douglas Isbell, "Science Battles Finance in Exploration Debate", Space News, April 15-21,
1991.
53Andrew Lawler, "Defense Panel Backs Plan To Explore Moon and Mars", Space News. April
2-8, 1990.
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within the SEI for which it has the appropriate expertise. For example, the
Defense Mapping Agency might take the responsibility for the mapping of the
Moon and Mars. In a similar vein, the Army Corps of Engineers might work
on the planning, logistics, and base maintenance for lunar and Mars bases.
Other possible roles for the DoD might include handling communication and
navigation functions.
The Department of Energy
Groups within the Department of Energy have already shown
considerable interest in working on the SEI. The DoE's role has so far been
restricted by Congress to development of space nuclear power sources, but the
DoE has been aggressively attempting to broaden its stake in the initiative.
The department created an Office of Space in late 1991, and received $5
million for exploration-related research for 1992 (in addition to its ongoing
space power programs).53 If it is successful in receiving a significant amount
of SEI-related funding, the DoE could add its clout to NASA's when trying to
influence Congress and the President in favor of the SEI
Aerospace Industry
The U.S. aerospace industry could possibly play a major part in the
future of the SEI. Currently, though, most companies are waiting for
Congress to show a commitment to the SEI before they put either money or
effort into the exploration endeavor. The hope of very large contracts in the
future has led a few companies to begin to conduct exploration-related studies
and research, though, and some companies have even established
53Andrew Lawler, "DoE Exploration Role Restricted", Space News, August 19-25, 1991.
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relationships with construction companies with an eye to possible future
work on the Moon's surface.55 A few companies have been promoting the
SEI,56 but significant lobbying is not likely to begin until the awarding of large
contracts seems imminent. If the SEI does grow large enough to start letting a
significant number of contracts, the aerospace industry will probably become a
powerful ally.
55Leonard David, "Congressional Apathy to Moon-Mars Deters Industry Efforts", Space News,
September 24-30, 1990.
56Debra Polsky, "Aerospace Industry Antes Up", Space News, April 15-21, 1991.
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III. The Russian Space Program
Any evaluation of the potential for future use of Russian space
hardware requires a solid understanding of the overall Russian space
program. It is necessary to know not only the performance characteristics of a
particular piece of hardware, but also its history and its place within the
broader context of the space program. From this information can be
determined the hardware's reliability, its potential for improvement, its
likely supporters in the public, government, and industry, and the likelihood
that it will continue to be produced in the future.
A Brief Survey of Russian Space Hardware
Launch Vehicles
Laboratories in the Soviet Union began producing small rockets in the
early 1930s. After the Second World War, a large rocket program was
initiated which built upon both this earlier experience and the knowledge
gained from testing captured German A-4 rockets. By the early 1950s, the
Soviets were launching various payloads, including dogs, to heights of up to
100 km on the 'Pobeda' or 'Victory' rocket, an improved version of the A-4.
In August 1957, the Soviets launched their first intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM); Sputnik was launched into orbit by the same booster later that
year.
34
The rocket that launched the first Sputniks, the R-7,5 7 had a central
core of four liquid oxygen (LOX)/kerosene RD-107 engines and four strap-on
units, each with four LOX/kerosene engines. The R-7, which was able to
deliver 1300 kg into a low orbit, was used three times during the 1957-1958
period, after which a small LOX/kerosene upper stage was added to the
design. This improved version, the Vostok, was able to launch 4730 kg into a
low orbit and small payloads to Earth escape trajectories. The Vostok has
been launched about 150 times, but the launch rate has recently dropped to
about one every two years.
Two more variants of the R-7, the Soyuz and the Molniya, were
introduced in 1961 and 1963 respectively. The Soyuz and the Molniya have a
more powerful second stage than the Vostok, and the Molniya incorporates
an additional third stage. The Soyuz can deliver a 7000 kg payload into a low
orbit, while the Molniya can deliver 1500 kg payloads into lunar trajectories.
The Soyuz and Molniya launch vehicles are still currently in heavy use;
about 1500 have been launched to date, with an approximately 95% success
rate for each launcher. Most Soyuz launches are of photoreconnaissance
satellites, but it is also used to launch biosatellites and the Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft. The Molniya, which once launched small lunar and
interplanetary probes, is now used to launch early warning and Molniya
communications satellites.
The "Kosmos" rocket joined the Soviet stable of launch vehicles in
1964. It is a two-stage vehicle, with an N204/unsymmetrical
dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)-fueled SS-5 missile as a first stage and an
5 7There are various nomenclatures for Soviet launch vehicles. Wherever possible, I use the
Soviet name for the vehicle. If the Soviet name is unknown, the generally accepted Sheldon
name for the vehicle is used.
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N20 4 /UDMH-fueled second stage. The Kosmos, which can lift 1,350 kg to a
low orbit, has been launched close to 400 times since 1964, with a success rate
above 98%. As the average weight of new satellites increases beyond the
Kosmos' capabilities, its launch rate has declined, but it is still used to launch
low-altitude navigation and communication satellites.5 8
The "F" booster, which was derived from the SS-9 missile, was first
used for fractional orbital bombardment tests in 1966. The basic vehicle, the
F-1, is a two stage vehicle which uses N 20 4 /UDMH fuel, and has often been
used to orbit payloads which incorporate additional propulsive stages. The F-
1's estimated payload capacity to a low orbit is about 4000 kg. The Tsyklon
version of the "F" booster, which was introduced in 1977, has an additional
small third stage which can be restarted three times, enabling the booster to
deliver multiple payloads to different orbits. The Tsyklon is advertised as
being able to put 4000 kg into a low orbit (though the U.S. DoD believes its
real capacity is 5500 kg) 59 and has compiled a 99% success rate over some 200
missions. The F-1 is now used only to launch ocean surveillance satellites;
the Tsyklon is used to launch remote sensing, communications, weather,
electronic intelligence and geodetic satellites.
The Proton booster, first launched in 1965, was the first Soviet launch
vehicle not based on an ICBM. There have been three versions of the Proton,
the last two of which are still in use. The original Proton, which flew only
four times, was a two-stage vehicle with six engines on the first stage and four
on the second; it could lift 12,200 kg to a low orbit. Like all Protons, it used the
new N 20 4 /UDMH-fueled RD-253 engine. The next two versions of the
Proton, which are still in use, debuted in 1968. The first of these to launch
58Nicholas Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1988, Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1989, p.12.
59Nicholas Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1988, Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1989, p.13.
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was a three-stage vehicle able to deliver 20,000 kg to a low orbit. This launch
vehicle, which incorporated a third UDMH/ N 20 4 stage, has been used over
the years to launch large payloads, including all of the program's space
stations, into orbit. The third type of Proton incorporated both the
UDMH/N 20 4 third stage and a LOX/kerosene fourth stage, and has been used
to launch geosynchronous remote sensing and communications satellites and
interplanetary spacecraft. The Proton had compiled a 87.7% success rate
through 187 launches by 1990, but most of its failures occurred during the first
few years of operation. Plans exist to increase Proton launch capacity 10% in
the next two years. 60
The Zenit booster, first launched in 1985, was the first completely new
Soviet launch vehicle since the Proton. This vehicle, which boasts a highly
automated assembly and launch, is a two-stage LOX/kerosene rocket that can
deliver 13,740 kg to a low orbit; its first stage doubles as the strap-on booster
for the Energia heavy lift vehicle. A three stage Zenit has been developed, but
has never been launched; the third stage would use a LOX/kerosene engine
similar to the Proton fourth stage. The Zenit's first fourteen launches were
successful, but it has failed three times in attempts to launch since 1990. Its
payloads to date have mostly been electronic intelligence satellites, but it is
intended to eventually take over the Soyuz booster's space station support
tasks. 6 1
The Energia launch vehicle, currently the world's most powerful
booster, was first launched in 1987. The Energia's core has four LOX/liquid
hydrogen (LH 2)-fueled engines; it is the first Soviet launch vehicle to use this
60Peter B. deSelding, "Russians Select Mir as Funding Priority", Space News, March 16-22,
1992.
6 1Steven J. Isakowitz, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1991, p. 170.
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highly energetic propellant combination. It also has four strap-on
LOX/kerosene propellant engines, which are identical to the first stage of the
Zenit launch vehicle. The Energia is able to launch either a large cargo carrier
or the Buran space shuttle; to date it has been launched once in each of these
configurations. Using the cargo carrier, the Energia is able to put an 88,000 kg
payload into a low orbit. Various plans for alternate versions of the Energia
have been developed. These include a smaller version, the Energia-M, with
only one core engine rather than four, which could put 40,000 kg into a low
orbit, and larger versions with up to eight strap-ons and a taller core, which
could deliver up to 200,000 kg into a low orbit.62
Additional space launch vehicles might be developed from the
Russian ICBMs that would otherwise be destroyed due to arms control
agreements. One proposed launch vehicle is the "Start" vehicle, which
would be developed from the SS-20 missile. The Start is envisaged to be a
three-stage solid-fueled rocket with the capability to deliver about 200 kg to a
500 km altitude orbit.63 Plans to develop a launch vehicle from the SS-24
missile have also been put forth; this vehicle would be air-launched from an
An-124 aircraft and could deliver a 500 kg payload into a 600 km altitude
orbit.64 Finally, there have been proposals to use SS-18s, the Soviet Union's
largest ICBMs, as launch vehicles. 65 An SS-18-derived launch vehicle could
be expected to have about twice the payload capacity of the SS-24-derived
launcher, though officials of KB Yushnoye, where the SS-18 is built, claim
6 2Steven J. Isakowitz, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1991, p. 119.
63
"Missiles Have Been Cut Back...and Sent into Space", Krasnaya Zvezda. January 10, 1991.
64Peter B. de Selding, "Soviets Seek Partner For Launch Business With Refitted SS-24s", Space
News, September 23-29, 1991.
65Andrew Lawler, "Teller: Use Ex-Soviet Missiles to Put Brilliant Eyes in Orbit", Space News.
March 30-April 5, 1992.
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that an SS-18-derived launch vehicle would be able to launch 8,000 kg into
orbit.
Table III-1 summarizes some of the performance characteristics of the
existing and planned launch vehicles of the Russian space program.
Table III-1: Russian Launch Vehicles
Launch First Payload to Payload to Launch Reliability
Vehicle Launch 200 km (kg) Escape Sites 66  since
(kg) 197067
Vostok 1959 4730 435 Bai, Ples 99 %
Molniya 1961 - 1500 Bai, Ples 95 %
Soyuz 1963 7,000 - Bai, Ples 98 %
Kosmos 1964 1,350 Bai(?), Ples, 96 %
K.Y.(?)
F-i 1964 4,000 - Bai (?), Ples 98 %
Proton 1965 17,000 5,700 Bai 92 %
Tsyklon 1977 >4,000 - Ples 97 %
Zenit 1985 13,740 - Bai 80 %
Energia 1987 88,000 30,000 Bai 100 %
Proton 1993(?) (?)18,700 (?)6,270 Bai(?)
Upgrade
Converted 1995 (?) (?)200 - -
ICBMs (??)8000
Zenit-3 1993 (?) - (?)4,300 Bai(?), C.York(?) -
Energia-M (?) 40,000 ? Bai(?) -
Largest (?) 200,000 ? Bai(?) -
Energia
Mod
Propulsion Hardware
The Soviet space program developed a large range of rocket engines to
power its fleet of launch vehicles. These rocket engines range from the low-
66The launch sites are Baikonur Cosmodrome (Bai), Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Ples), Kasputin Yar
(K.Y.), and the proposed Cape York launch site. These sites are described in more detail later
in this chapter.
67All numbers are approximate. Numbers in the literature vary, primarily due to differing
definitions of 'success'.
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technology RD-107 engines, which were developed in the 1950s, to the
powerful new RD-170 engine, to advanced propulsion devices that have not
yet been flown. As these rocket engines could very conceivably be used
separately from the launch vehicles they power, it is useful to examine them
as independent pieces of hardware.
Table III-2 summarizes the pertinent features of some of the major
rocket engines that exist in Russia today.
Table III-2: Russian Rocket Engines
Rocket Oxidizer/Fuel Exhaust Speed in Thrust Times
Engine 68  Vacuum (m/s) (kN) Used 69
RD -107 LOX/kerosene 3,077 m/s 1,000 5,800
RD -108 LOX/kerosene 3,087 m/s 941 1,450
RD -448 LOX/kerosene 3,165 m/s 55 150
RD -461 LOX/kerosene 3,234 m/s 298 1,300
Molniya 3rd LOX/kerosene 3,332 m/s 66 275
RD -216 N 20 4 /UDMH 2,852 m/s 864 800
RD-253 N 20 4 /UDMH 3,097 m/s 1,635 1,050
Proton 2nd, N204/UDMH 3,265 m/s 600 900
3rd
Block 4 LOX/kerosene 3,448 m/s 85 150
RD-219 N 20 4 /UDMH 2,871 m/s 990 200
RD-170 LOX/kerosene 3,303 m/s 7,906 20
RD -120 LOX/kerosene 3,430 m/s 834 12
RD-8 LOX/kerosene 3,352 m/s 78 12
RD-0120 LOX/LH2 4,435 m/s 1,962 8
SPT-70 Xenon 15,700 m/s 4 x 10-5  - 50
SPT-100 Xenon 15,700 m/s 8 x 10-5  ~ 50
Nuclear LOX/LH2  8,820 m/s 20
rocket
A few of these rocket engines have capabilities that match or exceed the
world's best. The RD-107, RD-108, RD-461, and RD-253 bear special notice
68There are a few rocket engines for which statistics are not yet publicly available. These
include the Kosmos second stage and the Tsyklon 1st and 3rd stages.
69The approximate total number of times each type of rocket engine has been used successfully
on a launch vehicle
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because of their age. All of these rocket engines are over 25 years old, and
have been used more than a thousand times. Though their efficiencies (as
shown by the exhaust speed) are low, their proven reliability is probably
unparalleled in the world. The Energia core rocket engine is notable for its
use of the liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen fuel; it is the only Russian rocket
engine to use this highly energetic combination. The SPT-70 and SPT-100 are
small electric thrusters that use a magnetic field to acclerate a xenon plasma to
very high exhaust speeds. Finally, the RD-170 rocket engine is in a class of its
own. It is the most powerful (in terms of thrust) liquid-fueled rocket engine
in the world, is highly efficient, and can be throttled at levels from 49% to
102% of its rated thrust.
Three projects to develop advanced propulsion technologies were
being pursued in the USSR at the beginning of the 1990s. These efforts were
directed towards the development of a supersonic combustion ramjet
(scramjet), a tri-propellant rocket engine and a nuclear-thermal rocket engine.
These projects could have potentially large payoffs if they are successfully
developed into working hardware --the scramjet could eventually lead to a
low-cost spaceplane, and the nuclear thermal rocket to a high-speed
interplanetary transport. The three projects are in various stages of
development; the scramjet and nuclear thermal rocket engine efforts have
already produced some working hardware.
The scramjet project's high point to date was the flight of a hydrogen-
fueled supersonic combustion ramjet in November 1991. This scramjet
reached speeds of approximately 7,000 km per hour, which is still far below
the speed of 27,000 km/hour needed to achieve orbit. Although plans to
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develop a space plane were announced in 1991,70 it seems unlikely that any
such vehicle will be produced in the next decade.
The effort to develop a nuclear thermal rocket has met with
considerable early success. Small test versions of a nuclear thermal rocket
with very high exhaust speeds have been fired for durations of an hour. The
rocket's designers claim that the current engine design can be scaled up to 500
to 1000 kN of thrust, and eventually to several thousand kN.7 1 The future of
this rocket is uncertain at the moment, though top officials in the Russian
nuclear program have called for a joint effort with the United States for
further work in nuclear propulsion.7 2
Launch Sites
The Soviet Union's first major rocket launch site was the Kasputin Yar
cosmodrome at 48.40 N in southwestern Russia. Kasputin Yar was the site of
the test launches of the German A-4 and the early Soviet rocket tests. The
cosmodrome was closed in 1953, but reopened in 1962 for launches of 'B' and
Kosmos rockets and 'Vertikal' suborbital rockets. The launch rate from
Kasputin Yar slowed to zero or one per year in the mid-1980's and may have
completely stopped.
Construction of the Baikonur Cosmodrome was initiated in May 1955,
in a sparsely populated area of the Kazakh republic at 45.6 N. Baikonur was
the site of the flight tests of the Soviet Union's first intercontinental ballistic
missile and the triumphant orbiting of Sputnik, by the same booster, later
70Moscow Radio Moscow World Service,, 1200 GMT, July 4, 1991.
7 1Joseph R. Welch et. al., "Development of Nuclear Rocket Engines in the USSR", Presented at
AIAA/NASA/OAI Conference on Advanced SEI Technologies, September 4-6, 1991, p.7.
72Leonard David, "Soviets Reveal Work In Advanced Nuclear Rockets, Seek to Share", Space
News, September 16-22, 1991.
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that year. For most of its existence, Baikonur was the Soviet Union's second
busiest launch site, supporting about 30 launches a year since the mid-1960s.
Baikonur has multiple launch pads for Vostok, Soyuz, and Molniya class
boosters and F-class boosters (though these have not been used since the early
1970s), two pads for the Proton, and three pads for the Energiya. It also boasts
a five km landing runway for the Buran shuttle.
The Plesetsk launch site began operations as the Soviet Union's third
launch site in 1966. Located at 62.80 N near Archangel in the Russian
republic, Plesetsk provides a northern site for polar launches that is not too
distant from the populous areas of Russia. Plesetsk has been generally
oriented towards the launch of military satellites; it was historically the
Soviet Union's busiest launch site, with multiple launch pads for A-class
rockets and the Tsyklon and Kosmos launch vehicles. An average of over 60
rockets were launched from Plesetsk every year from 1975 to 1986; this
number began to decline in 1986, as satellite lifetimes improved.
In all three launch sites, the launch pads and assembly buildings are
linked by rail. All Soviet launch vehicles are assembled horizontally at the
launch site then brought out to the launch pad by rail and lifted to a vertical
position. In general, the launch vehicles are very robust. They are able to
operate under very severe weather conditions, including high winds and
snow and it is not uncommon for multiple launches to be conducted on the
same day.73 The number of launches per year has been slowing in recent
years, but is still high compared to any other country. Through the 1980s,
Soviet launch vehicles placed around 90 satellites weighing 350,000 kg into
orbit each year. In 1990, the total was 76 satellites; in 1991 approximately 60.
73Nicholas Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1988, Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1989, p.9.
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Various proposals have been made over the years to launch Soviet
launch vehicles from other launch sites. (As discussed in the next chapter,
low-latitude launch sites can significantly increase the payload a launch
vehicle is able to deliver to certain orbits.) The most persistent of these
proposals has been one to launch Zenit boosters from the proposed Cape York
launch site in Australia. 74 The Zenits would be shipped to this 120 S launch
site in batches of three or delivered by transport aircraft.75 Current support
for this venture is uncertain, but in any case, launches would not start before
1997.76
Humans-in-space Hardware
Using the Vostok booster, the Soviets launched Yuri Gagarin into orbit
in April 1961. The spacecraft he travelled in, the Vostok capsule, weighed
about 4700 kg and carried only one cosmonaut. It had no maneuvering
capability except to return to Earth, and no soft-landing capability; the pilot
ejected from the capsule before it struck the ground. The Vostok capsule was
followed by the Voskhod, a three seat capsule created by removing both of the
Vostok's ejector seats and eliminating the requirement that cosmonauts wear
space suits. The Voskhod program marked the debut of non-pilot
cosmonauts in space, the first spacewalk, and the first soft-landing of a
spacecraft. After two flights, the Voskhod program was cancelled to make
way for the Soyuz.
74Jon Fairall, "With CSYA Down, Australians Hopeful on Spaceport Plan", Space News,
November 4-10, 1991.
75Steven J. Isakowitz, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1991, p. 178.
76Robina Riccitiello, "Zenit Failure may Hinder Russian Sales Campaign", Space News.
March 30-April 5, 1992.
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The Soyuz capsule was originally designed to be part of a Soviet
manned lunar program. The hardware for this plan was given the name
'Soyuz', or union, as it was to involve the linking together of a number of
spacecraft in Earth orbit. The Soyuz capsule was the only piece of hardware
retained from this original plan, though two other pieces of manned lunar
mission hardware were flown in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These were
Zond 1, a 5300 kg orbital module designed to take one cosmonaut around the
Moon, and the heavy Zond, a 10,500 kg three-cosmonaut vehicle which was
intended to be used as part of a manned lunar landing program.77 One legacy
from the Soyuz capsule's lunar heritage is its capability to re-enter the Earth's
atmosphere safely at the high speeds characteristic of a direct return from the
Moon.
The initial Soyuz capsule weighed 6575 kg at launch. It was composed
of three modules with a total habitable volume of about 9 cubic meters. One
of the three modules was unpressurized and contained maneuvering
engines, fuel, supplies and the solar arrays. The two habitable modules were
the command module, occupied during ascent and descent, which contained
control panels and three seats for cosmonauts, and the orbital module, which
contained the spacewalk hatch and lockers for food, equipment, and
experiments. 78 The Soyuz had the capability to rendezvous and dock with
another Soyuz spacecraft either automatically or when piloted. It, like all
Soyuz capsules to date, was capable of making water landings, but, as a rule,
soft-landed on dry ground.
77Brian Harvey, Race Into Space: the Soviet Space Program, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons,
1988, p. 85.
7 80ffice of Technology Assessment, Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in
Space, U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1983, p.11.
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The Soyuz capsule has been redesigned three times since this first
incarnation, though all of the spacecraft have had basically the same
configuration. The first redesign of the Soyuz came after the death of three
cosmonauts in 1971 in an accident where air pressure in the capsule was lost.
It was decided after this accident that the cosmonauts should wear spacesuits
during ascent and descent; to make up for the increased weight of the
spacesuits the third seat, the solar panels and some of the fuel storage were
removed. This second model of the Soyuz flew 28 times, 22 times to space
stations. (though four of these times, it was unable to dock with the station).
This Soyuz had only a three to four day lifetime when not connected to the
space station as it had no solar panels. When attached to the station, the
Soyuz lifetime was 90 days.
The second redesign of the Soyuz led to the introduction of the Soyuz-
T in 1976. This version of the Soyuz once again had solar panels and
additional fuel, and the savings in mass and space resulting from the use of
microelectronics allowed the reintroduction of the third seat. The lifetime of
the Soyuz-T while attached to a space station was demonstrated to be at least
150 days. The docking problems of the earlier Soyuz were lessened with the
Soyuz-T, which only failed to dock once, when a rendezvous radar did not
deploy. Twice, however, the automatic docking system failed and the
cosmonauts were forced to dock manually.
The current incarnation of the Soyuz, the Soyuz TM, was introduced in
1986. It boasts a new navigation and rendezvous unit, new communications
and power systems, a 200 kg greater launch payload capacity, and a 70-90 kg
greater return payload capacity.79 It has a lifetime of 180 days when attached
79Nicholas Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1987, Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1988, p.8 3.
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to the station, and a maximum lifetime of up to a week when flying
separately. 80 By 1992, Soyuz-TMs had flown 13 times without a serious
failure, though the automatic docking system has not always worked. Design
of a new piloted space capsule was said to be underway in 1991, but it is not
clear if and when it will appear.81
The other main spacecraft used to support the space station program is
the robotic Progress cargo spacecraft. The Progress, which first appeared in
1978, was based on the Soyuz design, but carried fuel and supplies rather than
cosmonauts. The original Progress weighed 7,020 kg and could carry about
2,300 kg to the space station, with which it docked automatically. The
Progress was first upgraded in 1986 after which it was able to deliver up to
2600 kg of fuel and supplies to the space station. In 1989, the Progress was
replaced by the Progress-M, which has an increased lifetime of 30 days as an
independent spacecraft or up to 108 days while attached to a space station.
Unlike the earlier versions, which had no capability to return cargo to Earth,
the Progress-M has a small return capsule, 60 cm in diameter, which is able to
return 100 - 150 kg to Earth.82 The Progress spacecraft have generally
experienced much less trouble in docking than the Soyuz spacecraft.
Soviet space stations, the destination of these Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft, began to appear after the demise of the Soviet lunar program in the
late 1960s. The first Soviet space station, Salyut I, was launched in 1971, and
the eighth, Mir, is still in operation in 1992. The first station was designed and
80Michael Parks, "Plight of Soyuz Raises Tough Questions", Los Angeles Times, September 8,
1988.
8 1Boris Olesyuk., "A Personal View: The Price of Our Jaunts Into Space", Kuranty, April 11,
1991.
82Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1530 GMT, August 25, 1989.
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manufactured in in only two years, 83 but its basic design is not very different
from that of the core module of the current Russian space station.
The core modules of all the space stations have weighed about 20
metric tons, and have been launched by the Proton rocket into 510 orbits at
altitudes of from 241 to 370 km. The core modules have varied from about
13 to 15 meters in length with a maximum diameter of 4.2 meters and a
volume (with a Soyuz capsule attached) of about 100 cubic meters. The core
modules have each had three sections, two of which were habitable. The
habitable sections are a transfer/docking compartment and a working/living
compartment; the unpressurized compartment is used for instruments and
propulsion.84 The first five Salyuts were equipped with one docking port,
Salyuts 6 and 7 had two docking ports, and Mir has six docking ports.
Salyut 2 did not achieve a stable orbit, but Salyuts 3-7 marked a period
of increasing Soviet mission lengths and capabilities in space. Mission
lengths increased from 24 days in Salyut 1 to 185 days in Salyut 6 to 237 days
on Salyut 7. Two crews visited Salyut 1; ten visited Salyut 7. Various new
systems were introduced as the program progressed, including additional
solar panels, the Progress cargo module, on-orbit refueling, water recycling,
the docking of additional modules to the station cores, and measures to
increase the habitability of the station. During the Salyut program,
cosmonauts learned how to perform repairs in space and much experience
was gained on human performance in space and in space operations, such as
docking, extravehicular repairs, and rendezvous.
83Brian Harvey, Race Into Space: the Soviet Space Program, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons,
1988, p. 192.
84Office of Technology Assessment, Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in
Space U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1983, p.15 .
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The Mir space station, launched in 1986, differs mainly from the earlier
stations in having six docking ports. A 5.8 meter long, 4.15 meter diameter
module named Kvant, was attached to the station in 1987, along with
additional solar panels. Two more core-sized modules, Kvant-2 and Kristall,
have been added since then, bringing the station's total habitable volume to
about 280 cubic meters. Mir theoretically receives 28 kw of power from its
solar arrays, but shadowing and photocell degradation problems mean that
the actual power level is closer to 10 kw.85
A number of plans for Mir's future have been presented. Plans for
expansion include two long-delayed core-sized modules, Priroda and Spektr,
to be launched in 1993 or 1994.86 Other plans have discussed replacing the
Mir core module, but keeping some of the expansion modules8 7 , or replacing
the entire station with a new Mir-2 station, built more along the lines of the
planned U.S. space station. 8 Adding some urgency to these plans is the fact
that the design lifetime of Mir was five years, an anniversary passed in 1991.
The only totally new piloted Soviet spacecraft since 1971, the Buran
space shuttle, was launched on its first, and to date only, mission in 1988. The
Buran, which resembles the U.S. space shuttle, is launched on the Energia
booster, and can be flown either with or without pilots. A payload of 30,000
kg can be delivered from the Buran into a low orbit (the empty orbiter can
reach an orbit up to 1000 km) and a payload of 20,000 kg can be returned from
orbit. The orbiter provides 30 kw of power and has 70 cubic meters of
85 Boris Olesyuk, "Is the Mir Station a Commodity?", Kuranty, February 1, 1992.
86Lt. Col. A. Dolgikh, "Let Me Introduce You to Mir Stage Two", Krasnaya Zvezda, August 2,
1991.
87Moscow Radio Moscow World Service 0710 GMT August 16, 1991.
88Peter B. de Selding, "Officials Plan Longer, Leaner Mir in Late '90s", Space News, October
21-27, 1991.
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habitable volume and 317 cubic meters of cargo space. 89 Though the only
flight to date had no humans on board, the crew of Buran can reportedly
range from zero to ten cosmonauts. Buran's initial maximum mission
duration is seven days, but this should be extendable to 30 days after
modifications. 90
Robotic Lunar and Planetary Spacecraft
The Soviets began their lunar exploration program in 1959 when they
used the Vostok booster to launch three probes towards the Moon. These
probes discovered the solar wind and the absence of a lunar magnetic field,
and transmitted back pictures of the far side of the Moon. Failures of the
Molniya upper stage and errors in the guidance and control of the probes led
to the failure of the next eight lunar probes; The only successful Soviet
mission to the Moon between 1960 and 1965 was the Zond 3 Mars probe,
which swung by the Moon on the way to Mars in 1965 and sent detailed
pictures of the Moon's surface back to Earth.
In 1966, Luna 9 successfully soft-landed on the Moon and sent back
pictures of its surface. Two more booster failures were followed by the launch
of the first successful lunar orbiter, Luna 10, which operated for 60 days,
sending back data from its magnetometer, gamma ray detector, infrared
radiometer, cosmic ray detector, and meteoroid counter. 9 1 These precursor
missions mapped much of the Moon, and tested the density and basic
chemical composition of the lunar soil. Three sample return missions in the
89Steven J. Isakowitz, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1991, p. 111.
90Nicholas Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1988, Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1989, p.113.
9 1Brian Harvey, Race Into Space: the Soviet Space Program, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons,
1988, p. 106.
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late 1960s failed, but were followed by the successful return mission of Luna
16 in 1970. The lunar orbiters and sample return missions continued until
1976, increasing in sophistication over this period --the final sample return
mission drilled and retrieved rock samples from two meters below the
surface.
The high point of the Soviet lunar program, however, was the two
Lunokhod rovers. The first vehicle weighed about 750 kg and measured 2.2
by 1.6 meters; the second was slightly larger. The rovers, which were powered
by solar panels and a small radioisotope thermal generator, carried cameras to
observe the Moon and sky and instruments to test the strength and
composition of the soil. The first Lunokhod survived nearly a year and
traveled 10.5 km. The second Lunokhod survived almost six months and
travelled 37 km, sending back 80,000 television pictures.
The Soviets also began to operate a planetary program at the beginning
of the 1960s. Launch vehicle failures destroyed the first three Mars probes,
and contact was lost with the first Venus probe early in its journey. Three
more Mars probes were launched in 1962, but the most successful was the
third, which experienced an orientation system breakdown when the
spacecraft was 100 million km from the Earth. A series of similar mishaps
plagued the Soviet planetary program throughout the early 1960s, until by
1966, the Soviets had launched 17 probes to Mars and Venus without a single
one completing its mission.
The first partially successful Soviet Mars probes came in 1971, when
two probes successfully achieved orbits around Mars. The landers that were
to have operated in conjunction with the orbiters, however, were
unsuccessful. These probes were followed by two more failures and a success
in 1973. (By this time, American planetary probes had overcome their early
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problems and were more lighter, more sophisticated, and much more reliable
than the Soviet probes.) No more Soviet Mars probes were launched until
1988, and in that ambitions mission to Mars and Phobos, both spacecraft failed
to complete their mission. Contact was lost with Phobos 1 when an incorrect
command switched off the attitude control system, and with Phobos 2 when
the onboard computer malfunctioned. 92
The Soviets had more luck with the exploration of Venus Venera 4
reached Venus and parachuted deep into its atmosphere in 1967. Venera 5
and 6 also reached Venus and parachuted even deeper inoa its atmosphere in
1969. These successes were followed by a generally successfun series of Venus
landers and orbiters ending with the Vega spacecraft, whic dropped a lander
and two long-lived balloons into the atmosphere before going on to observe
Halley's Comet in 1986,
Current plans for robotic missions focus on Mars. Two missions with
strong international participation are currently under development. The first
of these missions, scheduled to leave Earth in 1994, will indcude an orbiter
and a descent module that will deploy several small statio.ary probes. The
second mission, scheduled for 1996, will also include an orbiter and stationary
probes, but in addition will carry a robotic rover and a weather balloon.93
Funding for these missions is far from certain, though other countries
involved in the effort have been standing by to subsidize the program if
necessary. 94
92R.Z. Sagdeev & A.V. Zakharov, "Brief History of the Phobos Mission", Nur, October 19,
1989.
9 3William Boyer, "Visiting Russian Rover Team Calls Mars Funds Stab', Space News, June
1-7, 1992.
94peter B. de Selding, "Germany Seeks Cash Infusion to Save Russian Ml Mi~sion", Space
News, April 6-12, 1992.
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Applications and Space Science Satellites
The Soviet Union has long carried out strong robotic applications and
space science programs in Earth orbit. The first Sputniks carried out basic
space science tasks, and they were soon replaced with satellites performing
military, civil, and scientific duties. Historically, most Soviet spacecraft have
been part of these programs, but as they are, in general, not very relevant to
the SEI, they will only be discussed briefly.
Most Soviet satellites were launched on military missions, including
early warning, photoreconnaissance, ocean surveillance, weather monitoring,
navigation, communication, and electronic intelligence gathering. The
largest component of the military space program has historically been
photoreconnaissance, but the most interesting hardware for the purposes of
the SEI is inside the ocean surveillance satellites. To supply the large amount
of power needed to detect ships and submarines from space without using
large, high-drag solar panels, the Soviets developed a space nuclear power
reactor.
Though detailed information on the Soviet space nuclear reactor
program has yet to become widely available, the general features of two types
of reactors are known. The first of these is a thermoelectric reactor that
operated on all RORSATS prior to 1987. This type of reactor weighed
somewhat less than 390 kg, used approximately 20-25 kg of uranium fuel, and
produced about 1.3 - 2 kw of electricity.95 The lifetime of these reactors was
probably short; no RORSAT using them had lasted for more than six months.
The second type of reactor is the Topaz thermionic reactor, which was first
tested in space in 1987. These reactors weighed around 1000 kg, used about 12
95Gary L. Bennett, "A Look at the Soviet Space Nuclear Power Program", Proceedings of the
24th Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, Vol 2, August 6-11, 1989.
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kg of Uranium 235, and produced approximately 10 kw of electricity. The
lifetimes of the two test satellites that used these reactors were six months and
one year.
Finally, in addition to the military satellites, the Soviets have also
launched many space science and civil applications satellites. Applications
satellites launched have included communication satellites, weather
satellites, and earth resource monitoring satellites. Numerous scientific
satellites have carried out astronomical and space environment research as
well as microgravity research and production. Soviet scientific instruments
have also been carried on satellites performing other tasks and on the Salyut
and Mir space stations. In general, Soviet applications and scientific satellites
are notable for being less complex than Western satellites and for having
shorter operational lifetimes.
The Russian Space Program: An Institutional Perspective
Considering the current conditions within Russia and the uncertain
relations between the Russian republic and the other states which once made
up the Soviet Union, it is not yet clear what the final shape of the Russian
space program will be. An examination of the institutional structure of the
former Soviet program, and of how the changes of the past few years have
influenced both the structure and its constituent parts, however, enables the
creation of of some educated hypotheses about the program's future direction.
By the end of the 1980s the Soviet space program was a vast and
complex enterprise composed of approximately a thousand design bureaus
(KBs), scientific research organizations (NPOs), and factories, employing a
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total of around a million workers. 96 No national laws on space existed, and
the program's many component organizations interacted with each other
through a complex web of overlapping authorities, both official and
unofficial.
An attempt could be made to fit the Soviet space program into a
standard organization chart based on the official connections between the
major bodies involved in the program. At the top of this chart would be the
CPSU Central Committee Secretariat (the Politburo), which was expected to
make major decisions on space programs and policy. Below the Politburo
would be the USSR Council of Ministers' State Commission for Military-
Industrial Affairs, which, guided by a five-year plan, was supposed to handle
the high-level management and coordination between all the ministries and
departments involved in space activities. This Commission, in turn, had
authority over the space efforts of the Ministry of General Machine Building,
and the Defense Ministry. The Defense Ministry was in charge of tracking
satellites, cosmonaut training, and the nation's launch sites, while the
Ministry of General Machine Building was in charge of developing and
building the nation's space hardware, through its many KBs and NPOs.
There were an estimated thousand NPOs, KBs and institutes
performing work on the Soviet space program. The largest bureau was NPO
Energia, which had prime responsibility for the Energia launch vehicles,
operation of the Mir space station, and many other large tasks. Estimates are
that over the last 10 or 20 years, 60% of the money spent on the Russian
civilian space program went through this bureau. 97 Another major bureau
96Andrey Tarasov, "Club 206: Into the International Space Year on the Fragments of the Space
Program", Literaturnaya Gazeta, January 22, 1992.
97Peter B. deSelding, "Bargain Prices Build Russian Resentment", Space News, April 27-May
2, 1992.
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was the military-oriented Central Specialized Design Bureau (CDSB), which
manufactured the Soyuz, Molniya, and Vostok launch vehicles, as well as
scientific and Earth observation satellites. Other Russian space bureaus
included KB Machine Building, KB Salyut, which built the space stations,
NPO Molniya, which produced the airframe for the Buran space shuttle, and
TsNMIIMash, the Central Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building,
which ran the Soviet Flight Control Center. The largest bureau outside
Russia was KB Yushnoye in the Ukraine, which built the SS-18 and SS-24
missiles and the Tsyklon and Zenit boosters (though the rocket engines for
these vehicles are manufactured in Russia at NPO Energomash). 98
A few more organizations would have positions to the side of this
chart. The semi-independent USSR Academy of Sciences had the task of
proposing space science missions and coordinating international activity via
the Interkosmos Council. The Ministry of Health had a small role in space life
sciences and life support. A number of state commissions, such as the State
Commission for Flight Tests of Manned Space Complexes, had an oversight
role for particular parts of the program. Some high level bodies, such as the
Ministry of Defense, the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology and
the USSR Main Administration of Cartography, were customers for space
products.
In reality the organization of the Soviet space program was far more
complex than such a chart would suggest. The various technical and
operational units of the Soviet space program were created in a haphazard
manner, accumulating as the space program itself grew. Numerous
committees and commissions were formed over the years to coordinate these
98Colonel M. Rebrov, "Profile of a General Designer: The Owl of Minerva Appears at Night",
Krasnaya Zvezda, March 23, 1991.
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units, but these generally had no power. Personal and institutional prestige
and contacts, rather than the official role of a particular organization, tended
to determine where that organization fit into the Soviet space program. For
example, while the famous 'Chief Designer' Sergei Korolev was alive, his
design bureau set the main direction of the space program. Korolev's
position was strengthened by his contacts in the Politburo and his alliance
with 'Chief Theorist' Keldysh of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Importantly, there was no real central authority for the USSR's space
program. (One long-time observer managed to identify seven bodies with
official responsibility for determining the direction of the Soviet space
program.)99 The lack of any coordinating agency for space led to a situation
where the organization in charge of developing new hardware (the Ministry
of General Machine Building) was also in charge of determining what
hardware was needed. One apt description of the space program was that it
was "kind of a state within a state, which, in the process of its development, is
pursuing its goals, which are known only to it."100
While there were some cases where a customer for space services did
have a strong role in the development of space hardware (the Ministry of
Defense is perhaps the best example), in general the developers had the upper
hand. For example, though the USSR Academy of Science was supposed to be
in charge of the space science program, the reality was more often that a
spacecraft would be developed and then the space scientists would be asked
whether or not they wanted to use it.101 The main reason for this situation
was that assets for most civil space programs were allocated directly to the
99Yaroslav Golovanov, "Just Where Are We Flying To?", Izvestiya, December 12, 1991.
100Vladimir Terekhov, "Points of View, Discussions and Evaluations", Sovetskaya Rossiya,
August 22,1990.
10 1K. Gringauz, "Loss of Escape Velocity", Pravda, March 25, 1989.
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developer of the space hardware, rather than to the customer The hardware
developer then had the power to specify what equipment would be installed
and where the results would be sent. 102
In the late 1980s, a number of trends which strongly affected the Soviet
space program began to become apparent. These trends were:
* a change in the nation's attitude toward space, spurred on by glasnost,
* a reduction in spending on space from the central government, and
* the conversion of space factories to commercial goods production.
The trends tended to reinforce each other, and they continue to strongly
influence the Russian space program today.
The most obvious of these trends was that of the changing national
opinion toward the space program, spurred on by the policy of 'Glasnost'
(openness). Since the launching of Sputnik, the Soviet space program had
been used by the government as a propaganda tool. Failures were hidden,
successes were lauded, and the many benefits of the space program were
repeatedly trumpeted in the press. Public cynicism and disillusionment,
however, had led many in the Soviet Union to doubt anything the
government said, including its pronouncements about the wonders of the
space program. With the coming of Glasnost, this dissatisfaction began to be
heard, and by the late 1980s, it became clear that the public did not believe
what it had been told about the economic benefits of the space program. 103
Public dissatisfaction with the space program might not have had any
effect, but the economic troubles of the late 1980s resulted in less money being
available in the country. By 1989 public opinion seemed to support sharp
10 2B. Konovalov, "A Space Agency is Needed", Izvestiya, February 1, 1991.
103
"Interview with Chief of Glavkosmos A.I. Dunayev", Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya,
October 3,1987.
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cutbacks in the space program,104 and the government began to push the
concept of "khozraschet" or economic accountability on the organizations
involved in the space program, forcing them to show some results from the
money that was being spent on space. The initial reaction from space
organizations was to bring up dubious figures showing the economic return
from existing space programs, and of 'spinoffs' of those programs.10 5 ,106
The effort to squeeze economic returns from the space program began
to be felt by the space organizations as money for space programs dried up. In
1990, the government granted some of the larger organizations within the
Ministry of General Machine Building the right to independently sign space
cooperation agreements with organizations from other countries, 107 but their
attempts to sell space services to other nations were generally stymied by
restrictive U.S. policies and the business inexperience of the Soviet
organizations. Cash-strapped organizations thus had to find a way to make
money selling products other than space equipment.
During this period, the government was also trying to increase the
production of consumer goods, which were in poor supply throughout the
Soviet Union. As the space organizations were unable to make money
selling space services, the government set many of them to producing
consumer goods. The strong government support for this policy is evidenced
by the 1989 visit of the secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee
to NPO Energia to "draw particular attention to the need to speed up work to
104 Vitaliy Golobachev, "What We Are Finding, What We Are Losing", Trud.
105A. Rodionov, "Readers Conduct the Interview: Why Are We Going Into Space?", Trud
January 26, 1989.
106V. Kh. Doguzhiyev, "Examined in the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers: Space
Outlays and Returns", Pravitelstvennyy Vestnik, May 1989.
107V.S. Avduyevsky and L.V. Leskov, Where is the Soviet Space Program Going?. Moscow:
Znanie, 1990.
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supply to other economic sectors the scientific and technical achievements [of
the NPO]."' 10 8 The Ministry of General Machine Building was charged with
the development of modem equipment for enterprises such as bakery, soap-
making, sugar-refining, and the manufacture of prostheses and disposable
syringes, as well as transferring any spinoffs to Ministries that needed
them. 109
The next major change for the space program came with the breakup of
the USSR into its constituent republics. Though somewhere upwards of 80%
of Soviet space assets are concentrated within the Russian republic, two major
facilities are outside its borders: the Baikonur launch site and KB Yushnoye,
the factory that produces the Zenit and Tsyklon launch vehicles. Other
problems raised included the questions of who owned the satellites already in
space, whether international agreements made by the USSR were still valid,
and how the space program would be reorganized to conform to this new
situation.
After some initial problems, a number of agreements on cooperation
between the former Soviet republics have been signed, but these have
generally been vague documents aimed at allowing the space program to
continue operations. In the first major agreement, on December 30, 1991,
nine of the former Soviet republics signed an agreement on the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) space program, putting the
commonwealth's military space program and joint use programs under the
direction of the strategic armed forces and its civil space programs under an
interstate space council. The agreement mentioned the "need for rigorous
108
"Space Geared to the Economy", Pravda, February 8, 1989.
109V.S. Avduyevsky and L.V. Leskov, Where is the Soviet Space Program Going?, Moscow:
Znanie, 1990.
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observation of international agreements and obligations," 110 and barred
Kazakhstan and the other republics from interrupting the functioning of
Baikonur Cosmodrome. More agreements on space were signed in 1992; on
May 10, the leaders of ten of the former republics agreed to fund civil space
activities jointly, and on May 26, Russian President Yeltsin and Kazakh
President Nursultan Nazarbayev discussed the future of the Baikonur
Cosmodrome and, according to the head of the new Russian Space Agency,
"all restrictions and restraints" on its use were removed 111
It is highly doubtful that these agreements represent the last word on
any of the issues raised by the dissolution of the Soviet space program. For
example, the December 30 document created a CIS space program, but it is not
known if the CIS itself will survive, or whether it will have any power if it
does. In addition, the agreement did not resolve the main points of financial
and operational responsibility for space among the republics. 112 Finally, two
republics, Ukraine and Moldova, did not sign the agreement.
There have also been a number of reorganizations inside Russia. First,
the Ministry of General Machine Building was reformed as the Russian
General Machine Building organization, a new organization which includes
all the Russian organizations within the old MGMB except for NPO
Energia.11 3 Second, a Russian Space Agency, headed by Yuri Koptev, former
Deputy Minister of the MGMB, was set up in February 1992, with authority
110Vincent Kiernan, "Minsk Accord Struck on Space", Space News, January 6-12, 1992.
111Vincent Kiernan and Andrew Lawler, "Koptev Confident About Russian Space Program",
Space News, June 15-21, 1992.
112Peter B. deSelding, "Russian Bureaus Await Yeltsin Nod for Reorganization", Space News,
February 10-16, 1992.
113Andrey Tarasov, "Club 206: Into the International Space Year on the Fragments of the
Space Program", Literaturnaya Gazeta, January 22, 1992.
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over all Russian civil space activities. 114 Under this new scheme, the
Defense Ministry will control all military space assets and cooperate with the
civil agency in areas such as spacecraft tracking and telemetry. The civil space
program will operate the Mir space station, planetary efforts, and launch
programs relating to human missions. 115
Despite all the tumult in the political and economic environment,
much of the space program has yet to change dramatically. The abolition of
the Soviet Union did not result in the end of the Soviet space program; with
few exceptions the same people reported to the same jobs after the breakup.
Money that used to flow through the Ministry of General Machine Building
to build satellites may now go directly to the NPO involved in building the
satellite, but in general, it has not been stopped entirely. The fact that some
space enterprises are now divided by national boundaries has not prevented
them from continuing to work with one another. Slowly, however, the
shrinking amount of money available is inexorably forcing organizations to
change to meet the new conditions .
The Future of the Russian Space Program
The Overall Shape of the Future Program
The future of the Russian space program is far from clear. Before its
final form can be predicted with any hope of accuracy, it will be necessary to
know:
* how much Russia is prepared to pay for the space program,
* how the shrinking of the space program will be managed,
114 Boris Konovalov, "Russian Space Agency Set Up", Izvestiya, February 28, 1992.
115Vincent Kiernan and Andrew Lawler, "Koptev Confident About Russian Space Program",
Space News, June 15-21, 1992.
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* how the former Soviet republics will interact with each other, and
* the scope of international intervention in the program.
Until these questions are answered, the future of any particular piece of space
hardware will be very uncertain.
Perhaps the most important of the questions is how much money
Russia is going to pay to support its space program, which will determine the
overall program's overall size. According to Yuri Koptev, the head of the
new Russian Space Agency, Russian President Boris Yeltsin is a strong
supporter of the civil space program. 116 There, however, a couple of factors
which make it almost certain that the space program is going to decline in
size. First, the space program is not very popular with the people, many of
whom see it both as waste of money and as a relic of the Communist past
linked with the military-industrial complex. Second, and more importantly,
the declining Russian economy seems likely to lead to decreases in the
amount of money available for the space program.
How the shrinking of the space program is managed will also have a
lot to do with what parts of it survive. Though inefficiencies due to the
program's former Byzantine organizational structure and secrecy are large,
the savings from eliminating them (even if such a feat is politically possible)
will probably not be large enough to make up for funding reductions; it seems
certain that some real cutting of programs will have to be done. As one
observer stated, "there are just too many design bureaus, institutes, and
factories involved in the space business. Over the long term, some of them
are going to go away and those capabilities can't be retrieved again."117
116Vincent Kiernan and Andrew Lawler, "Koptev Confident About Russian Space Program",
Space News, June 15-21, 1992.
117Leonard David, "U.S. Firms Ponder Dealings with Former Soviet Union", Space News. May
4-10, 1992.
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This pruning of the space program could be carried out in a number of
ways, each with its collection of potential pitfalls. The program could just be
allowed to slowly decline, as it has been doing for the last three years, but this
is unlikely to result in either a strong space program or space industry.
Alternatively, the program could be forced to operate on a fairly capitalistic
basis, but this might result in the loss of prestigious programs that do not
have tangible financial payoffs. Finally, the government could pick and
choose which organizations and capabilities will be maintained and which
cancelled; the pitfall here is that the choice may be dominated by political,
rather than technical, economic, or policy-related factors. Early efforts to
prioritize national space efforts are being conducted by a 50-member
commission headed by the president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, but
it is not clear how much weight the commissions reccomendations will
have. 118
The third major question on which the future of the Russian space
program rests is what the future relations between the former Soviet
republics (most importantly Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) will be
like. Less than cordial relations between Russia and Ukraine could result in
the demise of the Zenit booster, for example; troubles with Kazakhstan could
result in Russia being forced to rely heavily on the Plesetsk Cosmodrome
(and the boosters that can be launched from there). The decision of who will
operate the military space programs will determine their size and
composition. Finally, unless some way for all (or at least most) of the
republics to pay for the overall space program is found, spending cuts will be
very deep.
118Vincent Kiernan, "Russia to Prioritize National Space Activities", Space News, August 24-
30, 1992.
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Large scale cooperative efforts with the space agencies of other nations
could also have an effect on the final shape of the Russian space program.
For example, Russia has applied to join the European Space Agency (ESA).119
If this application were to be accepted, Russian capabilities useful for a joint
ESA-Russia space program would probably be maintained, while Russian
programs that duplicate European capabilities might be cancelled. In a more
likely scenario, ESA may pursue some cooperative projects with Russia, thus
helping to preserve the existence of the hardware involved in those projects.
The United States also has the opportunity to affect the destiny of the Russian
space program; a large U.S./Russian program of cooperation in the SEI, for
example, could lead the Russians to concentrate on maintaining the
capabilities that would be needed for such an endeavor.
The Future for Particular Space Systems
It is clear that to guess which pieces of hardware might still be available
a few years from now is a very risky proposition. The best that can be done is
to examine each item of hardware in terms of the following criteria:
* its place in the overall space program
* its costs and benefits to the rest of the economy,
* its value for national security,
* its value for national prestige, and
* the political clout (and survivability) of its manufacturers and
users.
1 19 Peter B. deSelding, "ESA, Russians in Courting Ritual", Space News. April 6-12, 1992.
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The extent to which each of these factors is important will depend on the
overall shape that the Russian space program takes, as described in the
previous section.
The first criterion, the place of the hardware in the overall space
program, is quite important. It's unlikely that the Soyuz launch vehicle will
be phased out, for example, as it is the only Russian booster that has launched
humans into space in the last quarter-century. On the other hand, the
Vostok, which really has no payloads, could easily be completely cancelled.
This criterion is likely to be more important if the management of the space
program is given a strong hand to reorganize.
The second criterion, costs and benefits to the rest of the economy,
should be very important in the decisions over which hardware will remain.
The Buran shuttle, for example, seems unlikely to fly again because it fails
both this criterion (in being very costly and having no economic benefits) and
the previous criterion (in that it has no payloads). Systems, such as
communications satellites, which are providing necessary services to the
nation, however, are more likely to continue being produced. One crucial
point is that this is one criterion that can be affected by forces outside the
USSR. While the current situation, in which minute amounts of foreign
currency make a large difference in the survivability of a particular piece of
space hardware, is not likely to continue for long, it does seem probable that
modest financial support (or even the promise of such support) might be
enough to keep some items of hardware from being lost.
The third criterion, the value of the hardware to national security,
might apply to either the security of the Russian republic, or to whatever
inter-republic system ends up operating the former Soviet Union's military
space systems. While it seems very clear that the military is going to shrink
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significantly, it is likely that at least some military space systems will remain.
Hardware that is either part of these systems, or is used to support them will
be unlikely to be cut. Some examples of hardware that might be preserved for
their use in the military space program are the Tsyklon launch vehicle and
the Topaz reactor.
The fourth criterion used to judge whether or not a space system might
keep operating is its value for national prestige. Again, this might be the
prestige of the Russian Republic, or of whatever confederation may be
running the space program. In either case, there is strong evidence that,
despite the fact that space is not very popular in Russia, there is resistance to
completely giving up the country's former leading position in space. The
prestige factor is most likely to be important in the humans-in-space
programs, as they have the greatest political value, but this criterion may also
help save some space science hardware.
The final criterion, the political clout of the manufacturers and users of
a particular piece of hardware, will no doubt play an important role. For
example, it will be easier to kill a system built in a plant in another republic
than in a plant near the capital. There will also be pressure not to kill a
plant's major project, lest the cancellation causes the entire organization to
collapse. Large organizations, such as NPO Energia, might have enough clout
to save the hardware they are working on, or at least to decide which of the
projects they're working on they want to continue. (NPO Energia's power to
influence the future of the Russian space program was recently illustrated by
its contribution of a billion rubles towards the effort to keep Baikonur
Cosmodrome in operation.)120 If nobody is given strong authority over the
120Peter B. de Selding "Republics to Share Profits From Mir", Space News. August 10-16, 1992.
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future of the Russian space program, the influence of manufacturers and
users is likely to be the most important criterion for determining which
hardware will survive.
As a final note, even if a piece of hardware is cancelled, it will generally
take some time before the loss becomes irreversible. The ability to bring a
piece of hardware "back" depends on the condition of the equipment used to
manufacture it, the ability to retain the workers who know how to build and
operate the hardware, and the availability of all the necessary documentation.
The policy of "conversion," for example, has generally not yet resulted in the
loss of the machinery used to produce space hardware, as most plants have
continued to maintain it. The biggest problem caused by conversion has
rather been the loss of the highly trained specialists, who have left as
technical tasks became simpler and salaries lower. (It is believed that the
recent string of Zenit failures can be tied to the loss of technicians in KB
Yushnoye.) 121
12 1Leonard David, "U.S. Firms Ponder Dealings with Former Soviet Union", Space News. May
4-10, 1992.
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IV. U.S./Russian Interactions in the SEI
The costs and benefits of using items of Russian space hardware in the
SEI will depend to a large degree on the method of interaction between the
United States and Russia. Items of Russian hardware that are not cost-
effective for the U.S. to purchase for use in the SEI, for example, might be
useful to the initiative if they were to be provided without charge by the
Russians as part of a cooperative effort. In a similar vein, a piece of hardware
unable to meet the SEI's technical requirements might serve as a valuable
starting point for a joint U.S./Russian SEI hardware development program.
A careful choice of methods of U.S./Russian cooperation, based on an
understanding of the issues and actors involved, will be a crucial ingredient
to the success of any effort to introduce Russian hardware into the SEI.
Issues Concerning the Use of Russian Space Hardware in the SEI
The first step in determining the best means of using Russian space
hardware in the SEI is to examine the issues involved in such an endeavor.
These include domestic policy issues, such as concerns about the impact of the
use of Russian space hardware on the U.S. aerospace industry, on the rest of
the space program, and on national prestige; and foreign policy issues, such as
national security concerns, the situation within Russia, and the international
reaction to U.S./Russian cooperation. Operational issues raised by the use of
Russian hardware in the SEI must also be considered. These include the
problems of dealing with the Russian government and industry, and the
effects of cooperation on the overall cost and managerial complexity of the
SEI.
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The Effect on the U.S. Aerospace Industry
Use of Russian space hardware in the SEI could affect the U.S.
aerospace industry. The primary concern is that such use might take business
away from the U.S. aerospace industry while strengthening its Russian
competition. On the other hand, cooperation with Russia could result in the
transfer to U.S. industry of new technological capabilities, which would help
to improve the position of U.S. firms vis-a-vis competitors from other
nations. Cooperation with Russia might also potentially result in the U.S.
moving forward with the SEI, providing the aerospace industry with years of
lucrative government contracts.
Concern about the possible damage to U.S. industry from the use of
Russian space technology in U.S. programs is valid. Distinctions must be
drawn, though, between hardware (such as a lunar base) for which there is no
foreseeable commercial market and hardware (such as a medium-lift launch
vehicle) for which a commercial market already exists or might soon develop.
A differentiation must be made between hardware that has already been
developed by U.S. industry and hardware that has not yet been developed in
the United States.
There is likely to be a greater problem from Russian hardware for
which a commercial market already exists, or might soon develop, than from
hardware for which there is no foreseeable commercial market. Government
acquisition of commercially viable hardware, particularly in an industry (such
as much of the space industry) where the products are highly expensive and
sales are few, can result in a significant strengthening of the competitiveness
of the hardware's producer, which, in turn, can eventually result in
commercial gains to the producer that are far greater than the value of the
70
government purchase. This effect is heightened for hardware items for
which there is only an embryonic commercial market, as government
support in such a case can often be critical to a company's survival.
Acquiring Russian hardware for which a U.S. equivalent already exists
will be more of a problem than acquiring Russian hardware which has no
equivalent in the United States. While the first case would result in direct
losses to U.S. industry, acquiring Russian hardware for which there is no
equivalent U.S. capability deprives U.S. industry only of the possibility of
gaining a future development contract. Opposition to acquiring Russian
hardware for which there is no equivalent U.S. capability is also likely to be
muted because, while differences in costs between existing U.S. and Russian
hardware are likely to be relatively small, the expense of developing entirely
new hardware in the U.S. is likely to be far higher than the cost of purchasing
existing Russian hardware.
One factor that might warm the response of the U.S. aerospace industry
to the use of Russian hardware in the SEI is that such interaction could result
in the transfer of advanced Russian technology to the United States. Such a
transfer, particularly if the technology had some commercial application,
could help increase the competitiveness of U.S. companies. There is another
side to the issue; transfer of U.S. technology to Russian organizations could
also occur. In this case, the aerospace industry would be averse to transferring
technology that had commercial applications. The greater experience of the
United States, and U.S. firms, in dealing in the international market,
however, may insure that, at least at the beginning of any interaction, most
technology transfer would be to the benefit of the United States.
Another reason that the use of Russian hardware in the SEI might not
be strongly resisted by the U.S. aerospace industry is that such use could
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possibly be the critical act that convinces the nation (and Congress in
particular) that the SEI is worth pursuing. (This issue is dealt with in greater
detail in the next subsection.) As the U.S. aerospace industry sees the SEI as a
potential source of significant long-term funding,122 they may be prepared to
overlook some of the possible disadvantages to the use of Russian hardware
in it if they believe that such use is necessary to get Congress to begin
providing that funding.
Concerns about the impact of the use of Russian space hardware on the
U.S. aerospace industry will probably be one of the more important issues in
deciding the means by which such hardware should be incorporated into the
SEI. One group that will want to have a say in any such decision will be the
aerospace lobby, which in the past has pressured the government to limit
sales of foreign space hardware (though most of the government's decisions
in this area have been based primarily on foreign policy and national security
concerns.) 123 Probably more important than the aerospace lobby, though,
would be the political fallout that the U.S. government would have to endure
from supporting a plan which could be seen to be hurting U.S. firms. It seems
likely that any plan that arguably hurt the aerospace industry would have to
have significant cost or other benefits to be acceptable to the U.S. government.
The Impact on the Rest of the U.S. Space Program
The use of Russian hardware in the SEI could also have some effects
on the rest of the U.S. space program. One possible effect is that such use
might propel the SEI into a more prominent position relative to other space
projects, perhaps affecting those projects. The use of Russian space hardware
122Debra Polsky, "Aerospace Industry Antes Up", Space News, April 15-21, 1991.
123"Tell China and Russia the Rules", Editorial, Space News, July 20-26, 1992.
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in the context of a large cooperative program, for example, might provide
enough of a basic justification for the SEI to dramatically increase
Congressional support for the initiative. Even lesser degrees of cooperation
might convince Congress that the SEI would not be as prohibitively
expensive as previously feared, leading to an increase in their support for it.
If the SEI began to receive significant funding, this might (particularly in
times of tight budgets) result in reductions in funding for other space projects,
or in demands that the projects change in order to better support the goals of
the SEI.
Use of Russian space hardware in the SEI might also result in an
increase in the use of Russian space hardware elsewhere in the space
program. There are already studies underway to determine whether a Soyuz
capsule might be used as the space station's crew rescue vehicle, 124 and the
use of the Energia vehicle to launch the space station has been discussed in
Congress. 125 The broad use of Russian hardware in the SEI could open the
door to the possibility of extensive use of Russian hardware throughout the
rest of the U.S. space program. Extensive use of Russian hardware could
result in the augmentation of some projects (for example, by using cheap
Russian launch vehicles to launch space science satellites), and the redesign
or cancellation of others (for example, the space station could be redesigned to
be launched by the Energia).
The issue of the effect of the use of Russian space hardware in the SEI
on the rest of the U.S. space program is likely to have only a small impact on
any decision on whether such use should take place, or on how it should be
124Leonard David, "Soyuz Seen as Station Life Raft", Space News, April 27-May 3, 1992.
125U.S. Congress Subcommittee on Space, "Bilateral Space Cooperation With the Former
Soviet Union", Hearing, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 25, 1992.
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managed. Reaction of supporters of various NASA projects will be muted
because, first, there will be a lot of uncertainty about which programs will end
up being affected, and second, the effect on the overall space program is likely
to be heterogeneous, leading to a mixed reaction. The space station is the one
project that may be powerful enough to exert a strong influence, and worried
enough about its status to act despite uncertainty. Supporters of the space
station would probably attempt to stop any use of Russian space hardware
that they thought might imperil the project.
National Prestige
The use of Russian space hardware in the SEI could have a significant
effect on the national and international prestige of the United States. No
matter what the method of interaction involved, such activity would
showcase the end of the Cold War and the new willingness of Russia and the
U.S. to cooperate with each other. The overall form of the interaction,
however, could either increase or decrease the amount and type of prestige
gained.
The methods through which the U.S. and Russia might interact in the
SEI will affect the prestige of the U.S. program in a not entirely obvious
manner. For example, if the U.S. were to treat Russia as a mere hardware
supplier, this might make the U.S. look powerful, especially compared to its
former competitor, but it might also make the U.S. look like a "poor winner"
of the Cold War, taking advantage of the troubles in the Soviet economy
without giving anything back. On the other hand, if the U.S. were to
cooperate closely with Russia on the SEI, it could lower the perception of the
U.S. being far ahead of Russia in space, but it might also increase the
perception that the U.S. is a "leader" in space.
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The issue of the effect of using Russian space hardware in the SEI on
national prestige may not play a significant role in any debate over if and how
such interactions take place. The main reason for this is not because prestige
is unimportant in the space program--it is one of the fundamental reasons
the space program exists--but because many of the politicians and engineers
involved in making decisions about the space program have become
uncomfortable about making decisions based on prestige, rather than on
technical or economic grounds. The undeniable symbolic value of U.S.-
Russian cooperation in space, however, could force the prestige issue to be
considered.
The Effect on U.S. National Security
There are three main national security-related issues associated with
the use of Russian space hardware in the SEI. The first, already touched
upon, is the need to maintain the military-related capabilities of the U.S.
aerospace industry. The second, and historically most prominent, issue is the
transfer of militarily useful technology between the United States and Russia.
The third, and most controversial, issue is the effect of the use of Russian
space hardware on that nation's military-industrial complex. These three
issues are very likely to put some limits on any U.S./Russian interaction in
the SEI.
The maintenance of U.S. space capabilities and the vitality of the U.S.
space industry are national security issues because of the importance of space
to U.S. intelligence and defense efforts. Though the preservation of existing
capabilities is important to national security, it is unlikely that any capabilities
that are currently being used for defense purposes will be lost due to the use
of Russian hardware in the SEI. The more pertinent issue is the concern that
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the use of Russian hardware in the SEI might result in the loss of future
capabilities due to the cancellation of some existing or planned U.S.
development programs with potential military applications (such as the
development of a U.S. heavy lift launch vehicle).
Notwithstanding that it has been used mainly as an excuse to prevent
the Soviet Union and China from entering the commercial launch market,
there is also a real national security-related issue in keeping advanced U.S.
technology from falling into Russian hands. It is, however, an issue that is of
less consequence since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War. Now, even if Russia were to gain advanced military-related
technology, it is not clear that they have either the desire or the funding to
develop the technology into new military systems.
A perhaps more important side of the issue is that cooperation with
the Russians in the SEI may lead to the transfer of advanced Russian military
technologies to the United States. At least at present, though, the Russians
seem quite willing to allow the U.S. military to directly purchase some of
their advanced military technologies.126,127 If this policy continues, the U.S.
military will not need to use the SEI to gain new technologies, but if the
Russians begin to close down the direct flow of their military technologies to
the U.S. defense establishment, their participation in the SEI might become a
useful source of technologies with military applications.
The third national security-related issue is the effect that the use of
Russian space hardware in the SEI would have on the future of the Russian
military-industrial complex. This is another issue with two sides; the use of
126U.S. Congress Subcommittee on Space, "Bilateral Space Cooperation With the Former
Soviet Union", Hearing, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 25, 1992.
127Andrew Lawler, "Defense Teams Leading Way to Soviet Store", Space News. September 23-
29, 1991.
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Russian space hardware in the SEI could conceivably either help to maintain
Russian military capability or help to convert it to more peaceful uses.
Current U.S. policy is to attempt to starve the Russian military-industrial
complex; U.S. requests for acquisition of Soviet space technology currently
have "the presumption of approval, unless the acquisition would in fact
contribute to the maintenance of a threatening military capability."128
Support of the Russian space industry will have an effect on the
nation's military-industrial complex because the Russian space program,
even more so than the U.S. program, has many items of hardware with dual
military and civil backgrounds and roles. For example, many Soviet launch
vehicles are based upon ICBMs--some are produced in the same factories as
ICBMs--and even the launch vehicles with no military heritage can be used to
loft either civil or military payloads. Many spacecraft also have dual military
and civil uses; two of the Salyut space stations, for example, were primarily
used by the military.129 SEI acquisition of either Russian hardware with dual
military and civil uses or of hardware manufactured by organizations that
also produce military systems could be seen as preserving Russian military
capabilities.
But there are also a number of plausible reasons why the use of
Russian space hardware in the SEI could aid in reducing the threat from the
Soviet military-industrial complex. First, giving contracts to manufacture
hardware for the SEI to factories that can produce either military or civil
hardware may lead the factories to concentrate on their non-military
production. Second, widespread U.S. purchase of Russian hardware might
128Vincent Kiernan, "Russian Rockets: Threat or Economic Lifeline?", Space News, April 13-19,
1992.
129Brian Harvey, Race Into Space: the Soviet Space Program, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons,
1988, p.202.
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aid in preventing sectors of the Russian space industry from completely
collapsing, thus reducing the likelihood of unrest that might return hard-
liners to power. Finally, the injection of Western cash into the Russian space
program might help keep Soviet experts in some militarily relevant fields--
such as nuclear power or rocket design--from looking for work in other
countries.
National security-related issues could have a primary effect on
decisions regarding the use of Russian space hardware in the SEI, due to the
influence of the U.S. institutions involved. The most important of these
issues will probably be the effect of such use on the Russian military-
industrial complex. The final decision on how much Russian hardware
should be used in the SEI may depend strongly on whether Russia is
perceived to be continuing to dismantle its military, and on whether warm
relations continue between the United States and Russia.
Concerns Within Russia
The Russian response to any U.S. efforts to use Russian space hardware
in the SEI will probably be based on three major issues. Currently, the most
important of these factors, from the Russian point of view, would probably be
the economic costs and benefits of any participation in the SEL The other two
issues, however, the effect of participation in the SEI on Russia's national
pride, and desire to not give away all of Russia's military technology, will
tend to ameliorate any strictly economic approach to Russian participation in
the SEI.
The economic costs and benefits of providing space hardWare to the SEI
will likely be an major factor in any Russian decision on parlicipation in the
initiative. Economic issues are currently of extreme importance in the
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Russian space program; funding for space declined approximately 35%
between 1988 and 1991, and the decline is continuing in 1992.13,131 Foreign
sales are sorely needed by the organizations involved in the Russian space
program, both to preserve their work forces and to serve as signals to the
government that they are producing valuable hardware and are thus worth
maintaining. Foreign sales also provide an opportunity for the Russian
government to point to actual benefits being produced by the nation's space
program.
One counterbalance to the drive to market every item of Russian space
hardware is the growing reaction against selling off the country's space assets
at bargain-basement prices.1 32,133 This reaction may have been sparked by a
rumor that the United States wanted to buy the Mir space station in order to
deprive Russia of its "trump card" in space; 134 it was augmented by the media
backlash to the sale of the Topaz reactor. It is difficult to determine the
strength of this "national pride", but it seems likely that it will result in some
limits to what the Russians will sell (for example, they are unlikely to be
willing to sell the working Mir space station); it may also result in an increase
in the extremely low prices previously asked for Russian space hardware.
An important opportunity that is created by the remnants of Russian
national pride in their space program is that it could lead the Russians to
provide some hardware for the SEI on other than a strict cash basis. The hard
130S. Zhukov et. al. "The Scientific-Technical Revolution and the Economy: Russia and Space",
Pravitelstvennyy Vestnik, February 1992.
131Zhanna Shanurova, "Space is Again Asking for Money", Interview with Aleksandr
Dunayev, Kuranty, March 6 1992.
132Peter B. deSelding, "Bargain Prices Build Russian Resentment", Space News, April 27-May
2, 1992.
133S. Brilev and St. Kutcher, "How We Helped the United States to Economize on the SDI
Program", Komsomolskaya, April 15, 1992.
134Ravil Zaripov, "Lemons for the Funeral Repast, or 'Space Games' of the CIS', Moskovskiy
Komsomolets, January 17,1992.
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currency obtained through the sale of an item of hardware would have to be
gauged against the national prestige that could be gained from participation as
a partner in an international space project. It is uncertain how strong this
incentive is, as the Russian public is now generally unsupportive of the space
program,135 but it is a factor that may grow in relative importance if Russia's
economic troubles decline.
The Russians may also be reluctant to sell items of space hardware that
would allow other nations to acquire some of their unique military
technologies. Although the Russian government permitted the sale of the
militarily significant Topaz reactor, and reportedly has been willing to sell
other military systems, 136 it seems likely that the future transfer of militarily
significant hardware to the United States will not be without limits. If the
Russian government strengthens its oversight of the space sector, it is
possible that such military-related technology transfer may be further
restricted.
International Issues
Wide-scale use of Russian space hardware in the Space Exploration
Initiative is likely to have repercussions in other countries, particularly those
with which the United States often participates in cooperative space
endeavors. First, as has already been discussed, the use of Russian space
hardware in the SEI could have an effect on the international perception of
U.S. leadership in space. Second, the United States' space allies may want to
join in any large-scale cooperative SEI program. Finally, countries
135Andrey Tarasov, "Club 206: Into the International Space Year on the Fragments of the Space
Program", Literaturnaya Gazeta, January 22, 1992.136U.S. Congress Subcommittee on Space, "Bilateral Space Cooperation With the Former
Soviet Union", Hearing, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 25, 1992, p. 107.
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participating in international projects that might be indirectly affected by
U.S/Russian cooperation in the SEI may be wary of such cooperation.
The U.S. is already involved in cooperative space activities with a large
number of countries. 137 If the United States makes any broad cooperative
agreement with Russia, some or all of these countries may want the U.S. to
include them in the agreement. Such international cooperation could offer
these countries a chance to use the space assets of the United States and
Russia to augment their own capabilities, as well as allowing them to
participate in some of the ongoing technology transfer, and perhaps to share
in the prestige of participating in a visionary space effort. However, since the
U.S. and Russian space programs dwarf all other space programs,138 the roles
of the other nations would probably be fairly minor. This could certainly
change, though, over the long time frame of the SEI.
Probably more important to some countries is the effect of Russian
participation in the SEI on cooperative projects that are already in existence,
particularly the space station project. The current space station design
includes one Japanese and one European experiment module (out of a total of
four modules), as well as a Canadian robotic repair device. The nations
participating in the space station program have already invested significant
time and effort in developing their contributions, and see the space station as
an important part of the future of their space programs.1 39,140 For this reason,
137For example, the Space Station and Spacelab projects involve Japan and the European Space
Agency
138The next largest space program after the U.S. and Russian programs is probably the space
program of the Ukraine, which basically consists of one major Soviet design bureau. The next
after that, the program of the European Space Agency, is probably about a tenth the size of the
U.S. and Russian programs.
139Kate Pound Dawson, "Japanese Request Moderate Gains in 1993 Space Budget", Space News,
August 17-23, 1992.
140Peter B. de Selding, "ESA Circulates Streamlined Plan for Ministers' Review", Space News,
June 15-21, 1992.
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they, like other allies of the space station, may disapprove of any venture that
might result in the cancellation of the project.
Dealing With the Russian Government and Industry
The difficulties of dealing with the Russian government and industry,
particularly over the long-term, are likely to have a significant impact on any
use of Russian space hardware in the SEI. The reason for this is that low
hardware costs and high performance matter little if the hardware is held up
in red tape, technical support is unavailable, or contracts are not honored.
The two major issues in this area are the instability of the Russian
government and space industry and the unfamiliarity of Russian space
organizations with basic Western business practices.
As discussed in Chapter III, the stability of neither the Russian
government nor the Russian space program is assured. One reason this
instability is a major concern is because almost any use of Russian space
hardware in the SEI will require long-term interactions with the hardware's
producers. For example, an item of hardware that is acquired for long-term or
repeated use, is going to be modified, or is going to be used as part of a
hardware development program, will require extended technical support
from the people within Russia who know the hardware's subsystems, history,
and quirks. The availability of this technical support will depend on both the
continued stability of the organization that provides the support, and the
government policy that allows the organization to provide the support.
The other major problem with the instability in Russia is that it makes
it dangerous for the U.S. to plan for the future use of Russian hardware. This
is a particularly serious danger for large hardware items, which can have
decade-long development times, and for hardware that is required for
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missions which are essential for the continuation of the initiative. For
example, if the U.S. planned to use the Energia heavy lift vehicle to put a base
on the Moon in 2004, and then was prevented from doing so by events within
Russia in 2003, the entire schedule of the SEI could be delayed for years as the
U.S. developed its own heavy lift vehicle.
In addition to the long-term problem of the instability of the Russian
space program, there is also a short term problem that may hamper some
methods of using Russian space hardware in the SEI. This problem is that the
Russian space industry is currently very unfamiliar with basic Western
business practices. 141 For example, Russian firms have been reluctant to
provide Western firms with the amount of technical data that is needed to
assess the viability of possible cooperative efforts. In addition they seem to
have little understanding of the degree of control which Western system
prime contractors or integrators have over the technical details of the
subcontractors' work.1 42 Finally, they are unfamiliar with Western contract
law, as was evidenced when Glavkosmos, the Soviet marketing agency,
signed simultaneous exclusive contracts for microgravity experimentation
with a number of European organizations.143
The Russian space industry's inexperience with Western business
practices will have an effect on some types of interactions with the United
States, at least until the Russians learn Western business practices. First, U.S.
industry will be wary about dealing with the Russian space industry unless
they receive some assurance that the Russians will abide by any contracts they
141Leonard David, "U.S. Firms Ponder Dealings with Former Soviet Union", Space News, May
4-10, 1992.
14 2 Edward Crawley and Jim Rymarcsuk, "US-Soviet Cooperation in Space", Space Policy,
February 1992.
14 3 Peter B. de Selding, "Firms Question Exclusivity of Soviet Contracts", Space News, July 8-14,
1991.
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sign. Second, problems may arise even after the contracts are signed, as U.S.
primary contractors and Russian subcontractors argue over their respective
responsibilities. While contact with U.S. companies will help Russian firms
learn Western business practices, the U.S. might encounter less problems if it
were to deal with the firms through more traditional channels, such as
through the Russian government. (On the other hand, the current situation
in Russia is such that agreements for international hardware sales made
between private organizations are much simpler and less time-consuming
than intergovernmental agreements. 144)
Concerns About Cost
One of the most crucial issues in the use of Russian hardware in the
SEI is how such use will affect the cost of the initiative. The SEI's greatest
stumbling block has always been its huge cost, and one of the primary
motives for using Russian space hardware in it would be to reduce that cost.
The effect of the use of Russian space hardware on the cost of the SEI will
depend on the (previously discussed) impact on the U.S. aerospace industry,
the cost of the Russian hardware (as compared to the cost of the alternative),
the cost of integration, and the willingness of the Russian government to
provide the hardware at a reduced cost.
Direct purchases of items of Russian space hardware may not provide
as much cost savings as the prices presently being advertised might indicate.
The factors that have been causing Russian organizations to offer to sell their
hardware at bargain prices over the last couple of years (the reduction in
overall space funding, combined with unfavorable exchange rates and a lack
144Vincent Kiernan, "Russians Put Strings on Reactor Purchase", Space News. May 4-10, 1992.
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of knowledge of the real costs of producing hardware) are unlikely to
continue over the time-frame of the SEI (where the first launch may not
come until the end of the 1990s). The effect may be that the extremely low
prices that have been quoted for various items of Russian space hardware will
begin to rise in the near future. On the other hand, many items of Russian
hardware are going to remain cheaper than their Western alternatives due to
their simplicity, the years of experience the Russians have in producing them,
and the low cost of skilled Russian labor.
In addition to the direct cost of purchase, there is also a 'hidden' cost to
the use of Russian space hardware in the SEI--the cost of integrating the
hardware into the overall U.S. space program. The integration costs can be a
major factor in the overall cost of any hardware. Integration of the Soyuz
spacecraft with the U.S. space station, for example, would require
modification of the docking equipment, changing the cabin's internal
pressure, and adding an additional seat, alterations that could end up being
more costly than the actual purchase of the Soyuz capsule. 145
Costs of integration of Russian hardware into the SEI will depend on
how closely the two nation's hardware is linked. For example, launch of a
Russian robotic probe on a Russian launch vehicle would not require any
additional integration. Slightly more costly would be modifications to the
design of new U.S. hardware so that it could be used with Russian hardware,
such as a lunar lander that could dock with a Russian space station module.
Very high integration costs are likely to be incurred when existing hardware
must be modified to work with the hardware of the other nation. For
example, the Apollo-Soyuz mission required the development of an entirely
145Leonard David, "Soyuz, Shuttle Join Stable of Rescue Vehicle Contenders", Space News,
February 10-16, 1992.
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new docking system and the development of an emergency pressurization
system for the Soyuz capsule, among other changes. 146
The final, and maybe most important, issue affecting the cost of using
Russian hardware in the SEI is the willingness of the Russian government to
fund Russian participation in the SEI. Although the Gorbachev government
offered to mount a bilateral Mars mission with the U.S., as an alternative to
the Strategic Defense Initiative 147, it is not clear if the present or future
Russian government would do such a thing; such a decision would depend
upon the offer to participate made to them by the U.S., the economic and
political situation, the economic costs and benefits, and the perceived benefits
to national prestige.
Management of the SEI
A final issue is the effect that the use of Russian space hardware in the
SEI would have on the management of the initiative. No matter how
Russian hardware is introduced into the SEI, it will increase the managerial
complexity and loosen the managerial control of the initiative. The primary
cause will be the introduction of Russian organizations into the hierarchy,
organizations that are not subject to the same rules as the U.S. organizations
involved in the initiative. The seriousness of this problem will depend on
the previously discussed difficulty of dealing with the Russians and on the
level of Russian participation in the SEI. For example, the addition of a few
Russian subcontractors will not pose nearly as large a problem as the
development of a joint U.S./Russian lunar base would.
146Edward and Linda Ezell, The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project,
Washington DC: NASA, 1978, p. 210.
147V. Glushko, et. al., "Fantasy on the Drawing Board: The Road to Mars", Prada, May 24,
1988.
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Another possible management problem is that both the U.S. and
Russia might have difficulties in participating in any cooperative programs in
which they do not have the lead role.148 The U.S. traditionally insisted that it
have a leadership position in all of its major cooperative space projects (with
the exception of Apollo-Soyuz), as did the Soviet Union. This may not be a
significant problem for interactions which only involve purchases of Russian
hardware, but it could complicate the initiation of any joint programs.
Methods of U.SJRussian Interaction in the SEI
The use of Russian space hardware in the SEI can be handled through a
number of different means, ranging from the direct purchase of Russian
hardware for use in U.S. missions to fully cooperative programs. It is not
necessary to use one type of interaction over the whole SEI; instead, different
methods might be used for different kinds of hardware. The optimum means
of cooperation for each type of hardware will depend on the issues discussed
in the previous section, as well as on factors particular to each method of
cooperation.
There are six different basic methods that could be used to incorporate
Russian hardware into the SEI. Other possible cooperative methods (such as
making the U.S. and Russia equal partners in the SEI) do exist, of course, but
the six discussed are the ones that are probably the most feasible considering
economic and political realities. The six methods are:
1) Scientific cooperation
2) U.S. purchase of Russian technology to aid in U.S. hardware
development
148Crawley, Edward and Rymarcsuk, Jim, "US-Soviet Cooperation in Space", Space Policy,
February 1992.
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3) Use of Russian hardware by U.S. industry
4) U.S. purchase of Russian space hardware
5) U.S. -led endeavor with close Russian participation
6) U.S. -led endeavor with separate Russian participation
Scientific Cooperation
Scientific cooperation is defined here as cooperation between U.S. and
Russian scientists that generally does not involve either the exchange of
money or the development of hardware other than scientific instruments.
This type of cooperation could include such activities as the use of one
nation's scientific instruments on the spacecraft of the other nation, the
development of joint experimental protocols, and the sharing of scientific
data. Large scale activities such as the joint development of a lunar orbiter, or
of a nuclear thermal rocket are not considered scientific cooperation.
The long and successful history of international scientific cooperation
in space will make it easier for such cooperation to occur in the SEI. Both
nations have significant experience in this type of cooperative endeavor in
space, from programs like the Phobos spacecraft, which had instruments from
thirteen nations, 149 to the ongoing cooperation between the United States and
Russia in sharing life sciences data.15 0 The scientific community has become
so used to international scientific cooperation that they would probably
protest fairly strongly if such cooperation did not take place in the SEI.
Few major problems are likely to arise over U.S/Russian scientific
cooperation in the SEI. Such cooperation would not significantly effect the
149R.Z. Sagdeev & A.V. Zakharov, "Brief History of the Phobos Mission", Nature, October 19,
1989.
1500ffice of Technology Assessment, Exploring the Moon and Mars, Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, July 1991.
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U.S. aerospace industry, U.S. national security, other programs inside NASA,
or other international cooperative projects. It also seems likely that such
cooperation would not meet any significant resistance from the Russian
government or industry. Finally, because of the means by which scientific
cooperation occurs, it would not add to the managerial complexity of the SEI,
nor be hampered by the inexperience of most Russian organizations in
dealing with the West. On the positive side, U.S/Russian scientific
cooperation could help produce better scientific results without significantly
increasing cost and, in a small way, could increase national prestige for both
nations.
The only real concern about this type of cooperation is that there could
be problems if, due to the instability within Russia, funding for Russian
instruments that were to be used on a U.S. spacecraft was lost part way
through the project. This would not be a very large problem, though, as,
depending on the criticality of the instrument, it could either be left off, or the
U.S. could provide the (relatively small) amount of funding necessary to
complete the project.
U.S. Purchase of Russian Technology to Aid in U.S. Hardware Development
In this mode of cooperative activity, the U.S. would purchase an item
of Russian hardware to serve as the starting point for the development of
new hardware for use in the SEI. An example of this type of interaction
might be if the U.S. were to use the recently purchased Topaz thermionic
reactor to learn how to build a large thermionic reactor that would be used to
power a lunar base. This type of development could be carried out as a strictly
U.S. program or as a bilateral effort with the developers of the original
Russian hardware.
89
From the U.S. point of view, this type of program has a lot of
advantages. First, it directly transfers advanced technologies to the United
States, to the possible benefit of the U.S. military and aerospace industry.
Second, it can result in significant cost savings by taking the place of years of
preliminary technology development. The only likely domestic problems
such activity might cause would be if it were to threaten an ongoing
technology development program. (The purchase of the Topaz reactor has
already set off a reaction by threatening the U.S. SP-100 reactor program.)151
The largest obstacle to this type of interaction might come if Russia, for
reasons of prestige or national security, declined to sell their hardware to the
United States for such use. This problem could probably be avoided if there
was Russian participation in the technology development program, or if it
the development was performed in the context of wide U.S./Russian
cooperation in the SEI. Russian participation might reduce some of the
technology transfer-related benefits, and possibly increase the management
complexity of the activity, but it would also probably significantly speed up
the new hardware development.
Use of Russian Hardware by U.S. Industry
In this mode of interaction, the U.S. would encourage its industries to
use Russian hardware in their proposals for SEI contracts. This could
probably be done simply by easing restrictions on such use, and letting U.S.
firms know that they would not be penalized in contract awards for having
Russian subcontractors. U.S. industries would be left to decide whether they
wanted to directly purchase the hardware from Russian industries, use the
151Andrew Lawler, "House Panel Members Attack Topaz Purchase", Space News, February 3-9,
1992.
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Russian companies as subcontractors, or perhaps use other methods of
interaction. An example of how this might work in the SEI would be if
NASA were to issue contracts for a lunar orbital base and a U.S. contractor
were to subcontract with KB Salyut to develop a modified Salyut-type module
for this base. (This approach is being considered in the current study of
whether a Soyuz capsule might be used as a crew escape vehicle for the U.S.
space station.152)
This type of cooperation has a number of advantages. First, it would
allow industry to find the most efficient manner in which to use Russian
space hardware in the SEI, which would probably result in significant cost
savings. Second, by interacting with U.S. industry, the Soviet enterprises
involved will learn Western business practices, which might in some small
way help ease the Russian transition to a market economy. Aerospace
companies in the U.S. have also generally been in favor of this kind of
approach to using Russian space hardware,153 probably because it ensures that
they will have a chance to be involved in hardware development, and
perhaps also because of the potential for technology transfer.
There are some disadvantages to this type of cooperation, though. The
largest will probably be the difficulty the companies will have dealing with
the Russian government and industry, especially because U.S. industries can
not exert as much political pressure as could be exercised by the U.S.
government. This problem could be eased, though, if NASA were to work
closely with the Russian government to solve any major problems that were
encountered. The other main concern is that this type of interaction might
152Andrew Lawler, "Senate Panel Opposes Broker for Soyuz Deal", Space News, August 24-30,
1992.
153 U.S. Congress Subcommittee on Space, "Bilateral Space Cooperation With the Former
Soviet Union", Hearing, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 25, 1992, p.4 9.
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cause a lot of trouble because the U.S. companies involved would probably be
very concerned with the effect of U.S./Russian cooperation on their other
space business, and might not be particularly concerned with other issues,
such as national prestige and national security issues. This could quite
conceivably result in a great deal of controversy over their proposals for use
of Russian hardware in the SEI.
U.S. Purchase of Russian Space Hardware
In this type of interaction, the U.S. (through NASA) would purchase
Russian hardware, either through intergovernmental agreements or through
direct acquisition from the Russian hardware producers. For example, NASA
might purchase two Energia rockets from NPO Energia to use to launch a
Mars transfer vehicle. This type of cooperation might also include some
additional contracting with either Russian or U.S. companies to integrate the
hardware with U.S. SEI hardware.
This simple type of interaction has fewer advantages than, for example,
a wide-ranging cooperative program, but it also has few disadvantages. On
the positive side, direct purchases of Russian hardware would result in cost
savings over the development of equivalent U.S. hardware and would not
add greatly to the complexity of the initiative's management. In addition,
NASA, as a government organization, might have less trouble in dealing
with the Russians than U.S. industry would have. The only real problems
with this type of arrangement are, first, that the SEI could be vulnerable to the
instability inside Russia if NASA planned to use Russian hardware for critical
SEI tasks and, second, that the U.S. aerospace industry might not be very
supportive of this type of interaction because they would be losing possible
development funding but gaining very little.
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U.S.-led Endeavor With Close Russian Participation
In this type of interaction, the United States would make the SEI a
cooperative venture and ask the Russians (probably in addition to the
European Space Agency and Japan) to participate as junior partners. As in the
Space Station project, the international partners would contribute items of
hardware and the U.S. would provide the balance of the hardware and the
broad systems engineering. An example of Russian contributions under this
method might be the development of a nuclear power system for a lunar
base, or the provision of Soyuz modules as emergency lunar return vehicles.
There are a number of advantages to this type of approach. First, there
would be very large cost-savings gained by having the Russians pay for their
own part of the initiative. This type of cooperation would also be very high-
profile, and thus could lead to greater support for the SEI. In addition,
Russian contributions could probably be restricted to areas where the U.S. has
no equivalent hardware, and would not be competing for U.S. funds, so there
would be little protest from the U.S. aerospace industry. Finally, the close
cooperation could lead to significant amounts of technology transfer (though
the transfer would probably be in both directions.)
There are, however, numerous possible difficulties with this type of
approach. One large problem is that the initiative would become hostage to
the political climate in Russia; changes in the Russian participation in the SEI
could result in the delay or even the cancellation of the initiative. Another
major problem is that management complexity of such a program would be
very high. Perhaps the greatest problem is that for this scheme to work, the
Russians would have to be willing to contribute their own hardware, free of
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charge. Convincing them to do this might require that the U.S. publicly play
up the importance of the Russian contribution.
UL.S.-led Endeavor With Separate Russian Participation
This type of interaction would differ from the previous method in that
the Russian segment of the SEI would be kept separate from the U.S. part,
and, wherever possible, would not extend to elements on the 'critical path' of
the SEI (i.e. parts of the SEI that, if delayed or cancelled would result in the
delay of the entire initiative). For example, the U.S. could ask the Russians to
participate in the SEI by sending robotic rovers to the Moon and orbiters to
Mars to prepare for later human missions. This type of cooperation has been
used successfully before, notably in the international effort to study Halley's
Comet,154 and was recommended by U.S. scientists for the robotic exploration
of Mars.155
This type of cooperation has some of the advantages of the previous
method, but avoids almost all of its disadvantages. While maintaining
significant cost savings, this method avoids the problems associated with the
instability of the Russian space program, and would require much less
managerial complexity. The problem in convincing the Russians to pay for
their own missions would remain, but both the costs to the Russians and the
prestige gained from participating in the SEI would be lessened. Finally,
unlike the previous method of cooperation, this type of cooperation would
result in very little technology transfer in either direction.
154j. Kelly Beatty and Andrew Chaikin, eds., The New Solar System, Cambridge, MA: Sky
Publishing Corporation, 1990, pp. 208-216.
155Andrew Lawler, "Panel: U.S. - Soviet Mars Work Should Not Merge", Space News, April
23-29, 1990.
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V. Basic Mechanics of Space Exploration
It is necessary to understand the physical parameters of the SEI in order
to assess possible exploration plans and the hardware that will be required to
implement them. This understanding requires specification of the locations
that might be visited by SEI missions, an appreciation of the basic celestial
mechanics involved in travelling between the Earth and other points in the
inner solar system, and a sense of some of the operational concerns of SEI
missions, including the difficulties of conducting lengthy space missions
involving human presence.
Locations
To reach the the Moon and Mars, the SEI's primary destinations,
spacecraft must first pass through the near-Earth area. The near-Earth area
can be defined as ranging from the altitude at which short-term atmospheric
drag becomes negligible and spacecraft are able to orbit the Earth (about 150
kilometers above the surface of the planet) to about a million kilometers
from the Earth (three times the distance to the Moon), where the
gravitational attraction of the Sun becomes dominant. The characteristics of
different regions within the near-Earth area vary widely.
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is the area from about 150 km to 1000 km above
the planet. Humans have over 20 man-years of experience in LEO, and
robotic spacecraft far more than that. Above LEO are the Van Allen belts, tori
of charged particles which reach to from about 1,000 to 20,000 km above the
Earth. Numerous robotic satellites routinely travel through the Van Allen
belts, but the Apollo missions are the only piloted spacecraft ever to have
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passed through them. The most notable area above the Van Allen belts is
geosynchronous orbit, 35,000 kilometers above the Earth. At this altitude,
satellites in orbit have the same period as the Earth, and those in 00
inclination orbits remain fixed above one point on the Earth. Over the last
three decades, numerous robotic satellites (but no humans) have been placed
in geosynchronous orbit.
The Lagrange points of the Earth-Moon and Earth-Sun system are areas
in the vicinity of Earth with particular qualities that may make them useful
to the exploration effort. Lagrange points are locations where the
gravitational attractions of two bodies are balanced; a spacecraft at one of these
points will not be drawn towards either of the bodies. There are five Lagrange
points (known as L1 through L5) in the Earth-Moon system; these points orbit
the Earth with the same period as the Moon. Figure V-1 illustrates the
location of the Earth-Moon Lagrange points. (The Sun-Earth system also has
five Lagrange points in the same relative positions.)
L4A
Direction of Motion
L3 Ll 1 L2
EARTH
MOON
L5
Figure V-1: Location of Lagrange Points in Earth-Moon System
Though not all of the Lagrange points are stable (i.e. a spacecraft that begins to
drift away from them will continue to drift away), stable "halo" orbits around
the points can be maintained with minimal energy expenditure. The
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Lagrange points can be useful to exploration missions as "resting points" that
are not tightly bound to a planet's gravity. The utility of the Lagrange points
was shown by the ISEE-3 spacecraft, which, after completing its mission in a
halo orbit around the Sun-Earth LI point, used very little fuel to maneuver
into a position where it could measure the Earth's geomagnetic tail and then
rendezvous with comet Giacobini-Zinner. 156
The Moon orbits the Earth at a distance of 384,000 km, about ten times
further out than the orbit of geosynchronous communications satellites and a
thousand times higher than a typical space shuttle orbit. The Moon's orbit is
inclined 50 to the plane of the ecliptic, so the inclination of its orbit to Earth's
equator varies (over an 18.5 year period) from 18' to 281. The Moon is about
one quarter the diameter of the Earth, with about one eightieth the Earth's
mass, and a surface gravity approximately a sixth that of the Earth. It has no
general atmosphere or magnetic field; the lunar surface is exposed directly to
the solar wind and the interplanetary radiation environment. The Moon
revolves around the Earth with a period of 27.3 days, with one side always
facing the Earth. Because of this, the lunar days and nights are approximately
14 Earth days long. Lunar temperatures vary from 393 K (120 °C) in the
daylight to 153 K (-150 OC) in the dark.157 The U.S. Apollo and Soviet Luna
missions in the late 1960s and early 1970s proved the feasibility of landing
machines and men on the Moon and returning them safely to Earth.
Mars orbits the Sun with a period of 687 days. Its orbit is slightly
elliptical, so its distance from the Sun varies about 20% over a Martian year.
Due to this variation, and the different orbital periods of the Earth and Mars,
156Paul W. Keaton, "A Moon/Mars Base Transportation Depot", Lunar Bases and Space
Activities of the 21st Century, Houston: Lunar and Planetary Institute, 1985, p.144.
157T.D. Lin, "Concrete for Lunar Base Construction", Lunar Bases and Space Activities of the
21st Century, Houston: Lunar and Planetary Institute, 1985, p.144.
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the distance between the two planets can vary from about 56 million to 400
million km. Mars is about half the diameter of the Earth, with about a tenth
of the Earth's mass, a surface gravity about a third that of the Earth, and a
magnetic field 5000 times weaker than the Earth's. The Martian atmosphere
is primarily composed of carbon dioxide (C0 2); its density varies by up to 20%
over the Martian year (as the CO 2 condenses at the winter pole). The average
atmospheric pressure at the surface is about .007 Earth atmospheres, and the
average surface temperature about 218 K (-55 °C). Mars experiences frequent
dust storms; at certain times these storms can grow to global proportions.
Mars rotates with a period of 24.6 hours, giving it days and nights of about
the same length as we are used to on Earth. On Mars however, the sunlight is
only 43% as intense as it is on the Earth, due to the planet's greater distance
from the Sun. Mars has been visited by the U.S. Mariner orbiter and Viking
landers, and the Soviet Mars and Phobos spacecraft. No piloted or round-trip
robotic spacecraft have yet been sent to Mars.
Mechanics of Space Travel
To reach the Moon and Mars, the piloted and robotic spacecraft of the
SEI will have to escape the gravitational pull of the Earth, travel some
distance through space, and then achieve the correct velocity to either orbit or
land on their destination. Many missions will then require that the spacecraft
return to Earth. New methods of achieving these ends with minimum
energy use and travel time are continually being developed, but all are
refinements or combinations of a few basic techniques dictated by the laws of
celestial mechanics. These laws and techniques constrain the set of possible
missions for the SEI and drive the technology requirements for those
missions.
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The first step in travelling to the Moon or Mars is to rise above the
Earth's atmosphere with enough velocity to not fall back. Achieving this will
get a spacecraft into orbit (higher velocities will allow the spacecraft to escape
the Earth's gravity entirely). This is the part of the journey that requires the
most energy expenditure in the least time. Due to the strong gravitational
attraction of the Earth, travelling the few hundred kilometers from the
surface to LEO requires more AV (change in velocity) than is required for
travelling the millions of kilometers from LEO to the surface of Mars. Travel
times to orbit are short as it is inefficient to travel slowly up through the
Earth's strong gravitational field; usually acceleration is high and LEO is
reached in about 10 minutes.
LEO provides a convenient "resting point" for spacecraft, as they need
minimal energy to maintain their orbit, are still protected from radiation by
the Earth's magnetic field, and maintain a high velocity (which is important
for transfers beyond Earth orbit). The theoretical velocity required to reach a
circular orbit at the same inclination as the launch site is:
Vto orbit = / 2GM MI
Rplanet Rorbit
where G is the gravitational constant, M is the mass of the planet, Rplanet is
the radius of the planet. and Rorbit is the distance from the planet's center of
mass to the spacecraft. The rotation of the planet, however, gives launches in
the direction of the planet's rotation an initial velocity of
Vinit = (2rRplanet) (cos 0)T=2Rplanet
where Tplanet is the period of the planet's rotation and 0 is the latitude of the
launch site. Finally, there are losses due to gravity and drag on the launch
vehicle. (For a typical launch from Earth, AV losses due to atmospheric drag
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and gravity are about 1500 m/s.) The total AV required to reach a circular
orbit at the same inclination as the launch site is thus:
AVto orbit =  2GM GM - Vinit + AVioss
V Rplanet Rorbit
For example, launch from the Kennedy Space Center into a 28.50 inclination
orbit with an altitude of 500 km requires a AV of about 9.3 km/s.
Orbital velocity decreases with altitude for both circular and elliptical
orbits. The velocity required to maintain a circular orbit about a planet is
Vcirc. orbit = F/GM
VRorbit
For example, a spacecraft in a 500 km circular orbit has a velocity of about 7.1
km/s while a spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit has a velocity of 3 km/s.
The velocity of a spacecraft in an elliptical orbit varies with the location of the
spacecraft in the orbit as
Vellip. orbit =
where D is the distance from the planet's center of mass to the spacecraft and
Aorbit is the semi-major axis of the elliptical orbit. Elliptical orbits can be
useful for transferring between orbits, for capture from interplanetary
trajectories, and for other specialized applications.
For many missions, it is necessary for spacecraft to conduct plane
change maneuvers to adjust the inclination of their orbits. (The inclination
of an orbit is the angle between its orbit plane and the Earth's equator.) When
a payload is launched, the minimum energy orbit for it to enter is one with
the same inclination as the launch site. For example, payloads launched
from the Kennedy Space Center, at 28.50 N latitude, are usually launched into
an orbit inclined at 28.50. While it is possible to launch into an orbit with a
higher inclination than the latitude of the launch site, direct launch into a
lower inclination orbit is not possible.
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Spacecraft can also change inclination of their orbits after the spacecraft
has reached orbit. Though this maneuver generally takes much more energy
than directly launching into the desired inclination, it is necessary when the
desired final orbit inclination is lower than the latitude of the launch site.
The energy cost for a change in inclination (a plane change) in orbit is
AV=2Vorbitsin (2)
where Vorbit is the initial orbital velocity and Q2 is the magnitude of the angle
between the two orbital planes. For example, the AV for transfer from a 500
km altitude orbit at 28.50 to a 500 km altitude at 45.60 is 2.26 km/s. As can be
seen, plane changes require less AV at higher altitudes, where the spacecraft's
velocity is lower. In fact, for plane changes greater than 50', it takes less
energy to completely escape the Earth's gravitational attraction and then
return to the desired orbit inclination (though it takes much more time). The
energy required for this maneuver is at least
AV = 2Vorbit (f - 1)
For missions beyond Earth orbit, spacecraft must "escape" the Earth's
gravitational attraction. The minimum escape velocity from a circular orbit
is
Vescape = Y2 Vcirc. orbit
so the AV for the maneuver is
AVescape from orbit = (I2-1) /GMV Rorbit
though more velocity may be needed for certain types of transfer maneuvers.
If the escape maneuver is performed directly from the planet's surface, the
AV required is
AVescape from surface =
Rplanet
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which is slightly less than the AV required to enter an orbit and then reach
escape velocity from there. The major advantage of using a "parking orbit",
though, is that it is very difficult (due to weather, complex launch vehicles,
etc.) to launch directly from Earth with the precise timing needed to enter a
minimum-energy interplanetary trajectory. A spacecraft in orbit, however,
can just wait until its orbit plane lines up with the correct trajectory.
Careful planning of a spacecraft's trajectory can minimize the AV
required for travel between various points of interest beyond Earth's orbit.
One way of doing this is by scheduling travel for times when the Earth, the
spacecraft's orbit, and the target are aligned so that minimal AV is needed.
Performing the appropriate orbital transfer maneuver is also important in
minimizing required AV. Finally, trajectories can pass close by large bodies to
gain extra AV.
The Earth and the Moon are always at the same distance from each
other, so the major scheduling problem to minimize AV for travel between
them is in lining up the plane of the spacecraft's orbit with the plane of the
Moon's orbit. The inclination of the Moon's orbit varies from 180 to 280, so
the plane of any Earth orbit with an inclination greater than 280 will
eventually pass through the plane of the Moon's orbit. An orbit around a
planet precesses at a rate of
Q = 1.5 (J2) TGM (Rplanet) 2 (Rorbit) -3 5 (Cos i)
where 2 is the retrograde precession of the orbit plane in degrees/day, J2 is a
constant based on the oblateness of the planet, and i is the orbit inclination.158
A minimum energy transfer becomes possible when the orbit plane
(precessing retrograde at a few degrees a day, lines up with the Moon, which is
158Gordon R Woodcock, "Mission and Operations Modes for Lunar Basing", Lunar Bases and
Space Activities of the 21st Century, Houston: Lunar and Planetary Institute, 1985.
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precessing in a posigrade direction at a rate of about 13.20 a day. Such a
situation occurs every
1800 days
13.2 + Q
Since low inclination orbits precess faster than high inclination orbits
and low altitude orbits precess faster than high altitude orbits, low altitude
and low inclination orbits will have more opportunities for a minimum
energy lunar transfer. As an example, a 300 km, 28.50 orbit will have an
opportunity for an in-plane transfer to the Moon every 8.9 days, while a 1000
km, 600 orbit will have one every 11.1 days.
An additional factor that must be considered is the spacecraft's
destination on or around the Moon. Again, the timing of the transfer from
Earth is important in avoiding substantial additional AV expenditures. The
spacecraft's velocity relative to the Moon is a vector sum of its velocity
relative to the Earth and the Moon's orbital velocity; changes in the velocity
vector relative to the Moon will allow orbits or destinations of any given
inclination to be entered without the need for plane-change maneuvers.
Again, to allow minimum-energy transfers, the precession of the spacecraft's
orbit plane around Earth must be synchronized with the precession of the
Moon. Although Earth orbits exist where all the planes line up in
simultaneously on a regular basis, some additional AV must often be
expended.
Minimum energy trajectories for interplanetary transfers also become
available when the orbit planes line up, but since (unlike the Moon) the
planets do not precess rapidly around the Earth, the times when the
spacecraft's orbit plane lines up with the plane of the planet's orbit come less
often. For example, a 300 km, 28.50 orbit crosses the plane of Mars' orbit every
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25 days and a 1000 km, 60* orbit crosses it every 60 days. This is particularly a
problem if a spacecraft travelling to Mars and back is supposed to end its
round trip in the same orbit that it left from (to rendezvous with a space
station, perhaps.)
The major problem with entering interplanetary trajectories is not the
problem of lining up the orbit plane with the plane of the target planet's orbit,
however, but rather in timing the missions so that the two planets are at the
best relative positions to minimize total AV requirements. The period
between times when two planets are in the same relative positions to each
other is
T= 1T- 111
T1 T2
where T1 and T2 are the orbital periods of the two planets. The Earth and
Mars, for example, are in about the same relative positions to each other only
every 26 months. (The eccentricity of Mars' orbit results in exact
configurations being repeated only every 15 years.)159
Further complicating the timing of interplanetary travel is the
necessity in many missions for the spacecraft to eventually return to the
Earth. A returning spacecraft must be sure that the Earth will be in the correct
position for the transfer home. The time a spacecraft must wait for a
minimum energy return trajectory is
4,: ('t)ip
STI
twait
T1 T2
where ttrip is the travel time between the two planets. The total time for a
minimum-energy trip between two planets is equal to
159Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991.
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ttotal = twait + 2 (ttrip)
For an Earth-Mars trip, a minimum energy ttrip might be 260 days, so twait is
454.3 days, so the minimum energy total trip time is 975 days. Using more
energy will widen the available launch windows.
Figure V-2, a "porkchop" curve for the 1990 launch windows for Mars,
gives an idea of how the trip time, AV requirements, and launch dates are
interrelated. 160 In this figure, the diagonal lines are trip times, and the curves
represent the C3 (which is AV squared) required. For example, to make a 100-
day trip, a AV of about 7 km/s is required (with a launch window of about 10
days), while a 200 day trip can be performed with a AV expenditure of about 4
km/s. The two sets of curves (Type I and Type II) are for different
orientations of the Earth and Mars; in general the minimum AV values can
be found in Type II (long-duration) missions.
160James R. Stuart and Randall E. Coffey, "Analysis of Delivery Capabilities to Low Mars
Orbits Applying Current Technology Launch/Retro Propulsion Systems", The Case for Mars II,
San Diego: Univelt Inc., 1985, p. 396.
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Figure V-2: Example "Porkchop" Curve for Earth-Mars Transfers
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Once a spacecraft is pointed in the right direction at the right time to
minimize the AV required for the trip, it then performs an orbital transfer
maneuver. The same types of maneuvers can be used in going from LEO to
the Moon or from the orbit of the Earth to the orbit of another planet orbiting
the Sun. The basic orbital transfer maneuvers are minimum energy
Hohmann transfers, high-energy transfers, and low thrust transfers.
In a Hohmann transfer, thrust is applied to move a spacecraft from its
initial orbit into an elliptical orbit tangent to both the initial and desired final
orbits. As the spacecraft reaches the desired orbit, thrust is applied again to
circularize the orbit. For orbit transfers from lower- to higher-altitude orbits,
these thrusts are applied in the direction the spacecraft is moving; in transfers
from high- to low-altitude orbits the thrusts are applied in the direction
opposite to the spacecraft's velocity. The AV required for a Hohmann transfer
is
AV=/2GM_ GM _ M R2M /R2 _ M
R1  R1+R2  V R2 R2  R1+R2
where R1 is the radius of the initial orbit, R2 is the radius of the final orbit,
and M is the mass of the object (either the planet or the Sun) the spacecraft is
orbiting. For a Hohmann transfer from a 500 km orbit to a geosynchronous
orbit, the AV required is 3.8 km/s; for a near-Hohmann Earth-Mars transfer
the necessary AV is 5.6 km/s.161 (Remember that for an interplanetary
transfer, the spacecraft must first reach escape velocity before conducting the
transfer.)
While the Hohmann transfer is a minimum energy trajectory, it is also
a local maximum for transfer time. The time spent travelling a Hohmann
ellipse is
161Because of the eccentricity of the orbit of Mars, a slightly modified Hohmann transfer must
be used for travel between the Earth and Mars.
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t= 7C GM
where A is the semi-major axis of the transfer ellipse, and M is the mass of
the object the spacecraft is orbiting. The transfer time from a 500 km altitude
orbit to geosynchronous orbit in a Hohmann transfer is 5 hours 15 minutes;
the Hohmann transfer time from Earth to Mars is 260 days.
In a high energy transfer, more thrust is initially applied than in a
Hohmann transfer, moving the spacecraft into an elliptical orbit that
intersects and passes through the desired orbit. More thrust is applied when
the intersection is reached, circularizing the orbit. The high-energy transfer is
faster than a Hohmann transfer. Figure V-3 shows a Hohmann and a high-
energy transfer.
Desired Orbit
OrbitN
Initial Orbit
Initial FirstOrbit First Burn
Transfer Ellipse Second
Second Burn '.............. Transfer
Ellipse
Hohmann Transfer High-Energy Transfer
Figure V-3: Orbit Transfer Methods
If a spacecraft's propulsion system does not have enough thrust to carry
out a Hohmann transfer (which requires large short-duration velocity
changes), it can perform a low thrust transfer, where, as the orbit is elongated
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into an ellipse, thrust is repeatedly applied at the periapsis (the closest point to
the planet) of the orbit, gradually enlarging it until it approximates the
Hohmann ellipse, and then a series of burns are applied at apoapsis (the
farthest point of the ellipse) as the desired orbit is reached. The energy
needed for this kind of transfer is generally greater than that required for a
Hohmann transfer. A fourth type of orbit transfer is used when a constant
source of low thrust, such as a solar-powered ion thruster, is available. In this
case the spacecraft accelerates in the direction of its motion, spiraling out until
the desired orbit is reached. Figure V-4 illustrates a low impulsive thrust and
a low constant thrust trajectory.
Desired Desired
Orbit Orbit
(End Thrust)
Initial Orbit
Orbit
Repeated Burns
at Periapsis Begin Thrust
Low impulsive thrust transfer Low cnmstant thrust tnrmsfer
Figure V-4: Low Thrust Transfers
The time required to complete a low constant thrust transfer iS162
t = R, N R2
Acc
162William E. Wiesel, Spaceflight Dynamics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989, p. 90.
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where Acc is the acceleration of the spacecraft, R1 is the radius of the initial
orbit, and R2 is the radius of the final orbit. The AV required for the transfer
is
AV = (Acc)(t)
or the difference in the velocities of the two orbits (higher than the AV
required for a Hohmann transfer).
One possible maneuver that can be used to gain AV during an
interplanetary trip is a flyby. In a flyby, a spacecraft gains AV by travelling
close to a large body and using the body's orbital velocity and gravitational
attraction to change the spacecraft's overall velocity vector, including changes
in inclination. Though flybys can be a way to pick up "free" AV, they depend
on particular alignments of the planets and can sometimes require complex
and lengthy trajectories.
Once a spacecraft has completed its transfer orbit and come dose to its
target, it must usually change velocity again, either to land or to enter into a
particular orbit. This maneuver can be accomplished with the reverse of the
orbital transfers discussed above, or by aerobraking. The AV required to go
into a circular orbit around the target planet is
AV = +init2  2GM _ GM
V Rorbit Rorbit
where Vinit is the spacecraft's relative velocity to the target body. The radius
of the circular orbit that requires minimum AV to enter is
Rmin orbit = 2GM
Vinit
2
but the spacecraft can be put into an elliptical orbit around the target planet
for an even lower cost in AV. 163 One problem with using elliptical orbits in
this manner, though, is that both the orbit's plane and the spacecraft's
163William E. Wiesel, Spaceflight Dynamics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989, p. 302.
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position in the orbit must be correctly aligned for minimum energy travel
either to and from the planets surface or into interplanetary trajectories.
Often, this alignment can not be reached within the time frames of the
mission, necessitating changes in the spacecraft's orbit and thus reducing the
savings in AV.
One method of getting the necessary AV to enter orbit around a target
planet is through using an aerobraking maneuver. Aerobraking involves
using the atmosphere of a planet to slow the spacecraft into an elliptical orbit
or a descent trajectory. Two problems with aerobraking are the large amount
of heat generated during the maneuver and the necessity of having accurate
information about the atmosphere at the time the spacecraft reaches the
planet. The latter problem can be particularly difficult for a planet like Mars,
where the atmospheric density can change by twenty percent from season to
season.
Apart from flybys, the only proven way to gain AV in space is by using
a rocket. Rockets operate by propelling stored mass backwards at a high
velocity, thus forcing the rocket to travel forward. The faster the mass is
propelled out the back, the more velocity the rocket gains. The following
equation calculates the minimum amount of propellant that must be ejected
to gain a particular AV
Mi = e (AV/c)
Mf
where Mi is the initial mass of the spacecraft, Mf is the final mass of the
spacecraft 64, and c is the rocket's exhaust velocity. For a AV of 5.6 km/s (an
Earth-Mars Hohmann transfer) using a liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen rocket
with an exhaust velocity of 4470 m/s, the ratio of initial to final mass is 3.5.
164Both mass figures include the mass of the payload, the mass of the structure, the mass of fuel
and the mass of the rocket engine itself.
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This means that to send 5000 kg on a Hohmann transfer to Mars requires at
least 12,500 kg of propellant. Chemical rockets are the most commonly used
type of rocket, but nuclear thermal rockets, ion engines, arcjets, and
magnetoplasmadynamic (MPD) thrusters all can provide higher exhaust
velocities, albeit with drawbacks.
Chemical rockets burn various substances to achieve exhaust velocities
in vacuum from about 2500 m/s up to about 4750 m/s, with high thrust. (A
rocket's thrust is the mass flow rate through the rocket times the exhaust
velocity.) Solid rockets generally have lower exhaust velocities and cannot be
stopped or restarted, but are simpler and generally less expensive than liquid-
fueled rockets. Liquid fuel rockets utilize either storable or cryogenic
propellants. Rockets using storable propellants have lower exhaust velocities
than ones using cryogenics, but are simpler, cost less, and can be easily kept in
space for long periods of time. Some hybrid liquid/solid systems have shown
desirable safety and performance characteristics, but they have not yet been
used in space.
Nuclear thermal rockets heat their propellant to a very high
temperature to achieve exhaust velocities of 10,000 m/s and higher with high
levels of thrust. For an Earth - Mars Hohmann transfer for a nucear-thermal
rocket with a 10,000 m/s exhaust velocity, only 3750 kg of propellant would be
needed to deliver a 5000 kg payload. The performance of such rockets can also
enable high-thrust transfers for interplanetary travel, thus reducing the
duration of the trip. The rocket must also propel the mass of the reactor,
which reduces the benefits of nuclear thermal rockets for missions with low
AV requirements or small payloads. Nuclear thermal rockets are also expected
to be more costly than chemical rockets, and the risk of an accident which
might cause contamination of the Earth may preclude the use of nuclear
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thermal rockets in or below LEO. Nuclear thermal rockets have been tested,
but never flown in space.
Ion engines, arcjets, and MPD thrusters all use electric power sources to
accelerate particles from the rocket at very high velocities. While this
method can achieve exhaust velocities of up to 80,000 m/s, a very large power
source is needed to produce such velocities. The gains from the high exhaust
velocities are thus balanced by the need to carry the large power source along
for the mission. The power required for an electric thruster is
P= (1/21) Fc
where P is the required power, i1 is the efficiency of the thruster, and F is the
thrust of the vehicle. This means that for the high exhaust velocities,
accelerations will generally be very low. For example, an ion engine with an
efficiency of .85 and an exhaust velocity of 30,000 m/s would require 17.7 kw
of power to produce a thrust of 1 Newton. Since a typical power source might
have a mass of 20 kg/kw of power, the power source mass would be 354 kg,
and acceleration would be about .002 m/s. Electric rockets have only been
used in Earth orbit applications to date.
Table V-1 lists the typical exhaust velocities and thrust levels for
various propulsion technologies.
Table V-1: Rocket Propulsion Technologies
Technology Exhaust Velocity Thrust
(m/s) in Vacuum
Solid Fuel 2,300 - 2,900 Very High
Liquid Fuel 2,600 - 3,200 High
Liquid Hydrogen/Liquid 4,300 - 4,600 High
Oxygen
Nuclear Thermal 8,000 - 10,000 High
Electric Propulsion 10,000-50,000 Low
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Operational Concerns for SEI Missions
SEI missions in space and on the surface of the Moon or Mars will
require electric power, communications to Earth, and (if humans are
involved) supplies of food, air, and water. Human presence also raises
concerns about the effects of the space radiation environment and long-term
microgravity exposure. These operational concerns will strongly affect the
hardware requirements for the SEI.
Power
All space missions, piloted or robotic, require some kind of power
source for their various subsystems (communications, guidance, command
and data handling, life support, scientific instruments, etc.). The major space
power sources available are radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs), nuclear
reactors, solar photovoltaic and dynamic systems, fuel cells, and batteries.
Both RTGs and nuclear reactor systems use thermoelectric couples or a
thermionic energy conversion system to directly convert thermal energy to
electric energy. With RTGs, the source of thermal energy is the decay of
radioactive isotopes; reactors use the heat created by fission. Solar dynamic
power sources use concentrated solar energy to power a heat cycle, producing
mechanical energy which is then converted to electricity, while photovoltaic
arrays convert solar energy directly to electricity. Finally, batteries and fuel
cells (both of which can be recharged) use chemical reactions to produce
electricity; in fuel cells the reactants are replaced during operation. Some of
the properties of these different power sources are shown in Figure V-5.165
165Griffin, Michael D. and French, James R., Space Vehicle Design, Washington- American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1991, p. 398.
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Figure V-5: Characteristics of Space Power Sources
Solar photovoltaic systems with battery storage are the most widely
used space power system. The solar arrays power the spacecraft and recharge
the batteries when the spacecraft is in sunlight, and the batteries power the
spacecraft when it is in the dark. This works well in Earth orbit, when the
periods of eclipse are short in duration, but on the Moon, for example, where
darkness lasts for fourteen days, the size of the battery system required can
become prohibitive. Solar power can also be used with fuel cells as storage;beco e prohibitive. lar er ca  als  e s  it  f l lls s t r ;
115
this approach has not been tested in space, but seems to have a lot of
potential. 166
One problem with both photovoltaic and solar dynamic systems is that
they generate less power the farther they are from the Sun. At the orbit of the
Earth, the solar flux is about 1360 W/m 2, but the flux decreases as a function
of the distance from the sun squared (thus the solar flux at the orbit of Mars is
only about 590 W/m 2). The solar flux can be further reduced in areas with
murky atmospheric conditions, such as on Mars during that planet's
occasional lengthy dust storms.
Nuclear power sources have neither of the major problems of solar
power sources, as they operate without the need for sunlight. On the other
hand, there are some significant difficulties associated with the use of nuclear
power in space. First, there is the risk of the spacecraft re-entering the Earth's
atmosphere and dispersing radioactive debris. Even if extensive measures are
taken to prevent such accidents, the perception of risk may result in a
prohibition on nuclear power use in LEO. 167 RTGs have the additional
potential problem of the low availability (and high cost) of Plutonium 238,
the isotope generally used.
Communications
Communication between spacecraft and the Earth is another
requirement for space travel. Communication is necessary for navigation,
mission control, and data return. Communications in space are conducted in
various frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum. One of the major
166Griffin, Michael D. and French, James R., Space Vehicle Design, Washington: American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1991, p. 416.
167Aftergood, Steven, et. al., "Nuclear Power in Space", Scientific American, June 1991.
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limitations is thus the speed of light (3 x 108 m/s). The one way trip time for a
signal to travel between the Earth and the Moon is about 1.25 seconds; delays
vary between 4.5 and 21 minutes for communications between the Earth and
Mars, depending on the relative positions of the two planets.
Another limitation is the strength of the signal needed to
communicate over long ranges, which increases as a factor of the square of
the distance. Communication over long ranges requires either strong signals
or sensitive (and thus large) receiving antennae. Earth-Mars communication,
though, is simple compared to feats that have previously been performed,
such as communication with the Voyager spacecraft, which, when it
encountered Neptune, was 11.6 times further away than the greatest distance
between the Earth and Mars.
Communications on the electromagnetic spectrum also require a
straight unblocked line between the transmitter and the receiver. If a
spacecraft, surface base, or probe is on the far side of a planet, it will not be able
to communicate with the Earth unless there are relay stations either on the
planet or in orbit around it. This is particularly important for a base on the
far side of the Moon, which, as it is never visible from the Earth, would be
completely unable to communicate with the Earth without relays.
Concerns of Human Space Travel
One major concern in conducting space missions in which humans are
involved is that the mass of supplies, including air, water, and food, needed
to keep the astronauts alive can be very large. Humans consume about .63 kg
of dry food per day plus 3.1 kg of water (including the water in food), plus
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about .81 kg of oxygen, for a total of about 4.5 kg of consumables per day.168
For a 900-day Mars mission with a crew of four, 16,200 kg of consumables will
thus be needed unless some of the consumables are recycled.
Both the United States and Russia have been working on such
recycling efforts. Technologies have already been developed to recycle
various components of a spacecraft's atmosphere. More sophisticated
systems, including complete water recovery systems and schemes for growing
plants for food and oxygen are at various stages of development. Figure V-6
provides a rough idea of how the use of regenerative systems can reduce
overall mission mass as mission durations increase.
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Figure V-6: Regenerative vs. Open Loop Life Support Systems 169
Radiation effects are probably the most dangerous aspect of long-
duration space flights. Radiation doses for humans are measured in Rem
(roetgen-equivalent-man). The maximum allowable radiation dose for
radiation workers is 5 Rem/year with a 250 Rem allowable career exposure;
the general public can be exposed to .5 Rem/year. Current maximum
16 8 R.D. MacElroy and Harold P. Klein, "The Evolution of CELSS for Lunar Bases", Lunar Bases
and Space Activities of the 21st Century, Houston: Lunar and Planetary Institute, 1985, p.624 .
16 9 p.D. Quattrone, "Extended Mission Life Support Systems", in The Case for Mars San Diego:
Univelt Inc., 1984, p.132.
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allowable exposure for astronauts is 50 Rem/year, with a 300 Rem career
limit. Different types of radiation cause different reactions, but in general,
exposures of up to 75 Rem have little effect. Doses above 75 Rem may result
in sickness, and once exposure rises above 300 Rem, death can result within
days. Larger doses lead to increasingly certain and rapid death. In addition to
the short-term effects, radiation damage can result in long-term effects such as
increased risk of cancer.
The three types of radiation that present dangers to astronauts are
trapped particles, cosmic radiation, and solar flares. Trapped particles are high
energy electrons and protons that are concentrated in the Van Allen belts by
the Earth's magnetic field. Cosmic radiation is an isotropic flux of energetic
nucleii from outside the solar system. Solar flares are sporadic events that
send large numbers of high-energy protons, alpha particles and some heavier
nucleii out from the Sun. The atmosphere of Mars offers some protection
against cosmic rays and solar flares, but the Moon and other bodies without
atmospheres or magnetic fields do not.
The only serious danger from trapped particles in the inner solar
system occurs in the Earth's Van Allen belts. These belts are distorted tori,
open at the Earth's poles, which contain high energy electrons and protons.
The belts begin at about a thousand kilometers above the Earth; the charged
protons extend out to about ten thousand kilometers and the electrons to
about thirty thousand kilometers above the Earth. Radiation doses from the
Van Allen belts depend strongly on the shielding in the spacecraft.
Astronauts in the worst part of the Van Allen belts will take a lethal radiation
dose in a single day unless they have more than 1 gm/cm2 of shielding. Even
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with 10 gm/cm 2 of shielding the astronaut may receive daily doses of up to
300 Rem.170
Cosmic radiation is an isotropic flux of energetic nucleii from outside
the solar system with an intensity that varies inversely with the solar cycle.
Without shielding, an astronaut will receive a cosmic ray dose of about 20 to
40 REM per year, depending on the solar cycle --uncomfortably close to the 50
REM annual limit set for shuttle astronauts. 171 Shielding against the very
high-energy cosmic radiation is impractical because of the prohibitive mass
that would be required.
Solar flares are occasional short-duration events in which the Sun
emits large numbers of high energy particles. Flares occur in 11-year cycles
with anywhere from zero to a dozen or more significant flares occurring per
year, depending upon where the Sun is in the solar cycle. Radiation dose
from solar flares are upwards of 100 Rem/hour; most solar flares will easily
kill unshielded astronauts. Protection against solar flares requires significant
mass. With shielding of 1 gm/cm2, radiation doses from solar flares generally
range from 500 to 2000 Rem. Shielding of 25 gm/cm2 can reduce the
maximum dose to under 25 Rem, which is the present 30-day astronaut
exposure limit.172 Because solar flares are short-duration events, it is possible
to shield only a small part of the spacecraft and have astronauts stay inside
the shielded area during the flare.
170American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p.66.
171Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991.,
p. 23.
172American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p.66 .
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Long-term exposure to zero-gravity can also have deleterious effects on
astronauts. The longest period of time that U.S. astronauts have spent in
space is 84 days (in the final Skylab mission), although numerous Soviet
astronauts have spent more time than that in the space station Mir (the
longest stay to date was 366 days). The major effects of long-term zero gravity
are mass loss of bone and muscle, but there have also been some (as yet not
well understood) changes to the red blood cell and immune systems. It is
believed that countermeasures to zero gravity, including exercise and drug
treatment, can probably be used to minimize these effects, 173 though more
data is needed to confirm this belief. One major concern is whether
astronauts will be able to function on Mars after a long period without
gravity; another is whether any of the deleterious effects of zero gravity will
be permanent after the astronaut's return to Earth.
A final problem with long-duration missions is that operations in
space are still inherently dangerous. The chance of an accident, such as a fire
or an air leak, both of which can be fatal in space, increases steadily with time,
as do mission risks due to equipment wearing out, and replacement spares
being depleted. The odds that astronauts may have medical problems (such
as appendicitis) also grow higher as the mission duration increases, as does
the chance that their performance may be affected due to the long period of
confinement and exposure to the hazards of spaceflight. Exacerbating this
problem, it is generally not practical to mount quick rescue missions to
destinations beyond Earth orbit.
173Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991.,
p. 24.
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VI. The SEI's Hardware Requirements
The March 1992 space policy directive on SEI strategy 174 states that the
SEI "includes both Lunar and Mars elements, manned and robotic missions
and supporting technology" and that the objectives of the SEI "include a
return to the Moon - this time to stay - and human expeditions to Mars."
Numerous technical schemes implementing these objectives have been
proposed over the last decade, but no specific exploration plans have yet been
officially sanctioned as part of the SEI. Broad possible strategies for human
space exploration have, however, been laid out in the reports of the National
Commission on Space 1 75, the Ride Task Force 176 , the NASA Office of
Exploration 177, the 90-Day Study178, and the Synthesis Group.179 Although the
strategies proposed in these reports differ markedly, the demands of missions
beyond Earth orbit have produced a limited set of hardware requirements.
This chapter examines the hardware requirements of the SEI, focusing on
those that may be satisfied by Russian space hardware.
174George Bush, Space Exploration Initiative Strategy National Space Policy Directive 6,
March 9, 1992.
175National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier, New York: Bantam Books,
1986.
1 76Sally K. Ride, Leadership and America's Future in Space, Report to the NASA
Administrator, August 1987.
177Office of Exploration, NASA, Beyond Earth's Boundaries, 1988 Annual Report to the
Administrator, 1988.
178NASA, Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, November
1989.
179Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991,
p.42.
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Lunar Missions
The return of humans to the Moon is one of the fundamental
elements of the SEI. Human exploration of the Moon was proposed in all
five of the 90-Day Study's reference approaches to the SEI, and in all four of
the SEI plans (or "architectures") presented in the Synthesis Group report.
The tasks that the astronauts will perform when they reach the Moon are not
yet clear; possible activities include lunar exploration, reduced gravity life
sciences and materials experimentation, lunar-based astronomy, preparation
for the exploitation of lunar resources, and the testing of hardware and
procedures for later missions to Mars.
Although the SEI could include a wide range of possible lunar
activities, almost any plan for returning astronauts to the Moon will require
the same basic hardware elements. First, robotic precursor missions will be
needed to prepare for the return of humans to the Moon. Next, when short-
duration lunar excursions by astronauts begin, hardware will be required to
transport the astronauts to the Moon and back, keep them alive during the
journey and their sojourn on the Moon, and support them in whatever
activities they will be conducting. As mission length increases, perhaps
leading to the establishment of a permanent lunar base, additional hardware
may be needed to meet the astronauts' changing transport, power, and life-
support needs.
Robotic Precursor Missions
It is likely that any return of humans to the Moon will be preceded by
robotic precursor missions. The report of the Synthesis Group incorporated
lunar robotic precursors into three of its four architectures; the fourth, which
proposed using the Moon only as a test bed for later Mars exploration, relied
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on data from the Apollo program and other previous lunar missions. The
National Commission on Space, the Ride Task Force, the NASA Office of
Exploration, and the 90-Day Study all scheduled robotic precursor missions
before the return of humans to the Moon. It is not clear exactly what types of
lunar robotic precursors will be used in the SEI; likely candidates include a
polar orbiter, a network of ground stations, and rovers.
The first step for almost any return to the Moon is the development of
a comprehensive data base of information about the lunar surface. The
existing U.S. lunar data base, which comes largely from a series of Lunar
Orbiter spacecraft flown during 1966 and 1967, is low resolution, has
incomplete coverage of the lunar surface, and features a fairly high level of
uncertainty. 180 A new, high resolution data base, that takes advantage of the
many developments in remote sensing instruments since the 1960s, could be
used to help select possible landing sites for future human missions, plot
astronaut or rover traverses across the lunar terrain, determine areas of
scientific interest, and find locations of valuable lunar resources, such as
water ice.
The simplest means of acquiring such data is through the use of a
lunar polar orbiting satellite. A polar orbit is preferred because a high
inclination orbit is necessary to gather data on the lunar poles (where, it is
believed, water ice might be located), and because such an orbit will
eventually pass over every part of the Moon. Instruments for such a satellite
would perform high-resolution imaging to determine surface topography,
visible and infrared spectrometry to characterize the surface composition,
18Leonard David, "Robots Must Precede Humans to Moon, Mars", Space News, November 12-
18, 1990.
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gamma ray spectrometry to measure elemental composition, and microwave
sounding to determine the subsurface structure. 181 The orbiter might also
gather magnetism and gravity data and use radar to determine geological and
soil structure data down to depths of 10 to 20 meters.
A lunar polar orbiting satellite should not present any major hardware
difficulties. The lunar orbit environment is similar to the environment in
Earth orbit, so the spacecraft should be able to use fairly standard solar arrays,
thermal systems, guidance, control, and station-keeping equipment. Nor will
communications pose a significant problem, since the 2.5 second round-trip
delay is unimportant to a satellite in orbit, and the loss of signal strength due
to the distance from the Earth is not a problem for the large antennas
available on Earth for deep space missions. Satellite lifetime need not be
particularly long unless the orbiter is also functioning as a relay satellite for
stations on the surface of the Moon. Finally, the instruments needed (with
the possible exception of a radar sounding instrument) 182 are not particularly
challenging to develop.
In addition to a global remote sensing data base, it might be deemed
useful to develop a long-term data base of the geophysical and environmental
conditions on the lunar surface. Such information, in addition to its intrinsic
scientific value, could also be used to select sites for further scientific study,
future landings, resource exploitation, or for bases for human occupation.
This data base could be acquired by landing a network of small
18 1American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p.32 .
182 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p.32.
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geophysical/environmental stations on the lunar surface. These stations,
which might be either soft-landed or hard-landed, so as to penetrate into the
lunar surface, would use a variety of instruments to collect their data. The
Synthesis Group suggests stations which gather geophysical data with a
magnetometer, an alpha particle counter, an x-ray fluorescence spectrometer,
and imaging instruments, and which gather environmental data with
instruments to measure meteorite flux, dust from secondary meteor impact,
plasmas, fields, particles, and the lunar "atmospheric" composition.18 3
Finally, some scenarios for lunar exploration might benefit from
detailed ground-level surveys of possible landing sites, and the terrain
around them. This would improve the level of confidence about the landing
site and would provide early astronaut crews with data that could direct their
exploration efforts to the most interesting areas near the landing site. This
task could be carried out by one or more lunar rovers carrying many of the
same instruments as the geophysical/environmental station, perhaps with
the addition of ground-penetrating radar to image the subsurface of a
potential lunar base site.
The hardware requirements for a robotic lunar rover are fairly
significant. First, it must survive a soft-landing on the Moon. Once the rover
is on the surface, it will require some source of power (either RTG's or fuel
cells) to keep it operating through the lunar night; alternately it could shut
down for the night, but this could cause thermal problems. In addition, the
rover will need to have either a high degree of autonomous control or to be
in continual communication with the Earth as it moves. The 2.5 second
183Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991,
p.42.
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communications delay from Earth certainly does not prevent teleoperation,
though it would restrict the speed with which a rover could move; this could
be troublesome if the rover needed to react rapidly (if it began to slide down a
slope, for example). Control of a rover on the far side of the Moon would
require the deployment of high altitude relay satellites. It is unlikely that
such a vehicle would be needed, though, as most SEI plans focus on the lunar
near side.
An alternative to using one large rover would be to use numerous
small rovers. Such "mini-rovers" could not have the all the abilities of a
large rover--for example, they could not carry large instruments--but they
would have some significant advantages. First, the more numerous small
rovers could cover a greater area than the single large rover. Second, the
rovers could be designed with a slightly lower reliability than a large rover,
because the loss of one small rover would not result in the failure of the
mission. For the same reason, small rovers could be sent into treacherous
terrain (such as steeply sloping areas) which the large rover could not risk
entering. The debate over the relative worth of mini-rovers as opposed to
larger rovers is far from over; the SEI might use either type (or both) on the
Moon.
The hardware required to deliver the lunar robotic precursors to the
Moon is a function of the mass of each robotic precursor, the AV required to
land them on the Moon, and the time frame in which they will be launched.
It is important to understand that the choice of a launch vehicle will probably
be made during the hardware design process --the hardware will be designed
so that it can be launched by a particular vehicle.
Because the robotic precursors will be designed to be launched by
whatever vehicles are available, it is hard to estimate their mass. Historically,
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most similar robotic missions have had masses of 1000 kg or less: the
Surveyor lunar landers weighed about 300 kg, the Viking landers about 1000
kg, the Voyager spacecraft around 800 kg, and the Soviet Lunokhod Moon
rovers around 850 kg. There are no historical parallels to the network of
ground stations, but the NASA 90 Day study estimated the mass of a
geophysical station to be 100 kg (and the mass of a dual use
manned/unmanned rover to be 1470 kg).184 The mass of the rocket and fuel
necessary to land on the Moon must also be added for any hardware that is
going to operate on the lunar surface.
Two other parameters that will factor into the requirement for a
launch vehicle are the required AV and the time frame of the missions. The
minimum AV budget (calculated from the formulas in Chapter III) to travel
from LEO to a low lunar orbit is about 3.9 km/s, and the AV to go from there
to the surface of the Moon is about 2 km/s. Finally, although these robotic
precursors are presumably to be the first SEI missions, they are unlikely to be
needed until the late 1990s. (In the various architectures of the Synthesis
Group, the lunar robotic missions are scheduled for launch in the 1999 - 2002
period.) Therefore, the requirements for the launch vehicles for SEI lunar
robotic precursors are that they be available in the 1992 - 2002 period and that
they be able to deliver payloads ranging from perhaps 500 kg up to about 3000
kg (for a large rover) into lunar orbit.
18 4National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "Lunar Transportation System"',
Viewgraphs from the 90-Day Study, 1989.
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Initial Human Exploration on the Moon
Initial human lunar operations will require more and larger hardware
than the robotic precursor missions. Regardless of the general focus of the
lunar portion of the SEI, the first missions involving astronauts will probably
be two to four week excursions. All four of the Synthesis Group architectures
incorporate 14-day missions as the initial step in returning humans to
Mars. 185 The Ride report also suggested beginning with one to two week
missions, and the NASA 90-Day study proposed initial missions with
duration of up to 30-days. Missions of this length will allow the astronauts to
perform a significant amount of activities on the lunar surface but will not
require the larger hardware infrastructure needed to support longer duration
lunar stays.
Depending on the results of the robotic precursors and the general
goals and pace of the SEI's lunar program, these early missions might have
such varied tasks as preparing the site for a future base, performing scientific
experiments, laying the groundwork for lunar resource utilization, or
practicing for Mars exploration. The nature of the tasks the astronauts will be
performing, however, will not have much effect on the mission's major
hardware requirements because these requirements will be associated with
the tasks of transporting the astronauts to the Moon and back and keeping
them alive on the lunar surface. Hardware requirements for these missions
can be divided into the broad areas of 1) lunar habitation, 2) lunar activities
equipment, and 3) transportation to the Moon. The requirements for these
185Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991.
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three areas are closely linked; for example, larger habitats will require larger
launch vehicles, and larger launch vehicles will enable larger habitats.
The astronauts on these exploratory lunar missions will need a
pressurized habitat to live in, and base expeditions from, during their stays on
the Moon. The habitat could be delivered to the lunar surface along with the
astronauts (as in the Apollo program), or it could be sent to the Moon first in
a separate cargo flight. To support the astronauts, any habitat will have a life-
support system, an airlock, communications gear, internal walls and floors, a
power supply, and kitchen and hygiene equipment. The major issues that
must to considered in choosing a habitat design include transportability,
required extravehicular assembly, mass, radiation protection, power, and
volume. Each of these factors introduces constraints on the habitat design, as
shown in Table VI-1.
Table VI-1: Major Issues and Constraints for Initial Lunar Habitats
Issue Constraint
Transportability *Each section must fit inside payload fairing of
launcher
*Must be able to survive lunar landing
Extravehicular eMinimal EVA (in orbit or on Moon) to assemble
activity
Mass *Must be able to economically deliver habitat from
Earth to lunar surface
Radiation protection *Must protect astronauts against solar flares
Power *Must supply reliable power for duration of mission
Volume *Need sufficient habitable volume to meet
astronaut's needs
There are numerous other issues that must be considered in the design of a
lunar habitat, including thermal control, communications, and power
distribution, but they do not drive the overall design to the same degree as
the issues listed in Table VI-1.
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The constraints listed in Table VI-1 can be used to narrow the range of
designs for a lunar habitat. For example, the constraint on transportability
means that assembly of a multi-module lunar habitat in Earth orbit is
impractical because such a structure would probably not survive the lunar
landing. Extensive assembly on the Moon can also be ruled out for these
initial habitats, both because the astronauts will not have the time for such
construction, and because they will need to live in the habitats soon after
landing. The mass constraint may rule out habitat designs that offer complete
protection against radiation.
The issue of the amount of radiation shielding required for these
initial lunar habitats needs further examination. It will not be necessary to
shield against cosmic rays because the unshielded radiation dose from this
source will be, at most, about 5 rem in a month-long mission, well below the
maximum allowable dose. On the other hand, it seems likely that the
astronauts will need some shielding against solar flares. During the lunar
night, the astronauts will be protected from solar flares by the mass of the
Moon, but during the lunar day they will be directly exposed. Analyses
predict that 25 g/cm2 of shielding will be needed to reduce the radiation dose
from the most severe flares yet observed to about 25 rem.186 This mass can be
very high--covering half of a Salyut-sized habitat in 25 g/cm2 of shielding
results in a total shielding mass of 12,000 kg. Since solar flares are fairly short-
duration events, it may be necessary to shield only a small area of the habitat--
a "storm cellar"--where the astronauts would stay for the duration of the
flare. The lunar soil is a possible source of shielding material--while its use
186American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p.66 .
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requires significant construction work on the Moon, it may be worth it to
reduce the habitat mass.
It is not clear how large these initial habitats should be, since, like the
robotic missions, their size will depend largely on the capability of various
launch vehicles to deliver them to the Moon. The 90-Day study suggests
using modified space station modules with a length of 8.2 meters, a diameter
of 4.45 meters, and a mass of 12,000 kg. The size of these modules was driven
more by the space station requirements, 187 however, than by conditions on
the Moon or by projected mission needs. Historically, astronauts have been
able to live in very cramped conditions for short durations--in the Gemini 7
flight, two U.S. astronauts orbited the Earth for two weeks with essentially no
space to move around--but astronauts will need some space to perform
various tasks inside the habitat. As a preliminary estimate, the mass of the
habitat could range from about 6,000 kg to 20,000 kg, though this could
increase if radiation shielding is incorporated into the habitat structure.
The lunar habitat will need electric power for life support,
communications, on-board computers, and experiments. The choice of a
power source will depend on both the amount of power required and on the
duration of the stay on the lunar surface. The Synthesis group estimated
initial lunar habitat power needs to be up to 50 kw, and the 90-Day Study
suggested that initial power needs would be in the "tens of kilowatts." For a
14-day mission during the lunar day, a photovoltaic system would clearly be
superior; for missions that extend into the lunar night, some kind of stored
power would be required. Because of the importance of power to the habitat,
it is crucial that the power supply be highly reliable.
187which, in turn, were driven by the size of the Space Shuttle payload bay.
132
In addition to the habitat, the astronauts will require various other
items of hardware to support activities on the lunar surface. They will need
space suits to go outside the habitat; to travel to areas away from the habitat,
they will require a lunar rover. For trips of more than a few hours it may be
necessary to have a pressurized rover. Additional robotic rovers teleoperated
from the lunar surface or from Earth may also be used; teleoperation of these
rovers from the Moon would allow for much higher rover speeds because
there would be no signal delay. Finally, the astronauts will also need special
equipment to perform their various exploration and scientific tasks; such
equipment might include scientific instruments, excavation equipment, or
pilot plants for the use of lunar materials.
The single largest hardware requirement for initial human lunar
exploration will be for the transportation of the astronauts and their
equipment from the Earth to the Moon and back. This task is much more
difficult than the transportation of the precursor missions, both because the
masses involved will be much larger, and because the astronauts must be
returned to the Earth. The presence of humans also necessitates greater
margins of safety in both the vehicle design and in operational planning.' 88
Because of these concerns, it may be preferable to launch large hardware items
needed for human lunar presence, such as the lunar habitat, on separate cargo
missions.
There are many possible methods of transporting astronauts from the
Earth to the Moon and back. In the simplest method, a single launch vehicle
delivers the entire payload, including the return vehicle, to the lunar surface.
188An example of the safety requirement's impact on operational planning is that piloted
missions will have to be designed so that the astronauts can abort the mission and return to the
Earth in an emergency.
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After the completion of the mission, the return vehicle leaves the lunar
surface and travels back to the Earth. This approach has the advantage of
simplicity, in that it does not require any rendezvous, but it does require an
extremely large launch vehicle. As a very rough estimate, the booster
required to launch even a minimal human lunar mission using this method
would have to be at least double the size of the Saturn V.
The method of transportation used in the Apollo missions involved a
lunar orbit rendezvous. This method begins with the launch of the entire
mission on a single large launch vehicle, but upon reaching lunar orbit, the
spacecraft separates into an orbiter and a lander. The lander then travels
down to the Moon, leaving the orbiter in space. After the mission on the
Moon is complete, the lander leaves the surface and rendezvous with the
orbiter, which then returns to Earth. This approach does not require such a
large initial launch vehicle because it involves the delivery of less mass down
to the surface of the Moon and then back up again against the Moon's
gravitational pull. One disadvantage of the lunar orbit rendezvous method,
however, is that, due to the precession of the orbiter's path over the Moon,
aborts from the lunar surface may require costly plane shifts to rendezvous
with the orbiter. Depending on the safety rules for the mission, this could
result in the lander being required to have large fuel reserves, which, in turn,
would increase the overall initial mass and the size of the launch vehicle
required.
A third possible method of travelling between the Earth and the Moon
involves conducting an Earth-orbit rendezvous on the way to the Moon. In
this method, segments of the mission are launched separately and
rendezvous in LEO before travelling on to the Moon. One possible method of
Earth-orbit rendezvous would be to launch the astronauts separately from the
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rest of the spacecraft, thus allowing the use of a less reliable launch vehicle to
orbit the rest of the payload. Another method might be to launch the fuel
separately from the spacecraft and then fuel the spacecraft in LEO. Yet
another might be to launch the lunar landing modules and habitats
separately from specialized transfer vehicles, which would rendezvous with
the lunar modules and shuttle them back and forth between the Earth and
the Moon. Such transfer vehicles could be refueled in Earth orbit and used
repeatedly.
There are also alternate methods of returning to Earth from LEO.
Rather than having the lunar mission carry a re-entry capsule all the way to
the Moon, such a capsule could be left in LEO for the astronauts to
rendezvous with on their return from LEO. Possible variations of this final
Earth-orbit rendezvous include rendezvousing with a space shuttle, or
rendezvousing with a space station and then transferring to a re-entry
vehicle, such as the shuttle or a Soyuz capsule. One disadvantage to this
method is that it constrains the return from lunar orbit until the orbital plane
of the spacecraft being rendezvoused with is aligned correctly--additional fuel
would be necessary to perform any plane changes necessitated by incorrect
alignment of the planes.
The advantage of any of the methods involving rendezvous is that
they reduce the total mass that must be initially be launched to orbit.
However, there are three major disadvantages to using rendezvous. The first
is that any rendezvous adds complexity to the mission and increases the
probability of failure. The second is that any rendezvous will require either
advanced automated rendezvous and docking equipment or the presence of
astronauts, or both. The third reason is that it is more difficult to safely abort
missions involving rendezvous, both because of the added complexity and
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because of the possible requirement for multiple out-of-plane transfers.
These advantages and disadvantages must be weighed against each other in
deciding which method should be used. It is not yet at all clear which method
will be used in the SEI.
Nevertheless, a few basic hardware requirements can be derived from
the transportation needs of the SEI. First, unless there are going to be a large
number of rendezvous in LEO to start the mission, a heavy-lift vehicle will be
required. The reason for this is that sending astronauts to the Moon, along
with the transportation capability for them to return to Earth, requires that a
very large initial mass be delivered to LEO. Even with multiple rendezvous,
large launch vehicles are still needed--the AIAA's plan for early lunar
exploration incorporated three rendezvous, but still required a launch vehicle
that could deliver 75,000 kg to LEO.189
The Synthesis Group stated that "a heavy lift vehicle is the basic
capability needed to support any lunar and Martian architecture", and
recommended the development of one with a payload of from 150 metric
tons up to 250 metric tons into LEO.190 The AIAA assessment of technologies
for the SEI also stated that the most critical near term need was "a heavy lift
vehicle based on a modular design which can accommodate low Earth orbit
(LEO) payloads initially in the 70-ton range and can then grow to meet Mars-
mission lift requirements." 191 Even the NASA 90-Day study, which relied
18 9American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p.43b.
190Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991,
p.31.
19 1American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p.8 .
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heavily on assembly at the U.S. space station, stated that lunar missions "will
require an Earth-to-orbit lift capability of approximately 60 metric tons."192
There may also be a need for smaller launch vehicles to support the
lunar phase of the SEI. One requirement may be for a launch vehicle able to
deliver astronauts to LEO to rendezvous with the rest of the Lunar mission
hardware (previously delivered by a heavy-lift vehicle). Other possible, but
less likely, needs might be to launch fuel to lunar transfer vehicles or to
launch re-entry capsules into orbit to meet returning lunar astronauts.
The astronauts will also require a habitat for the journeys to and from
the Moon. Depending on the mode of Earth-Moon travel selected for the
early SEI, this habitat might also double as a lunar landing module or as an
Earth re-entry vehicle. As the duration of even a Hohmann transfer to the
Moon is only about five days, shielding this habitat against cosmic rays will
not be necessary. Nor will shielding against solar flares probably be required,
since solar forecasting predict the chances of a major flare during the brief
transit time. The short transfer will also mean that this habitat's life-support
systems will be mostly non-regenerable. Finally, the low power requirements
and short duration travel mean that power could come either from on-board
solar arrays or fuel cells.
The final major transportation hardware requirements will be for the
transport of payloads between LEO and lunar orbit and between lunar orbit
and the surface of the Moon. For both of these missions, high efficiency
rocket engines will be needed. However, high efficiency, low thrust rockets,
would be inappropriate for transfer to and from the lunar surface, because
192NASA, Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, November
1989, p. 5-2.
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they could not provide enough thrust to keep from crashing; their use in
transferring astronauts from LEO to lunar orbit would be ruled out by the
length of time the astronauts would be forced to spend in the Van Allen belts.
Therefore, standard chemical propulsion will be utilized, except possibly for
the mission of transferring cargo from LEO to lunar orbit. (Nuclear thermal
propulsion for these missions can be ruled out because of its high cost relative
to conventional systems.)
Further Human Presence on the Moon
Following the initial exploratory expeditions to the Moon, it may be
worthwhile to to pursue additional long-duration missions on the lunar
surface, perhaps leading to the establishment of a permanent lunar base. The
NASA 90-Day Study, the Ride Report, and all of the Synthesis Group
Architectures featured long-duration lunar activities. Rationales for longer
duration stays on the lunar surface could include expanded lunar exploration
and scientific research (including astronomy), preparation for the exploration
of Mars, and the exploitation of lunar resources. Long duration human
expeditions to the Moon will have some of the same hardware requirements
as the initial lunar missions, but the increased mission lengths will force
changes to other requirements, and will create some entirely new ones.
The design of long-duration lunar habitats will be subject to different
constraints from the design for the initial short-duration habitats. First, there
will probably be more astronauts in the long-duration habitats, and each
astronaut will require more space. Second, the growing lunar infrastructure
will enable some habitat assembly on the Moon. Third, cosmic ray radiation
will start to become a significant problem. Fourth, the habitat's power
requirements will be larger, and the power source will have to operate
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through repeated lunar day/night cycles. Finally, the larger number of
astronauts and the long duration of the missions will force either frequent
resupply or the use of recycling in the environmental control and life-support
systems.
The Synthesis Group recommended that long duration habitats have
30 to 100 cubic meters of volume per astronaut for long-duration stays. (This
concurs with the Russian experience, in which pairs of astronauts have been
able to endure for durations of up to a year in a space station with a volume
of approximately 100 m3.) As the crew of the lunar habitat grows, the total
volume enclosed will also have to grow. Enlarging the lunar habitat could be
accomplished either by connecting multiple small modules together, or by
constructing one large, perhaps inflatable, structure. Either of these
construction tasks will probably require the use of dedicated construction
hardware.
In addition to a heavily shielded "storm cellar" to protect the
astronauts during solar flares, the long-duration habitats may also need
protection against cosmic rays. The annual cosmic ray radiation dose on the
Moon is about 10 to 20 rem, with an uncertainty factor of about two.1 93 While
this is below the 50 rem NASA annual limit for radiation, routine exposure
to such levels of radiation may be deemed excessive. Halving the radiation
dose would require about 20 - 50 grams/cm2 of shielding, which could either
be part of the habitat, or lunar soil deposited on the habitat.
Long duration lunar missions will need reliable long-term power at
levels probably higher than were required by the initial habitat. The increased
193 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p.8.
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power would be needed to satisfy the growing life support and operational
needs of the habitat, as well as to support whatever activities were being
pursued by the astronauts. The Synthesis Group estimated that power
requirements for this stage of lunar habitation would begin at 100 kw and
eventually to rise to 1 MW for a full lunar base. The NASA 90-Day study also
suggested 100 kw as a starting point, with a final power level of 550 kw. The
best power source to meet these requirements is likely to be a nuclear reactor.
Development of nuclear electric surface power was recommended by the
Synthesis Group as essential for the SEI.
Finally, the long duration stays and larger crews will require either that
large amounts of consumables be delivered to the Moon or that consumables
be recycled. For example, a crew of six at a lunar base will consume about
10,000 kg of oxygen, food, and water each year if there is no recycling. It is
likely that any long-term lunar habitat will recycle some consumables and not
others. If water was completely recycled, for example, the amount of
consumables needed could be reduced by up to two thirds. Some recycling of
consumables may also be conducted in an demonstration mode that will not
initially results in overall mass savings.
In addition to the habitat, there would also be some new hardware
required to support operations on the lunar surface. New hardware might be
required to aid in the construction of the larger habitats, whether in moving
modules around or in collecting lunar soil for use as radiation shielding.
Other new hardware requirements would depend on what types of lunar
activities were being pursued at the lunar base. Possible requirements could
be for larger-scale units for mining or processing lunar resources, new
telescopes and other astronomical facilities, improved long-range rovers, or
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even for small rocket-powered craft that would be used to travel to sites too
distant or inaccessible to reach in a rover.
Transportation requirements for the extended human presence on the
Moon would not be very different from what they were in the early stage of
lunar exploration. While the new habitats might be larger, requiring a more
powerful launch vehicle or multiple rendezvous in LEO, they could also be
the same size as the earlier habitats. In fact, the largest changes in the
transportation between the Earth and the Moon in this phase of the SEI
would probably be due to the introduction of new launch and transfer
vehicles in the early years of the 21st century. Two new transportation
hardware requirements, however, could result from the extended human
presence on the Moon. The first of these is a possible requirement for a
vehicle to resupply the lunar habitats. Such a vehicle might be necessary if
new crews coming to the lunar base could not bring sufficient consumables
with them. The second is for a highly efficient transfer vehicle for travelling
between the Earth and the Moon. Such a vehicle would become more cost-
effective to develop as traffic between the Earth and the Moon increased.
Mars Missions
The second major SEI objective is the exploration of Mars by
astronauts. Human exploration of Mars was included in all of the 90-Day
Study's and the Synthesis Group's approaches to the SEI, and was also
suggested by the NCOS and the Ride Report. The exploration of Mars is
expected to be directed towards answering a number of scientific questions
about the planet, and will involve study of its present and past geology,
atmosphere, and climate. A possible additional task may be to determine the
feasibility of using Martian resources.
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The exploration of Mars is in many ways more challenging than the
exploration of the Moon. The basic difference is not the energy required to get
there--in energy terms a low Mars orbit can be easier to reach than the surface
of the Moon. Rather, the main difference is that the vast distances between
the Earth and Mars, and the changing alignments between the two planets,
necessitate extremely long-duration missions. This does not greatly effect
robotic missions, but it adds numerous difficulties to any missions involving
human presence.
Martian Robotic Precursors
It is virtually certain that robotic precursor missions will be sent to
Mars before any human exploration begins. Because existing data on Mars is
sparse, and transporting humans there extraordinary difficult, it may be
worthwhile to conduct an extensive Martian robotic precursor program.
NASA's 90-Day study recommended sending a global network mission with
two orbiters and multiple surface stations, a sample-return mission with a
rover, a four-satellite site reconnaissance mission, and five additional rovers
to study potential landing sites and prepare for human presence. 194 The
Synthesis Group recommended launching two orbiters for site
reconnaissance and communications, two rovers to certify and characterize
possible landing sites, and (for one architecture) a network of eight ground
stations to take geophysical and environmental measurements. 195
194NASA, Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, November
1989, p.3-10 - 3-12.
195Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991,
p.38.
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One of the most important tasks that must be accomplished before
human explorers arrive will be the selection of suitable landing sites.
Landing sites will probably be located near areas of scientific interest, or near
concentrations of significant resources; the identification of such sites will
require a global database of Martian topography and surface composition.
Data will also be needed to ensure that potential sites are suitable terrain for
landing (unlike the boulder fields encountered by the Viking landers), for
emplacing large habitats and power sources, and for sustaining surface travel.
Detailed information on the surface topography and composition and some
knowledge of the subsurface structure will be required to determine if each
site is safe.196
The hardware needed to acquire the necessary site selection data will
probably include one or more polar orbiting satellites and a number of surface
rovers. It may be necessary to have separate satellites to acquire the global
science/resource database and to investigate possible landing sites. This is not
only because acquiring high-resolution landing site data may require a lower
orbit than is optimal for a satellite collecting a global database, but also because
the selection of candidate landing sites may have to await lengthy study of the
data returned from the global imaging satellite. Rovers will be needed to
survey potential landing sites in detail, acquiring data on the local
topography, available resources, subsurface structure, and chemical
composition (including analysis of the soil for possible toxicity.)197
196Each site will have to be examined because of the wide variation of conditions over the
Martian surface. For example, the peak of Olympus Mons is almost in vacuum, the polar regions
are covered with ice, and some valleys may contain deep layers of ash or dust.
197The Viking landers found the Martian soil to be highly reactive, but did not have sufficient
analytic capability to determine if it might be toxic.
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In addition to preparing for human bases, robotic precursors may also
be used to gather scientific data about Mars. The primary scientific goals for
Mars exploration include gaining knowledge about climate change, searching
for evidence of life, and learning about the geology and formation of Mars.
Much of the hardware needed to acquire scientific data will be very similar to
that used to prepare for human presence; individual hardware items will
probably be used for both purposes. For example, rovers may be used to
conduct preliminary science surveys of areas near potential landing sites, or
to explore sites which are unsuitable for human exploration, and the same
satellites that are looking for landing sites could also observe scientifically
interesting areas.
One science mission that could require specially dedicated hardware
would be the long-term study of the Martian surface environment and
climate. In addition to satellite-based instruments, this task would require
measurements from a number of different areas on the Martian surface and,
possibly, at different altitudes in the Martian atmosphere. Surface
observations could be made by a widely distributed network of small
environmental/geophysical stations that could be soft or hard landed or
emplaced by rovers. These stations would measure seismic events, wind
speeds, atmospheric pressure, solar flux, and other local conditions. Long-
term measurements from different altitudes in the atmosphere, if such
information was deemed necessary, would require the use of sensors carried
on a large balloon or unpiloted airplane.
The most technologically challenging precursor Mars mission would
be to return samples of the Martian soil and atmosphere to Earth. The return
of samples to Earth can produce a much greater harvest of scientific
information than the analysis of the same materials on Mars, because far
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better and more varied testing facilities are available on the Earth. A
thorough robotic Mars sample return mission would sample both surface and
subsurface rocks at various sites, which would require the use of a rover. 198
Unlike other precursor missions, a sample return mission would also need a
rocket to leave the surface of Mars and enter a trans-Earth orbit.
Finally, there are a number of other miscellaneous activities that may
have to be performed by robotic precursor missions before human explorers
arrive. One of these is the characterization of density structure of the upper
Martian atmosphere as a function of latitude and longitude, time of day, and
season. This information, which is needed if aerobraking is to be used at
Mars, would require at least a satellite-based instrument, and could also
require atmospheric probes. 199 Other precursor missions may be needed to
establish surface navigation aids, and to test hardware and procedures for the
human missions.
Martian precursor satellites would have slightly different hardware
requirements than their lunar equivalents. All Martian robotic missions
would have to be slightly more reliable than their lunar counterparts, both in
order for them to survive the long journey to Mars, and because it would be
more difficult to replace them if they failed. Martian satellites would also
have slightly different communications, power, and thermal subsystems than
their lunar equivalents. The greater distance to the Earth would necessitate
more powerful communications equipment, and the reduced solar flux
would necessitate larger solar panels and a different spacecraft thermal
198Office of Technology Assessment, Exploring the Moon and Mars, Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, July 1991, p.76.
199 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p.49.
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balance. Solar panels would still be preferable to nuclear power, though, for
the small power needs that such satellites would probably require.
Martian rovers may be quite different from their lunar counterparts.
First, the existence of a Martian atmosphere will mean that Mars rovers will
have to be resistant to flying dust, rather than to vacuum welding. Second,
the 24.6 hour Martian day and the low solar flux at the surface may mean that
Mars rovers will need a different power source than their lunar equivalents.
The optimal power source for Martian rovers isn't obvious, though; the low
solar flux (especially during dust storms) will reduce the efficiency of a
photovoltaic system, but it is not clear if a radioisotope thermal generator
power source would be sufficiently superior to be worth the increased cost.
Finally, the great distance between Mars and the Earth will mean that
precursor Mars rovers will need a different communications and control
system from lunar rovers. To avoid having to equip each rover with a large
high power antenna, Mars rovers will probably communicate with Earth via
a satellite in Mars orbit. This would optimally be a separate satellite in
synchronous orbit over the rover (if the rover is at a low enough latitude),
but it could also easily be another capability of a global reconnaissance or site
selection satellite.
The time delay for communications between Earth and Mars, which
can be over 40 minutes, without even considering the delay caused by any
satellite relays, will render teleoperation from Earth almost impossible; any
precursor Mars rover will require a high level of autonomous control. This
would seem at first to rule out the use of mini-rovers on Mars, but rapidly
shrinking computer and improved autonomous control capabilities may
make highly autonomous mini-rovers feasible by the time they would be
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needed. Otherwise, the advantages and disadvantages of Martian mini-
rovers would be fairly similar to those of lunar mini-rovers.
Except for the case of a robotic sample return mission, the
transportation requirements for these precursor missions are not particularly
formidable, as transportation will be required in only one direction.200 Since
there will be no particularly urgent time constraints on these robotic
spacecraft, they will probably sent on minimum-energy trajectories. For the
Earth-Mars transfer, such trajectories are available about every 26 months.
The AV required for these minimum energy transfers varies for each launch
window, but is generally about 4 km/s to begin the transfer to Mars. An
additional AV of around 1.5 km/s is required to enter orbit around Mars from
a minimum energy trajectory, and approximately 1.7 km/s beyond that
needed to reach the Martian surface using parachutes and landing rockets.
These AV requirements can be lowered somewhat by utilizing
swingbys of Venus and aerobraking at the orbit of Mars. Venus swingbys will
increase the flight time to Mars, but this is not particularly important for
robotic missions. Aerobraking at Mars is significantly more problematic.
First, as discussed earlier, it will require a greater understanding of the
Martian atmosphere. Second, it will require major technology advancement,
and will incorporate a high level of risk.201 If aerobraking technology is
sufficiently developed, though, it could reduce or eliminate the need to
"expend" AV to enter orbit around Mars.
200Requirements for two-way transportation between the Earth and Mars are discussed in the
next sub-section.
201Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991, p.
A-41.
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Conventional chemical rocket engines should be sufficient to launch
any Martian precursor mission. The masses of the Martian precursors should
not be very different from their lunar counterparts --in the range of 500 to
3000 kg delivered to Mars orbit, and the AV's will also be in the same range as
for lunar missions (perhaps lower for some trajectories involving swingbys of
Venus). As with the lunar precursors, the Mars missions will probably be
designed with existing launch vehicles in mind. In summary, the launch
requirements for the Martian precursors will be that the launch vehicles
must be available in the 1999 - 2005 time period and be capable of launching
payloads of 500 to 3000 kg to the orbit of Mars.
Humans to Mars
The hardware required for any human mission to Mars will depend
largely on the type of orbital transfer used between the Earth and Mars. The
choice of the type of transfer will, in turn, be based upon the availability of
various technologies and on tradeoffs made between reducing mission time
and reducing the overall propulsion requirements. The basic problem is that
while transfer opportunities between the Earth and Mars that do not require
very high AV expenditures do exist, they result in very long overall trip
times. The longer journeys expose the astronauts to more radiation, increase
the deleterious effects of exposure to microgravity, and increase the amount
of supplies needed. This problem can be dealt with either by using high-
energy propulsion to reduce transfer times, by designing the mission
hardware for very long-duration flights, or by a combination of the two.
Table VI-2 lists the types of transfers most likely to be used in SEI. All
of the values in the table are approximate; the AV numbers do not include
the AV required to enter orbit around the Earth or enter the Earth's
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atmosphere on the return leg of the trip.202  A conjunction-type mission
basically uses near-Hohmann transfers to travel from Earth to Mars and from
Mars to the Earth. Opposition class missions involve a different alignment of
the two planets and require either a deep-space propulsive maneuver or a
Venus flyby on one leg of the mission. The fast versions of these two types of
missions are achieved by expending extra AV to speed up the travel between
the planets. Finally, the split-sprint method involves very high AV
expenditures to achieve nearly direct Earth-Mars flights.
Table VI-2: Earth-Mars-Earth Transfers203
Transfer Type Total AV Time in Space Time on Mars
(km/s) (days) (days)
Conjunction 9 600 400
Fast Conjunction 19 300 580
Opposition 15 400 30
Fast Opposition 26 340 30
Split Sprint 29 210 30
Another concept that has been proposed for Earth-Mars transfers is the
use of "cycling" spacecraft, which would travel between the orbit of Earth and
the orbit of Mars, using gravity assists to repeatedly return to the vicinity of
the planets. Astronauts would use high speed transfer vehicles to
rendezvous with the cycling spacecraft as it neared the planet, perhaps as it
passed through one of the Lagrange points. The advantage of this scheme is
202The return to Earth may involve entering Earth orbit, "parking" at a Lagrange point, or
making a ballistic re-entry into Earth's atmosphere.
203Derived from data in American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to
the Office of Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for
the Space Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990.
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that it only requires that the Earth-Mars habitat be put into the transfer orbit
once. The main disadvantage is that it requires a high mission rate to become
cost-effective, so much so that it may not be appropriate before the mid-21st
century.204
An advanced propulsion system will probably be required for missions
using any but minimum-energy conjunction transfers. As the required AV's
for the missions rise, it becomes ever more necessary to use a rocket with an
extremely high exhaust velocity. For example, a storable propellant chemical
propulsion system would need about five times as much propellant as a
nuclear thermal rocket for a conjunction class mission, but it would need
more than 200 times as much fuel as a nuclear thermal rocket for a
split/sprint mission. The nuclear thermal rocket is probably the only
advanced propulsion system with the requisite thrust and exhaust velocity to
perform high-energy transfers that can be available in the time frame of the
SEI. While electric rockets have higher exhaust velocities, they are not able to
produce the necessary thrust to achieve rapid Earth-Mars transfers.
Electric propulsion, however, may be useful for cargo missions
between the Earth and Mars. For these missions, lengthy travel times will
not be a problem, as the cargo will not be affected by an extra few hundred
days in space. The high exhaust velocities, however, will mean that fuel
expenditures for the transfer will be low, reducing the initial mass that will
have to be delivered to LEO. The power source needed for Mars cargo
missions will have to be fairly large; the Synthesis Group and the AIAA
estimated power requirements for an Earth-Mars electric rocket transfer
204 Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991, p.
63.
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vehicle to be about 5 MW. Nuclear power is the optimal source to achieve
these power levels.
The SEI may end up using different transfer schemes as the exploration
of Mars progresses. Assuming the necessary propulsive hardware is
available, the first mission might be a split sprint mission with a short stay on
Mars. (For this and other trips with short stay times on Mars, it would be
important to schedule the Mars landing for a time when global dust storms
are not likely to be occurring.) This initial mission would gain experience in
working on Mars and bring back samples (whether for scientific or resource
exploitation purposes) that could be used to help plan the next mission,
which might utilize a fast conjunction transfer with a long stay on Mars. If
high energy propulsion hardware is not available, however, the initial
human mission would probably use a conjunction type transfer, resulting in
a 400 day stay on Mars.
The habitats needed to support human Mars exploration will vary
depending on the type of transfer used. For example, the type of habitat
needed for a 400-day stay on Mars will be very different from a habitat used
for a 30-day stay, as it will have to be larger, more efficient in recycling
consumables, and more reliable. No matter what transfer is utilized, it is very
unlikely that a single habitat will be used for both the space and Mars
segments of any mission. One reason is that it would require a prohibitive
amount of fuel to transport a large radiation shielded habitat between Mars
orbit and the planet's surface. Another reason is that the habitat
requirements for the two environments differ, and trying to satisfy both sets
of requirements would probably result in an expensive, heavy, and complex
design. The SEI will probably incorporate separate round-trip space habitats
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and Mars surface habitats; the surface habitats will probably be sent to Mars in
a dedicated cargo mission.
The requirements for habitats used during Earth-Mars transfers will be
very different from those for habitats used in Earth-Moon voyages. First,
because of the long mission duration, the Mars transfer habitats will need
radiation shielding against both solar flares and cosmic rays. Second, the
issue of long-term exposure to microgravity may also force some design
modifications. Third, the astronauts will need a reasonable amount of living
space and, probably, regenerable life support systems. Finally, a long-duration
power source will be needed. In general, each of these requirements will
grow more onerous as the transfer times rise.
The space habitats used for Mars missions will require significant
amounts of shielding. First, the very high probability of a large solar flare
during the time spent in interplanetary transfers will necessitate that the
habitat have a heavily shielded "storm shelter." Second, the cosmic ray dose
over the duration of all but the most high-energy trips is likely to exceed.
recommended safe limits. Although the astronauts can take shifts in the
radiation storm shelter to lower overall cosmic ray dose, it seems probable
that upwards of 25 grams/cm2 of shielding will be used over much of the
transfer habitat. This shielding could be partially made up of fuel and
consumables in order to minimize the extra mass required.
Another problem caused by long transfer times is astronaut
deconditioning due to long-duration microgravity exposure. In addition to
possible long-term effects, such deconditioning might leave the astronauts
unable to function when they reach Mars. Other than reducing the trip times,
the primary methods of dealing with the problem would be to develop
countermeasures (such as exercise) to the effects of long-term microgravity, or
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to provide artificial gravity in the transfer vehicle. Artificial gravity could be
produced by rotating the transfer spacecraft, but the spacecraft would either
have to be very large or spun very rapidly. Either of these strategies would
cause problems: large rotating spacecraft would probably require multiple
launches from Earth and significant assembly on orbit, while small, rapidly
rotating habitats would have some unsettling effects on the astronauts inside
them due to the gravity gradient and the coriolis forces that would be created.
The astronauts in these habitats will also need relatively roomy
accommodations, and enough air, food, and water to last them for the
duration of the round-trip interplanetary transfer. The problems here are the
same as those discussed for the long-duration lunar habitat--each astronaut
will require sufficient personal space and some level of recycling of
consumables will have to be achieved. Again, as the transfer times increase,
the amount of space needed by the astronauts will also increase, as will the
total mass of air, food, and water required.
In all probability, the space habitat will also be the site of some scientific
and exploration-related activity. During the deep space segment of the flight,
astronauts may perform astronomical observations or conduct microgravity
experiments. Once the mission nears Mars, teleoperation of Mars rovers may
begin. In the event of dust storms that delay landing on Mars, such
teleoperation activities may continue for an extended period of time. The
hardware requirements for these on-board science activities will be small;
they will include power, communications, and possibly a location on the
outside of the habitat.
Finally, the space habitat will need a reliable source of power to meet
the needs of its various subsystems, the astronauts, and any onboard
experiments. The Synthesis Group estimated space habitat power
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requirements for a Mars mission to be up to 20 kw.205 As the spacecraft will be
in sunlight for the entire duration of the transfers, photovoltaic systems will
probably be the optimal power source. Battery storage would probably be
needed to augment the photovoltaic system for periods when the habitat is in
orbit around Mars.
The design of Mars surface habitats will depend strongly on whether
the stay on Mars will be for a month or for over a year. The differences
between long-duration and short-duration habitats were already discussed in
the lunar exploration section of this chapter; most of what was said there
holds true for Mars. One difference between Martian and lunar habitats is
that radiation shielding will probably not be needed for the Martian habitat,
since the atmosphere of Mars provides significant shielding against both
cosmic rays and solar flares.
The power requirements for Mars habitats would probably be similar to
those of the equivalent lunar habitats. The optimum power source for the
Martian habitats is not clear, however. If power requirements are below 50
kw, for example, photovoltaic arrays might be the optimal power source.
While the solar flux at Mars is lower than it is on the Moon, the short
day/night cycle would mean that photovoltaic/battery systems would still be
fairly efficient. If the habitat power needs are large, a nuclear reactor will
probably be the best power source for long-duration missions; high power
requirements for short duration missions might be met by the use of
photovoltaics and fuel cells.
205Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991, p.
69.
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Various other items of hardware will be used by the astronauts to carry
out the exploration of Mars. For journeys outside the habitat, the astronauts
will require a spacesuit designed for the gravity, thermal, and atmospheric
conditions on Mars--existing spacesuits would be too heavy and bulky for
long-term Mars exploration. Rovers, both pressurized and unpressurized,
will be needed to carry astronauts to areas of scientific interest beyond the
immediate vicinity of the habitat. Teleoperated rovers will also be needed to
explore interesting areas of the planet that the astronauts will be unable to
reach. Such teleoperation may require the presence of a communications
satellite, perhaps one left over from the precursor missions.
The final major hardware requirements for the Mars portion of the SEI
will be for the hardware required for travel between the planetary surfaces
and the Earth-Mars transfer vehicles. Any piloted Mars mission will almost
certainly involve both Earth orbit and Mars orbit rendezvous. Earth orbit
rendezvous will be necessary to assemble and fuel the large transfer vehicle,
and to deliver astronauts to it. Mars orbit rendezvous will be necessary
because it would be prohibitively wasteful of fuel to deliver the large transfer
habitat to the Martian surface and back. Finally, Earth-orbit rendezvous may
again be required to return the astronauts to Earth at the end of the mission.
The SEI's Mars missions will require both a heavy-lift vehicle and
significant assembly on Earth orbit. These will be required because of the vast
size of a Mars mission. The AIAA estimated that a 4-6 crew transfer habitat
would have a mass of from 40 to 55 tons.20 6 Delivering such a transfer crew
module to Mars and back on a low energy transfer with cryogenic rockets
206American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Final Report to the Office of
Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology NASA on Assessment of Technologies for the Space
Exploration Initiative, AIAA, December 31, 1990, p. 47b.
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would require at least 300 tons of fuel; to carry the same transfer vehicle to
Mars on a split sprint using a nuclear thermal rocket would require at least
850 tons of fuel. Since a heavy lift vehicle capable of putting 350 to 900 tons in
Earth orbit is not likely to be developed in the time frame of the SEI,
significant on-orbit assembly and refueling operations will be necessary.
Heavy-lift vehicles would help to reduce the amount of assembly, and would
also allow large components, such as a Mars habitat, to be delivered to orbit in
a single piece, thus simplifying their design. Smaller launch vehicles, as well
as safer launch vehicles suitable for launching humans, may be used to ferry
astronauts, fuel, and mission hardware up to the transfer vehicle.
On the return trip to Earth, the large transfer vehicle will probably be
left in a high orbit for possible refurbishment and re-use; it could also be left
at a Lagrange point to lower future AV requirements for it to leave the Earth's
vicinity or to allow for refueling with lunar materials. The choice of the
parking location for the transfer vehicle will depend on the hardware
available to reach it there, the stability of the orbit, the potential for re-use,
and any possible radiation hazard if nuclear power is involved. 20 7 The
astronauts could either be met at this parking orbit by a re-entry vehicle
(either expendable or reusable), or could use a transfer vehicle that they had
brought with them to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere.
Finally, hardware will be needed for travelling between Mars orbit and
the surface of Mars. A small crew excursion module, similar to that used in
the lunar missions, will probably be used to deliver astronauts between these
locations. Since the mass of such a module is likely to be small (the AIAA
207The Synthesis Group suggested ejecting reactors into a solar orbit to minimize the radiation
hazard.
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estimates 4,000 to 5,000 kg), the Martian gravity low, and the atmosphere thick
enough to provide some braking, the rockets used would not have to be
particularly powerful or efficient. The landing of a 70,000 kg habitat on Mars,
on the other hand, would require rockets with significant thrust and tens of
thousands of kg of fuel, in addition to a parachute braking system. Either
storable or cryogenic chemical-fueled rockets could be used; cryogenic fuels
would produce higher exhaust velocities, but significant development of
cryogenic fuel storage technology would be needed to store such fuels for the
duration of a journey to Mars.
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VII. Evaluation of Russian Hardware in the SEI
Evaluating individual items of Russian space hardware to determine
their suitability for use in in the SEI requires that each item of hardware be
judged against technical, economic, and policy criteria. These criteria are:
* Capability to satisfy the technical requirements of the SEI,
* Difficulty of integration into the SEI,
* Comparative cost to alternative hardware or technologies,
* Availability within the requisite time frame,
* Political implications of use in the SEI, and
* Potential additional benefits to U.S space efforts.
Some of these criteria are more complex than they may appear to be at
first glance. For example, the first criterion must take into account not only
the hardware's current capability to satisfy the technical requirements of the
SEI, but also its potential for modification to meet those requirements. The
comparative cost criterion must often measure the Russian hardware not
only against any U.S. or internationally available equivalent, but also against
potential development programs that could produce such an equivalent, and
even against completely different technologies that might meet the SEI's
requirements. Finally, the criterion of potential additional benefits, which
would generally only apply to cooperative development programs, requires
that the Russian hardware be examined in the context of its possible use
elsewhere in the U.S. space program.
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Energia Launch Vehicle
The Energia launch vehicle is an attractive option for fulfilling the
SEI's lunar and Martian heavy-lift requirements. The minimum
requirements for lunar missions were that the rocket be available by the early
years of the 21st century and that it have the capability to deliver payloads of
at least 60 metric tons to LEO. For Mars missions, the required launch
capacity will probably be considerably larger, but the capability will probably
not be needed until after 2010.
The current version of the Energia is able to deliver 88,000 kg into a 200
km altitude orbit at an inclination of 51.60; modified versions should be able
to deliver 200,000 kg to the same orbit.20 8 This exceeds the SEI's hardware
requirements as long as the mission plan allows the payload to be delivered
into an orbit with an inclination greater than 450. Direct lunar missions, for
example, would not be greatly affected by the use of such a high inclination
parking orbit, though such an orbit does render completely in-plane transfers
to the Moon impossible. Most SEI heavy lift payloads, however, will involve
assembly in orbit. If these missions involved an Energia launched from
Baikonur, the assembly would have to take place in a high inclination orbit,
as the Energia payload capacity is rapidly reduced for low-inclination orbits (it
can only deliver about 30,000 kg to a low 28.50 inclination orbit).
One possible means of solving this problem would be to perform the
assembly in a high inclination orbit (which would slightly lower the payload
capacity of launch vehicles traveling to the orbit from lower latitude launch
sites); another would be to launch the Energia from a lower latitude launch
208Steven J. Isakowitz, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1991, p.119 .
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site. The latter idea would require the construction of a new launch pad and
assembly building, but the concept is not totally infeasible, as the Energia can
be delivered anywhere in the world on the An-225 transport aircraft,209 and
does not require vast amounts of payload integration due to its horizontal
stacking and side-mounted payload design.
The alternatives to the Energia as the SEI's heavy-lift vehicle are all
development programs, as the Energia is the world's only currently available
heavy-lift vehicle. Only one of these development programs, the New
Launch System (NLS) is currently underway. The NLS program is basically a
rocket engine development program, but it could result in the production of a
heavy-lift vehicle, the NLS-1, which would have a LEO payload capacity of
60,000 kg. The future of the NLS program, particularly the heavy-lift portion,
is in serious jeopardy,210 however, as its price tag is estimated at $15 billion
through 1995. Other possible competitors to the Energia include a version of
the space shuttle that carries a payload instead of an orbiter, and a new launch
vehicle using technology (particularly the rocket engines) from the Saturn V
program. 211 It is a very safe guess that any of these development efforts
would cost billions of dollars. While the price of an Energia (quoted at $110
million in 1990)212 may rise, it will certainly not approach that level.
The most serious problem with the use of the Energia as the SEI's
heavy-lift vehicle is that it may no longer be available by the time it will be
209 Korchagin, V., "Buran Flies to Baikonur", Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, November 20,
1988.
210Leonard David, "House Panels Urged to Back Smallest of NLS Boosters", Space News,
March 30-April 5, 1992.
2 11Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991,
p.65.12Steven J. Isakowitz, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1991, p.108 .
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needed. The Energia has not been launched since 1988, and there is no
apparent demand for its services within Russia (though its designers at NPO
Energia have been attempting to create such a demand). 213 As the time since
its last launch increases, the chance that the program can be successfully
restarted will begin to decrease. Perhaps an even larger problem is that the
Energia's strap-on boosters are manufactured in the Ukraine, and its only
existing launch site is in Kazakhstan. In the Energia's favor, though, it has
the powerful NPO Energia organization behind it, and it has unique
capabilities, which the Russians may not want to give up.
The use of the Energia in the SEI would probably not be strongly
opposed. (As discussed in Chapter IV, the means by which the vehicle was
used would have a strong effect how its use would be received.) As the
Energia has no existing equivalent, opposition from the U.S. aerospace
industry would be muted, coming mainly from companies with hopes of
developing a U.S. heavy lift vehicle. United States defence interests could
also possibly intervene, since the Energia's strap-on boosters are produced in a
factory that used to double as the Soviet Union's largest ICBM factory. This
plant however, has announced that it is ceasing military production,214 so this
issue may be irrelevant by the time frame of the SEI. Finally, there would
likely be virtually no opposition within Russia to the use of the Energia in
the SEI.
213V. Nelyubin, "King of Satellites; Another 'Project of the Century'", Komsomolskaya Pravda,
February 15, 1991.
214Moscow Radio Rossii Network, 1200 GMT, March 2, 1992.
161
Robotic Precursor Missions
Another potential Russian contribution to the SE1 might be the
provision of robotic precursor spacecraft and the boosters to launch them
with. Russian robotic spacecraft, with either Russian, U.S., or international
scientific instruments on board could potentially be used for both lunar and
Martian precursor missions; Russian rockets could be used to launch either
Russian or U.S. spacecraft to the Moon and Mars.
Two Russian missions to Mars are already in development. The Mars
'94 mission, scheduled for a 1994 launch on a Proton booster, will include an
orbiter, two small meteorology stations, and two sub-surface penetrators. The
Mars '96 mission, which would also be launched on a Proton, may include
one or more rovers and an instrumented balloon. The Mars '94 program has
recently been in turmoil; without the support of the European nations
participating in the mission, it would probably have been delayed or
cancelled. 215  Some in Russia are still extremely doubtful that it will get off
the ground in 1994,216 and the viability of the Mars '96 mission is even more
uncertain.
Apart from these two missions, any Russian spacecraft contributed to
the SEI would be new; although they could draw on previous designs, they
would require building mostly new hardware. Some indication of how
successful the new missions are likely to be can be gained form examination
of the historical success rates of similar missions. This examination makes it
clear that the Russians, at least historically, have had fairly good success with
215Peter B. deSelding, "French Agree to Prop up Mars Missions With Cash", Space News.
February 17-23, 1992.
216Yaroslav Golovanov, "Just Where Are We Flying To?", Izvestia, December 17, 1991.
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robotic lunar exploration, but have had a truly dismal recorf in their attempts
to reach Mars.
The Russians have already successfully carried out a wide range of
lunar precursor missions. While they did not always iniially meet with
success, the Soviets were eventually able to put a series of a&biters around the
Moon and successfully land other spacecraft on the Moon's swface. Among
the Russian spacecraft landed on the Moon were the Luakhod rovers, the
only robotic lunar or planetary rovers ever successfully used, and the Luna
spacecraft, the only successful robotic sample return mission. In contrast, out
of a total of 16 attempts to reach Mars, the Soviets have never had a complete
success--most of the missions were total failures. The primary cause of the
failures is believed to be that the Russian space program is unable to achieve
the long-duration reliability that is needed to carry out robotic Mars missions.
Even though the Russian's have historically had success in conducting
lunar orbiter and rover programs, their lunar rovers and arbiters probably
would not be as capable as equivalent U.S. spacecraft. First, Russian scientific
instruments are generally not up to Western standards-this is demonstrated
by the extensive use of European instruments on recent Russian spacecraft.
Second, Russian miniaturization and computer technology is not up to U.S.
standards; for this reason they would probably be unable to produce
autonomous rovers or mini-rovers. 217
Russian launch vehicles, on the other hand, are quiite capable of
meeting the requirements of delivering robotic precursor spacecraft to their
targets. The three Russian launch vehicles (actually two Russian and a
Ukrainian) that might be used for such a task in the SEI are the Molniya, the
217Polsky, Debra, "JPL Proposes Small, Cheap Mars Landers", Space News. March 2-8, 1992.
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Proton, and the Zenit-3. The Molniya launch vehicle is capable of delivering
1600 kg payloads into a lunar transfer orbit and about 700 kg into a low-energy
Mars transfer. While this may be too small for some SEI hardware needs, the
Proton booster would probably be able to launch any SEI precursor mission, as
it is able to deliver a 5,700 kg payload into a lunar transfer orbit and 4,600 kg
into a Mars orbit. The Zenit-3 launch vehicle, if it were ever produced, would
also probably have the necessary launch capacity to launch any SEI precursor.
Both the Molniya and the Proton have reliability levels comparable with
Western launch vehicles; the Zenit-3 has never flown.
Integration of Russian robotic missions into the SEI would not be
particularly difficult, mostly because the precursors are not operationally
linked with the rest of the SEI. If Russian launch vehicles were to launch
Russian satellites the integration problem would be reduced to ensuring that
the U.S. deep space communications network was able to communicate with
the spacecraft. Use of U.S. instruments on Russian spacecraft and Russian
instruments on U.S. spacecraft would also not be particularly difficult, as
there is considerable experience with this type of integration. Finally, even
the use of Russian launch vehicles to launch U.S. satellites would not be a
particularly difficult integration task, especially once the Russians gain
experience in launching foreign satellites on a commercial basis.
The relative costs of using Russian and U.S. hardware in the SEI's
precursor missions will, as was discussed in Chapter IV, depend strongly on
the method of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. In general, though,
developing a new Russian spacecraft would probably be less expensive than
developing an equivalent U.S. spacecraft. The problem is that the Russian
spacecraft would probably also be less reliable and less capable than its U.S.
equivalent. Russian boosters would also probably be less expensive than their
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U.S. counterparts; their reliability and capabilities however, would probably
be very similar to those of U.S. launch vehicles.
It is not certain that the Soviet launch vehicles will be available in the
time frame (roughly from the late 1990s to 2005) they would be needed to
launch SEI precursor missions. The less powerful Molniya spacecraft seems
fairly likely to survive, as it is a derivative of the same "A-class" launch
vehicle that is the most commonly used Russian rocket. In addition, the
Molniya can be launched from either Baikonur or the Russian launch site at
Plesetsk. The Proton, on the other hand, can currently only be launched from
Baikonur, which is in Kazakhstan. The Proton is also notoriously
environmentally unfriendly, which may jeopardize its future at Baikonur.
The Proton is fairly crucial to the Russian space program, though, as it is used
to launch space station modules, so it seems likely that it will also be
preserved.
There are few political implications inherent in using Russian robotic
precursor spacecraft or scientific instruments in the SEI, but the use of
Russian launch vehicles could cause some trouble. Launching Russian
satellites on Russian launch vehicles would not cause much trouble in the
U.S., but using Russian launch vehicles to launch U.S. spacecraft would
certainly arouse strong opposition from the U.S. aerospace industry. In the
same vein, launch of Russian spacecraft on U.S. launch vehicles might be
opposed by the Russian space industry.
In summary, Russian spacecraft will probably be capable of carrying out
lunar missions, and Russian launch vehicles will probably be available to
launch those missions. Russian lunar spacecraft, though, may need U.S.
instruments to fulfill SEI data gathering requirements. Finally, launch of U.S.
robotic spacecraft on Russian launch vehicles, while feasible, carries a degree
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of risk due to the uncertainty within Russia, and could arouse opposition
within the United States.
Mir Modules as SEI Habitats
It is theoretically possible to use a Soviet space station module as a
lunar or Martian surface habitat or as a Earth-Mars space transfer habitat.
While this initially seems an intriguing concept, problems arise that may
make it infeasible. First, it must be understood that the current Mir station
could not be used for these tasks, as it will have long exceeded its operational
lifetime by the time it would be needed for use as a habitat. A new Mir
duplicate, or even a modified Mir will not be appropriate for these missions
either, though, as the requirements for operating in LEO have resulted in the
design of a habitat that is not suited for meeting the requirements for use
either on a planetary surface or in deep space.
The primary problem for almost any use of a Russian space station
module as an SEI habitat is the issue of radiation protection. Russian space
stations do not have any radiation protection, relying instead on the shielding
provided by the Earth's magnetic field.218 This means that the entire space
station module would need to have shielding added for any use in space or
on the Moon; even for a short-term habitat, a radiation proof "storm shelter"
would be needed. Use on the Moon would also require a different power
system, as the photovoltaic/battery systems used in Earth orbit would not be
appropriate for the long-duration lunar eclipse.
As radiation requirements rule out the use of a space station module in
deep space and on the Moon, the only real opportunity left would be to use
218Moscow Tass in English, 2036 GMT, October 26, 1989.
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the module as a Mars habitat. In this case too, though, numerous changes
would be necessary. First, the space station modules would have to be
redesigned internally so that the astronauts could function inside them in a
gravity field. The effect of gravity may also have some unexpected effects on
the module's subsystems. Finally, the capability of the module to land on
Mars is uncertain, and would have to be examined.
The overall problem with using a Russian space station module as a
habitat elsewhere in the solar system is that the Russian space stations are the
result of years of optimization for use in the particular environment of LEO.
It would probably be simpler and more efficient to design entirely new
habitats for use in deep space or on planetary surfaces than to modify the
Russian space station design.
Use of Mir to Prepare For the SEI
While the Mir space station may be inappropriate for use as a SEI
habitat, it could potentially be very useful in the preparatory phases of the SEI.
As it is clear that more life science data is needed before long-duration SEI
missions can be conducted, one preparatory use of Mir might be as a
laboratory for conducting long-term life science experiments.
The only other location at which such experimentation could be be
conducted would be on board the U.S. space station. If a U.S. space station is
built, it would probably be the optimum place to conduct SEI life sciences
experimentation, because it would have more power and a better
microgravity environment than the Mir station. This is one case, though,
where the existence of the Russian hardware may be more assured than the
equivalent U.S. hardware, as the U.S. space station is perennially in danger of
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cancellation or radical redesign.219 If the U.S. space station is severely delayed
or cancelled, Mir will become the most viable option for a pre-SEI life sciences
laboratory.
It seems fairly likely that the Mir program will continue to exist for at
least the next few years. One factor that may aid in its survival is that Russia
has made plans with the U.S. and with European nations to conduct joint
programs involving Mir over the next few years. In addition, the Mir
program is still the most prestigious part of the Russian space program, and
Mir is one of the few Russian space projects that is regularly bringing in hard
currency. One event that could cause the early end of the Mir program might
be the death of a cosmonaut--such an event becomes more likely as Mir ages
and the cosmonauts on board perform ever more risky extra-vehicular
activities.
There would be many problems associated with using the existing Mir
station for space life sciences research, many of them due to the fact that the
existing Mir station has already been in space beyond its initial design
lifetime. Currently, astronauts on Mir have very little time to conduct
research, because 80% of their time is spent on life-support issues, including
repairs, freight handling, and exercise.220 These problems would be reduced,
but certainly not eliminated,if a new Mir were sent up.
The U.S. could conceivably acquire a dedicated Mir-type module for use
as a life sciences laboratory in LEO, but, in addition to the problems described
above, the integration of the station into the U.S. space infrastructure would
be very complex. Use of a Mir-type space station would also probably tie the
219Liz Tucci, "Goldin Orders Station Revision", Space News, August 17-23, 1992.
220yaroslav Golovanov, "Just Where Are We Flying To?", Izvestia, December 12, 1991.
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U.S. to using a Proton launch vehicle to put the station in orbit, and Soyuz
launch vehicles and capsules, as well as Progress capsules, to resupply it. The
problem is the Mir is not just a single hardware item, but a system composed
of many hardware elements. Either the U.S. would have to use those
elements or redesign the station for use with the U.S. space infrastructure.
Overall, it would probably be more cost effective to design and build a simple
station compatible with the U.S. space infrastructure to serve as a life sciences
laboratory than to buy a Russian station.
Perhaps a better way to utilize Mir and its descendants in the SEI would
be to use them to learn from the two decades of Russian long-duration space
habitat experience. Experience learned from the Mir program could allow the
U.S. to avoid problems experienced by the Soviets as they developed their
long-duration space capability. In addition the technology that has been
developed over the years to support the Russian space stations could be
transferred for use in the SEI. An example of such a technology would be
Mir's fourth generation life support system, which includes a unique
debugged system for extracting water from the atmosphere.221
Political problems with the use of Mir for life sciences experimentation
or technology transfer would be directly linked to the possible effect that such
use might have on the U.S. space station. If the U.S. space station is either
cancelled or built, these problems should be fairly small--it is only when the
U.S. station is on the edge of cancellation that its supporters will oppose
anything that might threaten it. Any reaction inside Russia to U.S. use of Mir
221Ravil Zaripov, "Lemons for the Funeral Repast, or 'Space Games' of the CIS", Moskovskiy
Komsomolets, January 17, 1992, in TPRS Report Science and Technology - USSR: Space, April 1,
1992.
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is likely to be positive, unless the use is so pervasive that the U.S. is seen to be
"taking over" Mir.
Nuclear Thermal Rocket
Human exploration of Mars becomes much more difficult without a
nuclear thermal rocket for propulsion between the Earth and Mars. While
the U.S. is still years away from even testing such a rocket, the Russians have
already fired a nuclear thermal rocket for durations of one hour with exhaust
velocities of 8,820 m/s and a thrust of 20 kN. While this is on the low side of
the SEI requirements, it seems likely that with some further development,
the requirements could be met.
The U.S. nuclear thermal effort, which is still largely classified, has
spent $130 million to date. Engine tests may be conducted as early as 1994, but
they will drive the program cost up to $800 million 222 Estimates of the total
cost to develop a working nuclear thermal rocket from this program were
estimated at from two to five billion dollars for a first flight in 2006.223
Though further investigation is needed, it seems quite possible that using the
existing Russian nuclear thermal rocket could save on the order of a billion
dollars.
There are likely to be few political problems in the U.S. with the use of
a Russian nuclear thermal rocket, particularly if the U.S. acquires the
technology involved. The U.S. effort to build a nuclear thermal rocket began
as a DoD program to develop nuclear thermal upper stages for launch
222Andrew Lawler, "USAF to Lift Veil on Covert Nuclear Rocket", Space News, January 13-26,
1992.
223Leonard David, "Soviets Reveal Work In Advanced Nuclear Rockets, Seek to Share", Space
News, September 16-22, 1991.
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vehicles; as such use has become less likely, the DoD has become less
interested in the program, so they would probably not fight its eclipse by the
Russian program. Once acquired, nuclear thermal rocket technology could
also be used elsewhere in the U.S. space program; one such use might be in
enabling fast missions to the outer planets. Within Russia, the rocket's
developers are anxious to work with the U.S. either in selling their
technology or in developing joint projects. 224 Reportedly, their willingness to
cooperate stems from a desire to keep the program alive--this means that
there is no guarantee that the Russian nuclear thermal rocket will still be
available in the post-2005 time frame in which it would be needed.
Topaz Thermionic Reactor
Nuclear reactors may be needed for long-term Lunar and Martian
habitats and for use in nuclear electric propulsion for cargo missions. The
Soviet Topaz thermionic nuclear reactor is not able to meet the SEI's
requirements, but could possibly serve as the starting point for a program to
develop reactors that would be able to meet the SEI requirements.
The Topaz reactors have two features that prevent their use as SEI
power sources. First, they do not produce enough power. The approximate
power output of a Topaz reactor is 10 kw; power levels of at least 50 kw would
be desired for SEI habitats, and multi-megawatt power is needed for the SEI's
electric propulsion needs. Second, they do not have very long lifetimes; the
longest duration which one has been used in space has been a year. The long-
duration SEI habitats would optimally use reactors that lasted reliably over
224Leonard David, "Soviets Reveal Work In Advanced Nuclear Rockets, Seek to Share", Space
News, September 16-22, 1991.
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several long-duration missions, and a nuclear electric rocket would probably
also be better served by a more durable reactor, which would allow it to make
multiple journeys.
The major alternatives to using the Topaz reactor in the SEI would be
either to use a U.S. thermoelectric reactor based on the SP-100 program, or to
not use nuclear reactors at all. The only major effect on the SEI of nuclear
reactors not being available would be that it would be difficult to provide
power for large bases, and less efficient propulsion would have to be used for
the transport of cargo between the LEO and orbits around Mars and the Moon.
It would not mean the end of the SEI, however. If nuclear power is going to
be used, the major alternative to the Topaz is the SP-100, a NASA/DoE/DoD
program to develop a space thermoelectric reactor. 225
The major advantage that thermionic reactors have over
thermoelectric reactors is that they will not have to be as large to produce the
same amount of power. Estimates are that thermionic reactors will have four
to six times smaller radiators and will be two to three times more efficient
than thermoelectric reactors. 226 As power levels increase, the mass advantage
of thermionic reactors becomes larger, because at high power levels the
radiator becomes a very large fraction of the total reactor mass.
The principal advantage of the Topaz reactor over the SP-100 system,
though, is that it has actually been built and flown in space, while the SP-100
is still a development program. Recent estimates are that the SP-100 is still a
billion dollars and anywhere from 10 to 18 years away from a flight
2 2 5 Philip Pluta, et. al., "SP-100, a Flexible Technology for Space Power From 10s to 10OOs of
Kwe", Proceedings of Space Manufacturing 7, AIAA/SSI Conference at Princeton, NJ, May 1989.
226Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991,
p.7 0.
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demonstration. 22 7,228 The use of a Topaz reactor is likely to be opposed by
some supporters of the SP-100; on the other hand, the DoD may be interested
in the thermionic system because its smaller size could ensure its
survivability. Finally, as the Russians have already turned this technology
over to the U.S. strategic defense initiative office, it is unlikely that they
would protest against its use in the SEI.
Chemical Rocket Engines
In addition to the possible use of Russian nuclear thermal rocket
engines, it might also be worthwhile to use Russian chemical-fueled rocket
engines in the SEI. Most conventional Russian rocket engines do not have
performance characteristics that would make them worth integrating into
U.S. spacecraft. The two clear exceptions are the RD-170 engine used in the
Zenit and Energia launch vehicles, and the small SPT-70 and SPT-100 electric
thrusters. As the electric thrusters have already been transferred to the
United States, 229 this sub-section will concentrate on the use of the RD-170.
The RD-170 rocket engine is the most powerful liquid fueled-rocket
engine in existence. Its probable use in the SEI would be as the basis for a
heavy-lift vehicle. Such use would be a compromise between using an
Energia and not using any Russian technology; both the risks and benefits
would be reduced. One additional benefit that would be gained by the use of
the RD-170 in the SEI, though, is that it would probably result in technology
22 7Vincent Kiernan and Andrew Lawler, "Administration Pits Soviet Topaz Reactor Against
SP-100", Space News, January 13-26, 1992.
228Vincent Kiernan, "Nuclear Technologies Vie as Space Power Source", Space News, March 4-
10, 1991.
229Daniel J. Marcus, "Russia's Satellite Thrusters Draw NASA, Defense Scrutiny', Space
News, April 13-19, 1992.
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transfer to the United States. Use of the RD-170 would probably have very
little opposition in the U.S., particularly if the technology were transferred to
U.S. firms. Opposition in Russia might exist, but would be muted, especially
if Russian firms were involved in the development of the SEI heavy-lift
vehicle.
The major competitors to the RD-170 as the possible engines for a new
heavy-lift vehicle would be the engines that are being developed in the NLS
program and a revived version of the F-1, the rocket engine used in the
Saturn V launch vehicle. The cost of the NLS program and the uncertainty
about it ever developing a heavy-lift vehicle have already been discussed. The
F-i, though, might represent a more serious competitor to the RD-170. The
Synthesis group suggested that the use of F-1's in the SEI might allow for a
faster, cheaper, and safer heavy-lift launch vehicle. 230 The F-1 is not as
capable as the RD-170, however, as it has less thrust, a lower exhaust velocity,
and less throttling capability. It is also unclear how much the revival of the
F-1 would cost, but it could be very expensive, as the engine's supplier base is
gone and manufacturing technology has changed greatly since the early 1970s,
when it was last produced.
While it appears that the RD-170 might be a leading candidate for use
in the development of an SEI launch vehicle, its continued production is not
assured. The RD-170 is produced by NPO Energomash, which is in Russia,
but its only use is in the Zenit launch vehicle and the Energia strap-ons,
which are produced at NPO Yushnoye, in the Ukraine. If the Energia and
Zenit programs were to be cancelled, or forced to end because of
230Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold:
America's Space Exploration Initiative, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991,
p.65.
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disagreements between Russia and the Ukraine, the capability to produce RD-
170 might erode over the next few years.
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VIII. Recommendations
There is not one clear "best" way to use Russian space hardware in the
SEI. Though particular hardware items can be identified as being able to meet
SEI requirements at low cost, the choice of an optimal strategy for using the
hardware will depend on the chooser's opinions on the worth of the SEI, on
the value of cooperation with Russia, and on appropriate levels of risk-
taking. For this reason, two different strategies are proposed for the use of
Russian space hardware in the SEI.
The first strategy is a fairly low-risk approach that, in most cases,
utilizes Russian space hardware only as a basis for U.S. technology
development efforts. This strategy is designed to reduce the cost of the SEI,
but not to promote the initiative, and to reap the available benefits of the
Russian space program without attempting to preserve its capabilities. The
second strategy is a higher risk approach that would involve more use of
Russian hardware and broader U.S./Russian cooperation. As well as having
the potential to sharply reduce the costs of the SEI, this strategy could also
increase the prominence of the initiative in the United States and help
preserve some Russian space capabilities useful to the SEI. Rather than
avoiding uncertainty, this strategy would attempt to take active steps to
reduce it.
A Low-Risk Strategy for Using Russian Space Hardware in the SEI
In this strategy, the U.S. would attempt to gain the maximum benefit
from Russian space hardware without relying on the unstable Russian space
program or committing the nation to pursuing the SEI. This plan thus
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involves no large scale cooperative activities and no pledges to use Russian
space hardware in the SEI. Instead, it concentrates on the immediate use of
Russian space hardware as the basis of U.S. technology development
programs. In addition, it does not discourage small-scale scientific
cooperation between Russian and U.S. space scientists.
The major elements of the low risk strategy are:
* Purchase of a Russian nuclear thermal rocket and necessary
technical support. The technical support could include hiring Russian
researchers working on nuclear thermal rockets and using Russian nuclear
rocket test facilities. The goal would be to use the knowledge gained to
support a U.S. nuclear thermal rocket development program.
* Purchase of an RD-170 rocket engine and necessary technical
support. The goal would be to determine whether a U.S.-licensed version
would be worth developing, or, if not, whether some of the technologies
involved might be useful in the NLS program.
* Cooperation with U.S. agencies already investigating the
Russian Topaz-2 reactor. The objective would be to compare the ability of
thermionic reactors based on the Topaz and thermoelectric reactors produced
in the SP-100 program in meeting SEI requirements. Later decisions on
reactor development would await better definition of the SEI.
* Scientific cooperation on Russian planetary probes. U.S.
scientists would not be prevented from placing instruments on the Russian
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Mars '94 and Mars '96 probes. The choice of whether or not this should be
done would be made in the usual process of allocating space science resources.
* Coordination and data exchange with Russian scientists
performing life science experiments on Mir. The objective here would be to
maximize the useful data return from Russian experiments. Some small U.S.
experiments might also be conducted on Mir; again this would be carried out
through normal scientific channels.
* Encouragement of U.S. space station contractors to subcontract
with KB Salyut to review space station plans and to purchase Russian space
station-related technology where appropriate. The objective would be to gain
from the Russian experience in designing and operating space habitats
* A 1995 reassessment of the use of Russian space hardware in the
SEI. By this time, both the situation in Russia and the status of the SEI may
have stabilized, thus reducing the risk of engaging in U.S./Russian
cooperative programs within the SEI. As SEI missions will probably not begin
until the late 1990s, 1995 will probably not be too late a date to incorporate
Russian hardware into the initiative.
A Higher Risk Strategy for Using Russian Space Hardware in the SEI
The second strategy for using Russian space hardware in the SEI differs
from the first in that rather than avoiding the problems associated with
uncertainty, it actively seeks to reduce the uncertainty. In this strategy, the
U.S. would seek to sign a high-level agreement with Russia on long-term
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cooperation in the SEI. Cooperative activities would start with small, trust-
building exercises and work up to fairly close cooperation. While this
approach features greater risks than the first approach, it could also result in
greater benefits.
Rather than waiting and seeing whether the U.S. will go ahead with
the SEI and what Russian hardware capabilities will survive the current
troubles, this strategy seeks to influence the outcome in both countries. In the
U.S., the high-level cooperative agreement would hopefully give Congress a
reason to begin funding the SEI. In Russia, it would optimally provide an
incentive for the government to attempt to preserve hardware items that
could be used in the SEI.
Despite the long-term focus of the SEI, prompt action may be required
to make this strategy work. There is no particular hurry in the U.S., but two
time constraints are at work inside Russia. First, Russian space capabilities
are being steadily eroded as the space program shrinks-if the U.S. waits too
long, some capabilities may be lost. Just as important, the Russians are
currently attempting to set goals and priorities for their space program; at a
later date it may be more difficult to influence the direction of their space
program.
The major elements of the higher risk strategy are:
* Having the U.S. and Russian Presidents sign an agreement to
pursue long-term cooperation in the SEI. This agreement would mention the
elements of the strategy listed below. The European and Japanese space
agencies would also be asked to participate in the SEI.
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* Adopting a strategy of slowly expanding U.S. Russian
cooperative activity in the SEI, starting with small cooperative endeavors and
eventually building up to the use of Russian hardware in important SEI roles.
* Designating the U.S. Mars Observer and the Russian Mars '94
missions as the initial elements of the new, cooperative SEI. If possible, some
SEI-related U.S. instruments would be included in the Mars '94 mission.
* Initiation of a cooperative U.S./Russian research program on
nuclear thermal rockets, using Russian nuclear rocket test facilities. The goal
would be to develop and test a high performance nuclear thermal rocket for
use in the SEI.
* Signing an agreement to use the Energia as the heavy-lift vehicle
for the SEI, with the intent of preserving the Energia until it is needed. Other
means of preserving the Energia might include finding other payloads (such
as a redesigned space station) for it to launch and encouraging the Ukraine to
continue manufacturing the Zenit, at least in its form as the Energia's strap-
on booster.
* Cooperation with U.S. agencies and Russian designers in the
study of the Russian Topaz-2 reactor. The initial objective would be to
compare the ability of thermionic reactors based on the Topaz and
thermoelectric reactors produced in the SP-100 program in meeting SEI
requirements. Later decisions on reactor development would await better
definition of the SEI.
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* Assisting the Russians in carrying out life sciences
experimentation on Mir. This would include providing them with the same
equipment used in U.S. life sciences experiments and continuing ongoing
data exchange programs.
* Hiring Russian space station designers to aid in habitat and space
station design. Where necessary, Russian space station-related technology
would be incorporated into the design. The objective would be to gain from
the Russian experience in designing and operating space habitats.
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